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Abstract

This thesis begins with an examination of the context of nsk in which multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) are being drafted and implemented. Through a
discussion of the relationship between the characteristics of multinational corporations
and the phenomenon of globalisation, the impetus behind globalisation practices is
reveded. This is then contextualised with an examination of the contribution of the
chemical industry toward the parailel globalisations of production and environmental
h m . A discussion of trade and investrnent liberalisation instruments is then undertaken

to illustrate the current hierarchy between these instruments and MEAs. This analysis
reveals the present incompatibility of these instruments and suggests the need, nom an
environmental perspective, to reconceptualise the relationship. An examination of two
emerging chemical management conventions for Pnor Informed Consent and Persistent
Organic Pollutants m e r illustrates the difficulties in drafting environmentally effective
MEAs and discusses possibilities for change, such as the need to utilise a precautionary

approach. The thesis concludes by finding that the present hierarchy of interests, in
which MEAs are secondary to those of trade and investment instruments, must be
reversed in light of the serious implications of continuing to maintain the status quo.
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1.0 Introduction

The work of Ulrich Beck provides a basis for inquiring into the present purpose and
utiiity of international environmental law. His book, entitled Risk Sociew Towards o
New Modernifyl, characterises industrialised society as one in which "risk'"has become

the principal policy consideration. Under such a conceptualisation environmental law
becomes a means of both controlling and allocating risk.
We are therefore concerned no longer exclusively with making nature
usefid, or with releasing mankind fiom traditional constraints, but also and
essentially with problems resulting fiom techno-economic development
itself. ... Questions of the development and employment of technologies
(in the realms of nature, society and personality) are being eclipsed by
questions of the political and economic 'management' of the risks of
actually or potentially utilized technologies - discovering, administering,
acknowledging, avoiding or concealing such hazards with respect to
specidly defined horizons of relevance.3
For Beck the production of nsk is directly related to the production of weaith and,
therefore, the globalisation of industrial production has resulted in a globalisation of risk?
Because risk has traditionally been calculated in the context of spatial and temporal
markers, science and law that utilise these means fail to provide effective remedies
against risk and instead become sources for its legitimisation.5 This legitimisation
occurs when the inability to circumscribe risk with traditional means is not taken into
account in decision-making.
Along with the growing capacity of technical options...grows the
incalacuabiliiy of their consequences. Compared to these global
consequences the hazards of prirnary industrialimtion indeed belonged to
Iu. Beck, Rkk Society.- Towardi:a New Modernity, trans. M . Ritter (London: Sage, 1992).
2 ~ h term
e 'risksociety' is used to describe "the systematic way of dealing with h m & and insecurities
induced and introduced by modernization", ibid at 2 1.
31bid.at 19-20.

a different age. The dangers of highly developed nuclear and chernical
productive forces abolish the foundations and categories according to
which we have thought and acted to this point, such as space and time,
work and leisure tirne, factory and nation state, indeed even the borders
between continents. To put it differently, in the risk society the unknown
and unintended consequences corne to be a dominant force in history and
society.6

The work of Donald Wells' provides an explanation of how risk has traditionally been
assessed. He suggests that risk analysis is shaped by our linear perception of the
ecosystem, which characterises the ecosystem's reactions to intervention as logical,
incremental and predictablea

In contrast, a non-linear view recognises that the

ecosystem is sensitive to its initial conditions and, therefore, is dynamic, sensitive and
unpredictable in its reactions.9 From a linearist perspective, movement across the
threshold between acceptable and unacceptable risk produces incrementai and predictable
results.iO With a non-linearist perspective, the boundary is between order and chaos, and
when crossed, nonincremental and unpredictable results occur.ll

Based upon this

analysis, Wells suggests that environmental policies should be formulated in a context of
"substantial uncertainty".12

In addition to the observations of Beck and Wells, the perception of risk has also been
found to be shaped by extemal factors such as market forces, political pressures, and

61bid. at 22.

'D.T. Wells, Environmental PoIicy: A Global Perspeciivefor the Twenty-First Cenfury (Upper Saddle
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996).
8 ~ b i dat 186.
91bid at 187.
Iolbid at 188.
1 lbid
121bid at 189.

'

3
personal and professional biasesY By combining these three opinions an insight into the
factors which influence negotiatoa of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
can be obtained. Not only are negotiatoa influenced by the presence and perception of
risk as defined by science, but they are also faced with the influences of liberalised
market policies and extenial factors.

Therefore, the context of MEAS is one in which liberalisation policies not only globalise
the market but also nsk. This risk, being incapable of delineation with traditional means
of nsk analysis, is further compounded by the presence of extemal factors which
influence environmentai decision-rnakers. It can M e r be reasoned that the use of
international law as a means of globalising production, through trade and foreign direct
investment instruments, both supports and implicitly sanctions the globalisation of risk.
So how does this affect MEAs? If international environmental law is a means for
controlling and allocating risk, and if Beck and Wells are correct, then decision-making
on the basis of nsk assessrnent would appear to be futile. Perhaps international
environmental law needs to be designed to achieve new goals, predicated upon
preempting risk rather than merely managing it.

In order to reconceptualise international environmental law it must also be assessed

within its role of harmonising the competing perceptions of nature inherent in pnvate and
public environmental interests.14 international environinental law fulfils this role by
-.

"M.R Auer, "Risk Perception and International Environmental Affairs: The Organochlorine Debate
Behveen Sweden and Finland" (1997) 26(6) Ambio 359 at 362,
I41n this contexf a private interest refers to the perception of the naairal environment as being a nsource
available for exploitation using persona1 initiative. A public interest, in contmt, is one that perceives the
natural environment as a resource which should be utilised according to the principles of egalitarianism and
cornmunalism. See R. Cowling, "The Canadian Environment and the Politics of Public and Private
Domains: Environmental Policy in Theory and Practice" (January 1997) No. 236 ISS Working Paper Senes
at 2 [hereinaftet "Canadian Environment"].

determinhg the extent of access to global natural resources and thereby accommodathg
both the protection of nature, and the need to integrate environmental scarcity into
economic decision-maki.ng.15 It has been suggested that environmental policy needs to

be designed so as to explicitly recognise the social, economic and political necessity of
safeguarding both the cornpethg public and private interests, but to also provide a public
over-ride of the private interest, when the public interest is jeopardised.

I6

While such a

mechanism "rnust not be used recklessly" it could be useful when "the competing public
and pnvate interests cannot be reconciled, and where to allow the private interest to
supenede the public would result in unnecessary harrn to the natural environment".17 If
international environmental law were to advance such a goal for itself, in addition to a
need to move beyond its present fixation upon risk analysis, then this neo-law would
have to originate in a context where there is no doubt that private interests must, for the
good of the global environment, be subjugated to the public interest and that the harm not
merely be deferred, but prevented.

It is proposed that the realm of the chemical industry provides a forum for such an

analysis and discussion. The chemical industry, through its production of pesticides and
hazardous chemicais, illustrates the nature of globalised risk. These products have been
characterised by Beck in the following manner :
They induce systemic and often irreversible h m , generally remain
invisible, are based on causal interpretatiom, and thus initially only exist
in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them. 'ïhey
can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized or minimized within
knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social
definfion and construction. Hence the mass media and the scientific and
1 5 ~ .Siebert, "Trade Policy and Environmental Protection" (1996)The World Economy: Global Trade
Poi'y 183 at 1 83.
I6"Canadian Environment", supra note 14 at 14.

I71bid at 14-5.

Iegal professions in charge of defining risks become key social and
political positions. 18 (emphasis in original)
Furthennote, the management of pesticides and hazardous chemicals provides a good
example of the problems inherent in risk assessment. Risk assessment in this context has
been criticised on the basis that it seeks to describe a d e or acceptable level of use for
these productslg and in doing so, fails to take into account alternatives to their use.20

In conducting such an assessment of international environmental law the recent
negotiations of multilaterai chernical management instruments provide an example for
inquiring into the utility of MEAs. In undertaking this andysis, the chernical industry as
a contributor to the phenomenon of globalisation will be discussed, followed by an
l8lbid. at 22-3,
19h4. O'Brien. "Facing Down Pesticide Risk Assenment" (1994) 4(1) Global Pesticide Campaigner, cited

to (visited 27 August 1998) ~gopherJlgopher.igc.apc.org:2998/0PESTIS/r.904223210.24709.5> at 2. In
relation to the reliability of pesticide risk assessment, this author stated at page 2:
What is not scientifically defensible is a claim of "safety" for a pesticide that has not k e n
tested for al1 possible types of h m , for al1 types of physical conditions and al1 types of
organisms, by al1 routes of exposure, and in combination with al1 other toxic chemicals
those organisrns are encountering..At is impossible scientificatly to daim "safety" for
pesticides.
An example of the misleading nature of risk analysis in refation to pesticides can be found in a product
description of Bayer's Folidol Dust, produced in India, as "an effective insecticide which decomposes
completely in the environment without the slightest risk to humans or ânimals". Folidol is rnanufactured
from one of the most hazardous pesticides, Parathion, which is acutely toxic to the central nervous system
and has been linked both in developed and developing States with acute worker poisoning and deaths of
wildlife and fish.
M i l e it does ordinarily decompose rapidly in the environment, conditions of temperature
and hurnidity, especiaily in soi1 and water, can greatly slow the decomposition time.
See A. Wright, "Where does the Circle Begin? The Global Dangers of Pesticide Plants" (1994) 4(4) Global
Pesticide Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998)
< ophe~//gopher.igc.apc.org:2998/OPESTiS/r.92232
102470920> at 1-2.
O'Brien. ibid at 2. In addition. there is a large volume of literature which descnbes the ability to use
alternative practices, such as Integrated Pest Management (IPM). For a discussion of some alternatives see
M.A. Altieri, & C.I. Nicholls, "Indigenous and Modem Approaches to [PMin Latin America" (1997) 13(4)
ILEiA Newsletîer 6; W. Legg & M. Potier, "Reconciling Agricuiture and the Environment" (1998) No. 2 10
The OECD Observer 32; B. Libert, "The Transition of Baltic Agriculture" ( 1997) 26(7) Ambio 473; F.
Meerman, et al., "Integrated Pest Management: Smaliholders Fight Back with IPM" (1997) 13(4) ILEIA
Newsletter 4; T.W.Mew & M.B.Cohen, "Future Reseatch Priorities in International PIant Protection
Focus on Rice" (1995) 2(2) Agri. + Rural Dev. 24; G. Stoll, T r o p Protection in the 1990s" (1997) 13(4)
ILEIA Newsletter 10; LJ. Unnevehr, P.L. Pingali, & D.Zilberman, "Changing Pesticide Policies:
Introduction" (1997) 22(2) Food Pol'y 105; and, D. Zilberman, & K, Millock, "Financial Incentives and
Pesticide Use1' ( 1997) 2 ( 2 ) Food Pol'y 133.

8
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examination of international liberalisation policies. Together this will assist in the
coniextuaiisation of the global political environment in which the new conventions are
being drafted. This is then followed with an analysis of the two emerging chernical
management conventions on Pnor Infonned Consent and Persistent Organic Pollutants
and their (in)ability to remedy the present environmental harm caused by the use of toxic
chernicals and pesticides.

Suggestions are made to strengthen these chernical

management instruments through the introduction of stronger measures to control
industry's actions, thereby generating a public over-ride of private interests. In
conclusion, the need to redefine the hierarchy between MEAs, and tmde and investment
instruments is proposed.

2.0 A Potent Mù: MNCs, Chernicals and Globalisation
Globalisation is a complex process, in which the relationships between global acton are
affected by strategic, political, social, cultural and economic influence^,^^ and are
unhindered by temtorial and jurisdictional barriers?
Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human
organization and interaction to a transcontinental or Niterregio~lfevel. It
involves a stretching of social relations across t h e and space such that
day-to-day activities are increasingly S u e n c e d by events happening on
the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly
localised groups and institutions can have significant global
reverberations. Globalization is neither a singular condition nor a linear
process; neither is it a final end point of social change. Rather it is best
thought of as a multidimensiond phenornenon applicable to a variety of
forms of social action - econornic, politicai, cuitural - or sites of social
activity, like the environment? (emphasis in original)
In an econornic sense, it can be defined as "the increasing integration of international
markets" caused "by rapidly expanding worldwide flows of goods, services, capital,
information, and sometimes peoplefl.24 Globaiisation also concems the increasing
privatisation of the naturd environment as corporate enterprises increase their global
reach in search for components and markets for their products.

2 1 ~Tonelson,
.

"Globalization: The Great American Non-Debate" (1 997) 96(6 13) Current History 353 at

355.
U ~ .Rosenau,
~ .
"The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization" (1997) 96(613)

I

Current History

360 at 361.
2 3 ~ Goldblatt,
.
et al., "Economic Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting Balances of Power" (1997)

22 Alternatives 269 at 27 1.

24~onelson.supra note 2 1 at 353.

2.1 MNCs as Globalking Agents

Multinational corporations (MNCs)2S are perceived as the "driving impulse1Q6behind
globalisation and therefore, their interaction with, and cornmitment to, environmental
concems becomes paramount. An examination of the literature reveals that four MNC
characteristics can be linked to globalisation, and hence environmental deterioration:
their size and global power; their structural organisation; their inherent competitiveness;
and, their lack of regulation.

2.1. I MNC Size and Global Power
The first factor contributing to globalisation is the importance attributed to these acton
because of their size and global reach.27 Present in most states of the world, they conml
not only many advanced technologies and raw materials, but entire economic sectors.28
Currently the world economy is driven by approximately "20,000 MNCs [who] account
for between one-quarter and one-third of global output and 70 percent of international
traden,29 and, who are 5 1 of the 100 largest economies in the world.30

Additionally, it is important to recognise that MNCs, and not states, control a majority of
the world's natural resources as well as their production, distribution and marketing
25The term 'multinational corporation' is utilised in a broad manner, thereby encompassing transnational
corporations (TNCs) as weil. While at least one author has drawn a distinction between the two on the
basis that a TNC is one that "draws on global resources, management, production, and other capabilities"
this distinction is not required here, In this paper it is those enterprises that operate, in even a limited sense,
in more than one nation-state which are important. Quote cited fiom D.S.Papp, Conternporaty
International Relations: Frameworksfor Understanding,44th ed. (New York: Macmillan College, 1994) at
96. See also P.F. Drucker, "The Global Economy and the Nation-State" (1997) 76(5) Foreign Affairs 159
at t67-168.
2 6 ~ . Oman,
~.
"The Policy Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization" (1997) 40(2) Dev. 43 at 5 1.
27~app,
supra note 25 at 95.
281bid.at 96.
2g~oldblatt,supra note 23 at 277.
)@
Clarke,
I-.Silent Coup. Confionting the Big Business Takeovw of Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives and Jake Lorimer & Company, 1997) mereinafter Silent Coup].

activities,31 and by extension, the environmental impacts of these activities as well. In
fact, MNCs have k e n lauded as "the midwives of the new world economyn.3*

In the 1990s large business enterprises, even sorne smaller ones, have the
technological means and strategic vision to burst old b i t s - of time,
space, national boundaries, language, custom, and ideology. By acquiring
e a r t h - s p e g technologies, by developing products that can be produced
anywhere and sold everywhere, by spreading credit around the world, and
by connecting global c h a ~ e l of
s communication that can penetrate any
village or neighborhood, these institutions we normally think of as
economic rather than political, private rather than public, are becoming the
world empires of the twenty-first century.33

In short, contrary to what MNCs would have people believe, their decisions have
enormous national and political importance."

The fact that this power may not be

requested is irrelevant because it exists due to their size.35
In an econornic sense, multinational corporations cm make or break a
local economy and in the case of smaller states, even a national economy.
MNCs provide investment funds, jobs, advanced technologies, and
educational services...With their ability to move production facilities from
high labor-cost areas, MNCs have proven to be the groundworks on which
several national economic "miracles" such as Singapore, Hong Kong and
3 1 ~ u p p ofor
n this statement can be found in the opinion expressed in "TNCs and Globalisation: Prime
Sources of Worsening Ecological Crisis" (1997) 81/82 Third World Resurgence 12 at 13 [hereinafter
"TNCs"]:
that MNCs create more than half of the greenhouse gases emitted by industry;
that they have almost exclusive control over al1 production and use of CFCs and ODSs;
that they dominate and have intensified their mining activities;
that they control80% of global lands cuitivated for export crops, with only 20 fims accounting for
90% of pesticide sales;
that they "manufacture most of the world's chlorine" contained in several toxic substances (PCBs,
DDT and dioxins);
that they transport "envimnmentally unsound production systems, hazardous materials and pmducts"
to the South;
that they are the pdmary traders of natural resouces and commodities; and,
that they promote unsustainable living patterns though thei.advertising and product promotion.
3 2 ~ Barnet
~ . & J. Cavanagh, Global Dreomi: Imperiul Corporazionr and the New WorZC Or&r (New
York: Touchstone, 1995) at 15.
33~bid
at 14.
"~app, supm note 25 at 97.
35ibid at I 02.

Taiwan have based their prosperity..Because of their aggregate collective
holdings of currency, MNCs collectively have the ability to influence
exchange rates.36

2.1.2 MNC Organisational Structure

The second MNC characteristic is found in the structural organisation which they have
adapted over time. MNCs' growth and spatial expansion can be explained in relation to
three different time periods.37 In the f w MNCs operated in a mercantilist capacity a s
central nations withdrew comrnodities rnanufactured in peripheral nations."

This was

followed by a second period in which MNCs were concerned with extraction and
production and the third, current, period in which MNCs are engaged in an
internationalisation of capital and an integration of the world's labour forces9 This
change in MNC behaviour, between the second and third periods, can be partially
attributed to the changing global political structures of the past 60 yean. Prior to World
War II, MNCs operated in a vastly different political environment. At that time,

governments relied upon barriers to trade, and consumer preferences and industrial
standards differed between states.40 This made operating intemationally dificult and
therefore, MNCs operated with a national and decentralised organisational form.4 This
changed following the end of World War II as harmonisation took place in both
consumer preference and industrial standards, and trade barriers were decreased." This

was also the time when the General Agreement on Turzrs and Trode was adopted.43 This

36ibid.
at 102.
3 7 ~ Banerjee-Guha,
.
"Industriai Geography and Studies on

Multinational Corporations" (1998) XXXIII(4)

Economic and Political Weekly 159.
38ibidat 16 1.

39ibid
JQ~app,
supra note 25 at 97.

jlibid
42ibid.at 97.
43~eneral
Agreement on Tar@

and Trade, 30 October 1947.55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafier GATT 194q.

changing political environment provided a new opportunity for MNCs to expand their
reach, and they began to market and manufacture products making use of the additional
cheap raw materials and sources of labour now availab1e.M

Today, subsidiaries of MNCs tend to be organised geographically and are generally used
as conduits for the transfer of money and as generaton of made between t h e m ~ e l v e s ~ ~

In their desire to maximise profits MNCs cm minimise the cost of inputs, dominate a
state or regional market with a particular product, or find a more favourable political or
economic location for a s~bsidiary.~6This even extends to decisions of a parent
corporation to ignore a subsidiary if a host state's policies are unfavourable. Al1 of these
factors contribute to the realisation that MNCs are a difficult type of organisation to
control.47 Such an enterprise "has the ability to see the advantages of and to irnplement
policies that maximise the interests of the system, even if they corne at a cost of profits to
an individual subsidiary".48
The multinational enterprise is important because of its ability to move
resources across international boundaries. It is also important, in some
instances, as a transnational actor that makes decisions without regard to
the direct interests of its operations in any single country. It is equally
important because of the responses that it engenders fiom governments of
nation-states that react to its potential for weakening their contml.J9

In sum, it is their centralised structure which results in the diminution of state influence

over MNC decision-making.

"~app, s u p note 25 at 97.
Jr., ''The Multinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of International Organisation?" in
R.O. Keohane & J.S. Nye, Ir., eds., Transnational Relations and W d d Politics (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972) 97 at 105 Fereinafter "Multinational"].
&~app, supra note 25 at 100.
47"~ultinational",supra note 45 at 105.
481bid
jg1bid. at 113-4.

4 S ~ . Wells,
~ .

To host nations...oversight and centraiisation irnply a loss of control over
their own political, economic, and social destinies. With operations
overseen and decisions made for a subsidiary in a corporate headquarten
that may be half a world away, the governrnents and peoples of a host
state may legitimately question whether the decisions made by the MNCs'
management have the interests of the host state and its inhabitants at
heart.50

2.1.3 MNC Competitiveness
A further factor which influences globalisation is

MNC competitiveness.

As MNCs

strive to increase their global markets, they compete with nationaily-based corporations
whose own national environmental regulations may be more lenient and who have a

greater knowledge of local markets, consumers and governments.sl

MNCs have been known to consider the lower regulatory standards for pollution
abatement and environmental protection as an incentive for relocation, particulady for
"traditionally heavily polluting industries such as steel, non-ferrous metals, asbestos and
some toxic chemicais".s2 This phenornenon of corporate flight" was examined in an
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on
environmental policies and industrial competitiveness. This study concluded that the cost
to corporations to comply with environmental regulations had less impact upon their
decision-making than the factors of market access, raw materials, political stability,

"~app, supra note 25 at 104.
R.E. Lipsey, "The Competitiveness of Countries and their Multinational Firms" (1994)
No. 1 16 Reprint Series, Department of International Economics & Geography, Handelsh6gskoIan 1
Stockholm, reprinted fiom L. Eden & E.H. Potter, eds., Multinationals in rhe Global Political Economy
(New York: St. Martins Press, 1993) 129 at 129,
5 2 ~ El-Hinnawi
.
& M.H. Hashmi, The Srare of the Environment (London: Buttenvorths, 1987) at 168.
5 3 ~ htenn
e korporate flighttrefers to a corporate decision to relocate production facilities to a nation-state
with lower environmental regulations. See C. Stevens, "Synthesis Report: Environmental Policies and
Industrial Competitiveness" in OECD,Environmental Policies und Industriaf Competitiveness (Paris:
OECD, 1993) 7 at 1 1 [hereinafter "Synthesis Reportn].
5 1 ~ BlomsWm
.
&

infiastructure and transportation costs in a given host state." In fact environmental costs
were found to be less than those paid by industry for "labor, real estate, transportation,
energy, and tax considerations1'.5~While environmental regdatory costs do not appear to
motivate MNC relocation, industrial migration does occur within sectors as a result of
lower environmental standards,
Environmentally-dirty industries, particularly resources-based sectors,
have rnigrated over the 1 s t two decades to lower income countries with
weaker environmental standards; the result is a geographical shift in
production capacity within sectors with a consequent acceleration of
industrial pollution intensity in developing countries.56

The fourth factor contributing to globalisation is the (in)ability of states to regulate

MNCs. While states are certainly capable of legislating nationally in a manner which
they deem to be necessary, they are also influenced by several extemal factors, such as
their foreign debt burden and their international law comrnitments. Intemal and external
factors contribute to a states' ability to enact environrnental regulation and to enforce it.S7
Not only does a state require the intemal capability to develop an environmental policy,
and to enact it, but it M e r requires the fmancial, technical and infrastructural means to
implement it. Furthermore, a state must feel capable of such an enactment on an
international basis. Obligations, especially in the case of a foreign debt burderQ8 make
54~bid.
at 7.
5 S ~ Graham.
.

"Environmental Protection & the Statesw(1998) 16(1) The Brookings Rev. 22 at 23.
56''~ynthesisReport", supra note 53 at 1 1.
57~actors
which have been cited as influencing a state's implementation and cornpliance with
environmental regulation are: its physical conditions; history; culture; economy; political institutions;
public opinion; administrative capacity;leadership; NG Os (non-governmental organisations); know ledge
and information; epistemic communities; pre-existing traditions, legislation and regulations; and, the
international environment, including international momenturn. See H.K. Jacobson & E.B. Weiss,
"Strengthening Cornpliance with International Environmental Accords: Prelirninw Observations fiom a
Collaborative froject" (1995) 1 Global Gov. 119 at 144.
5 8 ~ oardiscussion of the environmental implications of foreign debt see P. Adams. Odious Deors: Loare
Lending, Corruption and the Thiid World'sEnvironmental Legacy (Toronto: Earthscan, t 99 1).

the implementation of environmental regdations impractical, if not impossible. The
result is that states balance the degree of environmental regulation which they are capable
of maintainhg and enforcing, against the costs of such a reguiation and its projected
relative success. In this regard the policy choices of developed and developing states will
Vary. Because the rnajority of transnational corporations are owned by citizens of
developed states," these governments are pressured and Iobbied to a greater extent to

make policies which are favourable to their corporate citizenry. In contrast, developing
states' govemments who act as a host to a MNC will find themselves in a different
situation, and may offer incentives as an inducement for a MNC to locate.

In an effort to control MNCs, governrnents have attempted to regulate them nationally in
various ways, such as by requiring a percentage of local ownership in a subsidiary."

In

addition they can attempt to control the amount of repatriation of profits from a
subsidiary, or the exports of certain types of capital and products.61 Some govemments
have even utilised blacklists or embargoes against particular MNCs.62

At the international level, the most eamest attempt began in the mid- 1970s when the

United Nations was approached by a group of developing states with the request that a
Code of Conduct be drafied to regulate MNCs.63 Work on a ciraft code was conducted by
the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) from 1977 to 1992,
consisting of 19 rounds of negotiationa

However, industry lobbying at the United

59~app,
supra note 25 at 106, where it is stated that out of the world's largest 44 MNCs, only one is based
in a developing state.
6016id at 107.
611bid
621bid.
63lbid. at 107.
"M. Finger & J. Kilcoyne, "Why Transnational Corporations are Organizing to 'Save the Global
Environment"' ( 1997) 27(4) The Ecologist 138 at 138-9.

Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), in 1992, was
successful in excluding any mention of the regulation of MNC activities fiom the fmai
text of Agenda 21-65 Not only were al1 the UNCED agreements silent with respect to any
regulation of MNCs,but the regulation of these entities was in fact decreased66 when the

UNCED secretariat "promoted self-regdation through a Business Council for Sustainable
Development1'.67 In 1993 the draft Code of Conduct for MNCs was rejected and the

UNCTC was closed.68

It is the fact that MNCs are private enterprises which makes the ability to regulate them

using international law difficult, but notwithstanding this, MNCs can be regulated by
international law in both direct and indirect ways.69 While international guidelines and
codes can provide non-binding direct ways to influence MNC decision-making,
international conventions can indirectly regulate MNCs by requiring their Parties to
implement national legislation in accordance with the convention's intent."

Indirect

regulation is problematic because the proper application of the instruments' pnnciples is
uncertain, and procedurally they are inadequate to meet the needs of environmental

65/bid.at 139 and also United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agendo
2 1: Programme of Actionfor Sustainable Development, UN Doc. NCONF. 15 Ii26IRev. 1 (Vol.I), cited to
(visited 4 December 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/habitat/agenda2 l> mereinafter Agenda 2 I l .
""TNCS", supra note 3 1 at 13.
67/bid
6 8 ~ Khor,
.
"Effects of Globalisation on Sustainable Development After LMCED" ( 1997) 81/82 Third
World Resurgence 5 at 10.
6 9 ~ . Hamilton,
~ .
"Regulation of Corporations Under International Environmental Law" (Address to the
Canadian Council on International Law, 19-2 1 October 1989, Ottawa, Ontario) in Canadian Council on
International Law, ed., Preserving the Global Environment: Proceedings of 1989 Conference of the
Canadian Council on International Law 72.
70~bid.
at 73-84. Examples cited for direct regulation are: the UN. draR Code of Conducr, the OECD
Guidefinesfir Multinational Enterprises, the international Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration on
Principles Concerning Multinafional Enterprka and Social Policy, and the ICC Environmental Gui&lines
for World Industry. The examples cited for indirect regulation are: the Trail Smelter decision, the Co&
Channel case, and the Basel Convention on the Control of TransbounabryMovements of H ~ a r d o u sWastes
and their Disposai. For a discussion of these international instruments and decisions see fbid

claims?

In addition, few states enact national legislation in accordance with their

international obligations, thereby leaving many MNCs free fiom regdation, and those
who do enact legislation, cannot apply it against those MNCs who operate outside of
their home state?

Recently international agreements have begun to place restrictions directly upon private
parties."

This hybrid form of instrument contains provisions which both directly

regulate MNCs and require member states to execute national legislation with the same
intentions.74 Examples of this type of instrument are the international conventions which
proscribe third party liability for nuclear darnage and oil pollution.75

An M e r illustration of the difficulty

in regulathg MNCs can be found in their recent

adoption of a 'green' facade. Since 1984, MNCs have been attempting to portray
themselves, not as the harbingers of environmental destruction, but as
environmentalists.76 Recognising the challenge of developing a global sustainable
economy, MNCs see themselves as agents of global progress:

...corporations are the only organisations with the resources, the
technology, the global reach, and, ultimately, the motivation to achieve
sustainability.77

7 5 ~ oardiscussion of these instruments see Section 5.4 of this thesis.

a discussion of the origins of the World Industry Council for the Environment, who lobbies on
environmental issues for industry, see P, Chattejee & M. Finger, The Emh Brokers: Power. Politics and
World Datelopment (London: Routledge, 1994) at 1 14.
7 7 ~ . Hart.,
~ . "BeyondGreening: Strategies for a Sustainable World" (1997) 75(1) Harv. Bus. Rev. 66 at 67.

Following UNCED, industry began to embrace sustainable development as a slogan and

aim for itself.
The Earth Summit marked the coming of age of corporate
environmentalism - the melding of ecological and economic globdisation
into a coherent ideology that has paved the way for the transnationals to
reconcile, in theory and rhetoric, their ubiquitous hunger for profits and
growth with the stark realities of poverty and environmentai destniction.78
While MNCs have instigated some changes in their technologies and practices which
have had a positive environmental effect, they have also allegedly been able to
"appropriate the language and images of ecology and sustainability" to their own
advantage, thereby slowing down the public pressure to make greater changes.79
Sustainable development.0 as a term, has also been coopted by transnational corporations
through their "absorbing the question of ecological sustainability into theu ovemding
agenda of economic globaii~ation".8~As another author has stated:
Sustainable development...has brought us to this point, where the rich
and powerful have become the self-appointed stewards of the welfare of
the masses and the environment in their global village, where concem for
the environment has become a critical way through which to claim that
political stewardship and the rïght to create the values which will govem
the human comrnunity."
As a slogan, sustainable development is used by corporations in the context of a need for

strong economic efficiency, rather than in c o ~ e c t i o nwith wider issues or a real

'*J. Karliner, "The Greening of Global Reach: Corporate Environmentalism Cornes of Age" ( 1997) 85
Third World Resurgence 6 at 7.
791bid
8"The term 'sustainable development' gained international acceptance after its appearance in 1987. It States:
a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments,
the orientation of technical development, and institutiona1 change are al1 in harmony and
enhance both current and friture potential to meet human needs and aspirations.
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987) at 46.
8i ~arliner,supra note 78 at 7.
"E.B. Ross, "Environment, Economy and Equity: Challenging the Consensus on Sustainabie
DeveIopment" (Address for SCHOLAS Public Lecture, 1 November 1996).

cornmitment toward change?

However, this confiscation of sustainable development

has worked in their favour, because public perception of MNCs has changed:
Industry ...enjoys an enhanced reputation as a force for environrnental
hprovement, with increasing public acceptance of the message that it is
possible to be both 'c1eant and profitable. Processes and products have
been rethought and, more and more, solutions appear which benefit both
the environment and product sales."

Part of this transformation can be attributed to the Business Council on Sustainable
Development (BCSD),a group of 48 chief executive officers, of some of the largest
corporations in the world, which later merged with the World Industry Council for the
Environment to form the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.8S A
publication released by the BCSD,pior to the Earth Summit, highlighted the four pillars
of corporate environrnentalism, and therefore, of sustainable development: open and
cornpetitive trade; pncing mechanisms to reflect environmental costs; self-regulation;
and, cleaner production and more efficient use of resources.86
The question is, are corporations really becoming more environmentally aware? While
corporations have begun to adopt voluntary environrnental standards,87corporate 'green'
executives Say that their greatest intemal contact and support cornes from legal,
production and public relations departments and their lowest with fuiancelaccounting and

Welford, "ïhe Big Brothers: Transnational Corporations, Trade Organizations
and Multi lateral Financial Institutions" in R. Wel for& ed., Hijacking Environmentaiism: Corporate
Responres to Sustainable Deveiopment (London: Earthscan, 1997) 137 at 152.
8 4 ~ . Long,
~ .
"Environmental Regulation: The Third Generationn(1 997) 206 The OECD Observer 14 at 15.
8s~arliner,supra note 78 at 8.
861bid. at 8.
8 7 ~ oardiscussion o f this pint see J. Nash & J. Ehrenfeld, "Code Green: Business Adop& Voluntary
Environmental Standards"(1996) 38(1) Env. 16.
8 8 ~ lames,
.
"What Makes a Green Executive?" (1996) 7(6) Our Planet 28 at 28.

8 3 ~ Casagrande,
.
Ir. & R.

This suggests that legislation and image remain the drivhg forces behind
environmental action and that most companies still pay too Iittle attention
to integrating the environment with the finances and people that make up
thei.IifebloodP
As such, the current trend of states toward deregdation of MNCs may be a big rnistake.

Having established the global context of MNCs, it is now possible to undertake an
examination of the chemical industry and its environmentai impact.

2.2 The ChemCaflndustry

In 1998 the chemical industry celebrated its past seventy-five years of progress?

This

industry in 1923 was "a handhil of companies that made organic compounds and
marketed them to users such as textile makers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
explosives producers", but since then the industryfs product range has diversified to
include petrochemical products, rubber, pharmaceuticals, paints, fertilisers, polymers,
textile dyes, artificial fibres, photographie products, pesticides, and napalm.9t

The global market for chemical sales for the world's top 50 chemical producers92 was
estimated at $383 billion in 1996P3 The global market for pesticides alone in that year
891bid
9 0 ~ oardiscussion of the changes in the chemical industry in the past seventy-five years see M.S. Reisch,
"75 Years of Industrial Progress: From Coal Tar to Crafting a Wealth of Diversity" (1998) 76(2) Chem. &
Eng. News 79.
91~bid.at 79,79-109.
9 2 ~ h e s eproducen, listed in descending rank by sales volume for 1996, are: BASF, Hoechsî, Bayer, Dow,
DuPont, Shell, Novartis, ICI, Exxon, Elf Aquitaine, Rhône-Poulenc, Dainippon Ink & Chemicals, Toray
Industries, Mitsubishi Chemical, Monsanto, Veba, Surnitorno Chernical, Norsk Hydro, ENI, Akzo Nobel,
General Electric, Union Carbide, Henkel, Formosa Plastics Group, Solvay, DSM, Amoco, Air Liquide,
SABIC, British Petroleum, Asahi Chemical, Showa Denko, Total, Eastman Chemical, Unilever, Huntsman
Corp., Occidental Petroleum, Praxair, BOC, Degussa, Sekusui Chemical, Zeneca, AlliedSignaI, Rohm and
Haas, Roche, Acro Chemical, Ashland, Mitsui Petrochemical, Air Products, and Mitsui Toatsu. See P.L.
Layman, "Slowdown for Global Top 50: Petrochemical Cycle Pulled Down Total Sales of World's Largest
Chernical Producers Last Year Following Strong 1995" (1997) 75(29) Chem. & Eng. News 15 at 16.
931bid at 15.

was $30 billion.% Even though total chernical sales had dropped by 3% for the world's

50 largest chernical producers in 1996P5 it did not stop economists fkom forecasting a
"rosy" 1997 for U.S. chemical producers, including projected growth in developing

Markets outside the US.offer the greatest growth potential for chernicals
and pharmaceuticals businesses (sic) over the long terrn. Many
companies are more willing to make investments in developing countries
because many of those counhies have embraced liberalized trade policies,
allow companies to take majority ownership positions, and permit
companies to take their profits home?
Even industry presidents subscribe to such a view, as DuPont's president and chief
executive officer, John A, Kr01 stated:
Countries worldwide would benefit from continued DuPont expansion, but
that will happen only if govemments reduce trade restraints, protect
intellectual property, and formulate rational environmental policies..P8
DuPont announced that it anticipates to "double its business in Central and Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa from around $650 million ...to $1.4 billion in

2000".w Part of the reason for industry expansion into the developing States is likely
attributable to the existence of Export Processing Zones which can provide advantages to
corporations through their physical, social and economic isolation from the host state. lm
W " ~Convention
~ ~ : on Dangerous Chernicals and Pesticides" (1998)28(2) Env. Pol'y & L. 75 at 76
hereinafier "Dangerous"] .
I5Layman, supro note 92 at 15.
%M. Reisch "Global Chemical Outlook Bright: Stmng Demand Will Especially Benefit US. Producers"
(1997)75(12) Chem.& Eng. News 1 l(1) at 1 l(1).
97~uotingRoger E. Brinner, executive director and chief economist for DRVMcGraw-Hill. Lexington.
Massachusetts, ibid
9 8 ~ u o t e to
d M. Resich, "lmprove Business Climates, DuPont Urges Governments" (1997)75(9) Chem. &
Eng. News 12(1) at 12(1).
991bid
or M e r information on Export Processing Zones, see: M. Barlow. "Maquiladoras of the North"
(October 1997)Cdn. Forum 9;A. Dowla, "Export Processing Zones in Bangladesh: The Economic Impact1'
(1997)XXXVII(6) Asian Survey 561; D.W.Eaton, "Transformation of the Maquiladora Industry: The
Driving Force Behind the Creation of a NAFTA Regional Economy" (1997) 14(3) Ariz. J. Intll& Comp. L.
746; E.A. Ellis, "Bordering on Disaster: A New Attempt to Control the Transboundary Effects of
Maquiladora Pollution" (1996)30 Val. U.L. Rev. 621;D. Keet, "Export Processing Zone: Strategies in the

The year 1997 did prove to be kind to the indutry, with the Asian financial crisis causing
little impact.lol Looking ahead at 1998, and using predictors such as forecasted G r o s
Domestic Product (GDP),consumer spending and innation, it has been said that this year
the industry may experience modest growth if there is no trade war arising fiom the
Asian currency cnsis and if the trends continue to follow the GDP. Io2 Initial reports for
the 30 major U.S.chemical producers, on the second quarter for 1998, show that there

has been a decline of 4% fiom last years' second quarter with sales falling 2% to a
combined $43.6 billion. '03

In addition to having a history of economic prowess, the chernical industry has one of
extensive environmental impacts. While some of these impacts are evidenced by the
aniline dye manufacturers of the 1800'~,10~
the spraying of DDT,IOS the continuing
production and manufacture of the pesticide methyl bromide,106 and the antics of the

Context of Regional Cooperation and Development, and a Globalized Economy" (1996) 26(4) AFn'ca
Insight 354; D.J.Smith, "Survey on Free Zones: How Far WiIl the Gulf's Ftee Zones Go?" (1998) 276 The
Middle East 37; L.S. Vanhoose, "Extemal Harms: Toyota, the Japanese "Maquiladora", and the Need for
Countries to Regulate Their Nationals Abroad" (1992-93) J. Nat. Res. & Env. L. 439; and, E.J. Williams,
"The Maquiladora Industry and Environmental Degradation in the United States - Mexico Borderlands"
(1996) 27 St. Mary's LJ. 765.
101"~acts
& Figures for the Chemical indumy" (29 June 1998) Chem. & Eng. News, cited to (visited 15
August 1998) <http://pu bs.acs.org/hotartci/cenear/980629/facts2.htm1~.
Io2"worldChemical Outlook" (1997) 75(20) Chem. & Eng. News 17. See this edition of the journal for a
more detailed analysis of the projected 1998 market for the global chemica1 industry.
lo3w.Storck, "Earnings Slump in Second Quarter: lmproved Productivity and Lower Costs Helped Hold
the Decline in Check" (1998) 76(33) Chem. & Eng. News, cited to (visited 26 August 1998)
<httpY/pubs.acs.org/isub~~riWjounial~i33/htmV7633bus
1.html#7633bus1tab 1>.
lMSeeAS. Travis, "Poisoned Groundwater and Contaminated Soil: The Tribulations and Tria1 of the First
Major Manufacturer of Aniline Dyes in Basel" (1997) 2(3) Env. Hist. 343.
OSsee R. Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).
lo6~ethy1
bromide, manufactured by giant corporations like Elf Autochem, is toxic to human health and
the environment.
The features which make methyl bromide "almost the perfect pesticide" - its high toxicity
to pests and its ability to penetrate fùmigated substances also increase its toxicity to
humans. Exposure to rnethyl bromide can cause acute damage to the centrai nervous
system, Iungs, kidneys, eyes and skin. In theù "risk assessment" research, scientists have
not found a dose of methyl bromide Iow enough for them to deem "safe".
Notwithstanding a recognition of this pesticide's hannfid effects, the industry has been:

-
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asbestos and rubber corporations,l07 its environmental impact can be more profoundly
illustrated by the production of pesticides.

The pesticide industry has production facilities in both developed and developing states,
but of the fi@

top chemical producers in the world only two originate kom developing

and newly industridised states.1°8 Some of the production facilities of the world's top

producers can be found in Brazil, India, China, Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, Venezuela,
Malaysia, Turkey, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand and Colombia.Iog

Larger

developing states such as BraP1, India and Mexico also produce their own pesticides for
domestic and exporting needs, using active ingredients purchased fiom other faci1ities.I Io

These products generally are those for which patent rights no longer exist, such as DDT
and Parathion.ul

While developing states account for only 25% of al1 worldwide

...lobbying hard for the Montreal Protocol to institute a later phase-out date for Third
World countries while simultaneously circumnavigating the globe to create thriving
methyl bromide markets throughout Asia, Africa and Latin Arnerica, in particular,
Mexico, Kenya, Morocco, Jordan and China. Global methyl bromide sales increased by
more than 50 percent from 1984 to 1992, growing fiom roughly 45,000 tonnes to more
than 75,000 tonnes.
See Elf Autochem, "There are Faster Routes to Building Your Molecules" (1997) 75(22) Chem. & Eng.
News, Back Cover, J. Karliner, A. Morales, & D. OfRourke, "The Barons of Bromide: The Corporate
Forces Behind Toxic Poisoning & Ozone Depletion" (1997) 27(3) The Ecologist 90 at 90-97- Methyl
bromide was one of the banned substances under the Montreal Protocol, see Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Delete the &one L q e r (as amended), 16 September 1987.26 1.L.M. 1550, cited to (1996)
2 1 Int'l Env. Rep. 3 15 1, article 2H mereinafter Montreal ProtocolJ.
l o 7 ~ oan
r account of the lobby against ending the trade in asbestos, see J. Harrod & V. Thorpe, Asbesfos:
Politics and Economics of a Lethal Produet (Geneva: international Federation of Chemical, Energy and
General Workers' Unions, 1984). See also an account of the rubber industry in J. Harrod, Health Hazarrds
in the Rubber Industty: An International Report (Brussels international Federation of Chemical, Energy
and General Workers' Unions, 1988).
Io8seefootnote 92. In this list al1 producers originate in the states of Germany, US., U.K., Netherlands,
France, Japan, Norway, Italy, Belgiwn, or Switzerland, except for Formosa Plastics Group fiom Taiwan,
and SABIC from Saudi Arabia.
109~righk
supra note 19 at 2-3.
l0lbid at 3-4.
llbid at 4.

pesticide use,l12 it is the danger associated with these products and the unregdated nature
of their expoa which is problematic.

The US.,a major pesticide producer, exported in 1996 a total of 687,601,508 pounds of
pesticides.113 This increased substantidly fiom the 100.4 million pounds exported in

1992.

14

However, these figures have been described as coaservativei'5 because:

...between

1992 and 1996, more than 2 billion pounds of pesticides left
U.S. ports with their specific chernical names omitted from publicly
accessible shipping records. In many cases the description is simply
"pesticide", or "weed killing compound"; in others, trade names or
abbreviations are used which cannot be found in publicly-accessible
pesticide dictionaries, reference books or online databases.1 l 6

In addition, for confidentiality reasons pesticide exporters can have their names withheld
from the Port Import Export Reporting Service transcripts.117 This means that the shipper
of an export will only be identified as "Order" in the port records. 1 18 In 1994 the volume
of pesticides shipped with the exporter identified as "Order" reached a total of 281.1
million pounds, nearly doubling fiom the 1992 volume.

l9

To compound this situation, at least 2 1 million pounds of the pesticides exported in 199596 were forbidden for use in the U.S.120 Pesticides c m be classified in severd different
12~. Knirsch, "Pesticide Life Cycle Analysis: A Case Study in Niger" (1 995) 5(1) Global Pesticide
Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998)
< opher?//gopher.igc.apc.org:2998/OPESïIS/r.904223210.247093 1> at 1.
C. Smith, "Exporting Risk: Pesticide Exports h m U.S. Portsn ( 1998) 8(2) Global Pesticide
Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998)
<gophetl//gopher.igc.apc.org:2998/OPESTfS/r.90422321024709.IO> mereinafier "Exporting"].
14c.
Smith, "Exporting Risk: Pesticide Exports from US. Ports 1992-94" (1996) 6(2) Global Pesticide
Campaigner, cited to (visited 27 August 1998)
<gopher?/lgopher.igc.apcpcorg:2998/0PESTI2232
10.24709.28> bereinafter "Exporting 1992-94"].
i151bid at 1.
I 16n~xporting".
supra note 113 at 1.
17"~xporting
1992-94", supra note 1 14 at 4.
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l 18ibid
l 19ibid

120'*~xporting",
supra note 1 13 at 1.

categories in relation to their permissible use within a state such as unregistered,
suspended, discontinued registration, restricted, severely restricted, or banned,

but this

does not affect their ability to be exported to other states. Between 1995-96, at least 14
tons of banned and unregistered pesticides, 8 tons of severely restricted pesticides, and

106 tons of restricted pesticides were exported from the U.S each day.122 The majority of
these pesticides were exported to developing states. '23

Developing states are generally il1 prepared to handle these compounds because of lower
worker safety rneasures and inappropriate storage and disposal methods.124 A case study
in Niger, concentrathg on three commonly used insecticides, found problems with
storage and transportation, deficiencies in labelling, packaging and product quality, and a
lack of safety equipment for workers such as rubber boots and face r n a s k ~ .In~ addition,
~~
the study found that manufacturers of the products had not complied with the
requirements for product responsibility found in the voluntary United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), International Code of Condm on the Distribution and

Use of Pesticides.126 Based on this information, it is not surprising that 50% of pesticiderelated illness and 72.5% of fatal pesticide poisonings occur in developing states. 12'

I 2 h eclassificationsof banned, restricted and severely restricted reflect the acceptable risk associated
with a pesticide's use based upon environmental and health considerations. A banned pesticide is one
which is forbidden for use, a restricted pesticide has certain restrictions placed upon who c m use the
chernical or in what context, and a severely restricted pesticide is one for which almost al1 uses have been
prohibited. For a discussion of a11 of these terms see "Exporting 1992-94", supra note f 14 at 1-2, and
"Exporting", supra note 1 13 at 4-5.
lU"~xponing",ibid at 4.
lulbia! at 1.
124Knirsch,supro note 1 12.
'Zlbid at 2- 3.
1261bidat 3-4. Also see Internoional Code of Conduct on the Distribulion and Use cf Perticidec (as
amended), t 985, cited CO H. Hohmann, ed., Basic Principles of International Emironmental Law, vol. 1
(London: Graham & Trotman, 1992) 173 hereinafter International Code]. The International Code is
discussed in Section 4.1 of this thesis.
127Knirsch,supra note 1 12 at 1.

Another problem faced by developing states is the need to destroy obsolete pesticide
stocks. It has been estimated that there are more than 100,000 tonnes of obsolete
pesticide stocks in developing states, many of which are highly toxic and persistent
compounds, such as "Aldrin, DDT,Dieldrin, Endrin, HCH, Lindane, Malathion, [and]
Parathion".12*

The $80 million required to clean-up these stocks has prirnarily corne from

a few developed states, although recently the chemical industry has agreed to "finance on
a case-by-case bais up to 30 percent of disposal co~ts".'~g

These examples highlight the dangers associated with the use of pesticides and also
demonstrate the intercomectedness between producers and users.

The chemical

industry's fiiture needs to be legaily shaped so as to balance the need for environmental
protection and human health, against the economic drive which these corporations
exhibit. The future of the chemical industry, fiom its own perspective, c m perhaps best
be stated using the words of Robert B. Shapiro, chairman and chief executive officer of
Monsanto Company. 130
The multinational corporation is an impressive innovation for dealing with
the tension between the application of broadly interesting ideas on the one
hand and economic and cultural differences on the other. Companies like
ours have gotten pretty good at figuring out how to operate in places
where we can make a living while remaining tme to some Cundamental
rules. As more countries enter the world economy, they are accepting with greater or lesser enthusiasm - that they are going to have to play by

1 2 8 ~FAO:
~ ~ Problem
,
of Obsolete Pmicide Stocks Desemes Greater Attention by Donor Countria and
fndusfry?Press Release 98/15 (1998), cited to (visited 27 August 1998)
~http~lw.fao.org/waicent/ois/press%5
Fne/presseng/ 1998/pren98 1 S.htm> at 1. The unique qua1i ties of
persistent organic pesticides are discussed in a Chapter 5.0 of the thesis. See footnote 587 and
accompanying text.
1291bid.at 2.
1301. Magretta, "Growth Through Global Sustainability: An Interview With Monsanto's CEO. Robert B.
Shapiro"(1997) 75(1) Harv. Bus. Rev. 78.

some rules that are new to them. My guess is that, over time,
sustainability is going to be one of those ruies.13'
What is troublesome is not the need for sustalliability, but that the chernical industry may

be allowed to define sustainability to match their own 'greent image.

2.3 Summing Up
The ability of MNCs to move globally according to their own preferences, while having
merit, also has obvious disadvantages, especially if environmental regulations are
permissive and therefore capable of being abused by corporate agendas. A main
contributor to this ability to relocate is the increasing liberalisation of trade and
investment policies. The fear is that the global trend toward harmonising liberalisation
policies "may create incentives for companies to relocate to jurisdictions with lower
levels of environmental regulation and lower cornpliance costsfl.132 While recognising
that liberalised capital and investment can aid in the move toward sustainable
development, some cal1 for the integration of environmental conditions directly into trade
agreements. 133 The merits of such an assertion will be examined next.

13'lbid at 88.
u2"~ynthesisReport" supra note 53 at 1 I .
Hudson, "Explonngthe Relationship Between Investment, Trade and Environment" in OECD,
Environmental Policies and Inhsrrial Compefifiveness(Paris: OECD, 1993) 130 at 130.

3.0 Liberalisation of Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
Liberalisation refers to policies which have been undertaken in an attempt to privatise
and deregulate the global market.

In such a conceptualisation, "production and

distribution are...organized in accordance with decentralimd, private-sector patterns
coordinated by the market," rather than in a centralised manner by govemrnentsP

The importance of examining trade and investment policies stems Eom the fact that these
policy decisions affect, not only the extent of "urban and rurai poverty, [the] globalization
of capital, and the survival of the state"i35 but the heaith of the global environment.
Therefore an analysis of the effects of liberalisation upon the environment, and the means
through which it is being expressed, will be undertaken.

3.1 Trade Versus Environment
A discussion of liberalisation requires an examination of the nexus between trade and the

state of the environment. It has been said that "trade policy is becoming the f o m for
deciding whether the global economy will be based on the ethics of sustainable
development or on laissez-faire market prin~iples"."~Therefore, trade liberalisation
becomes a focal point of any d e t e d a t i o n of the future of the global environment. The
fact that "trade liberalisation initiatives have been generally carried out without attention

i 3 4 ~ Ricupero,
.

"Privitization,the State and International Institutions" (1997) 50(2) J. Int'l Affairs 409 at

409.
i 3 S ~ . ~Chrisîy,
.
"Markets or Govemment? Balancing Imperfect and Complementaiy Alternatives" (1 996)
78(5) Amer. J. Agr. Econ, 1 145 at 1 155.
136T.Wathen, "A Guide to Trade and the Environment" in D. Zaelke, P. Orbuch & RF. Housman, eds.,
Trade and the Environment: Law.Economics, and Poiicy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 3 at 4.

to environmental efle~ts"I3~
M e r supports the need to advance academic discussion in

this area.

A prirnary liberaiisation policy is the promotion of free trade, which has been associated

with the dominant discourses of comparative advantage, internationalisation,
globalization and the growth of world markets.138 The term 'free trade' refers to the
"unlimited exchange of commerce between buyers and sellers across national borders"
and it is predicated upon the principle of comparative advantage.139 This economic
principie states that d l states should produce those products which they can produce most
efficiently, and trade these with other states for those products which are less efficient for
them to produce. Theoretically, such a system of trade results in an overall enhancement
of economic activity for al1 states.140

There has been a contentious academic debate sunounding the benefits of free trade in
relation to the environment. The two opposing views which have been advanced are that
free trade benefits the environment and conversely, that it harms it. Several arguments
c m generally be attributed to advocates of free trade, such as an opposition to
environmental measures that may be detrimental to corporate competition and advocating
for a harmonisation of environmental regutations.141 This is done in the belief that
increased trade will be beneficial to the environment because it will stimulate economic

I3'c. Stevens, "The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Re-emergence of
the Trade and Environment Debate" in D.Zaelke, P. Orbuch & R.F. Housman,eds., Trade and the
Environment: Law. Econornics. and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1993) 83 at 90.
13*~asagrande,
supra note 83 at 137.
1 3 g ~ a t h e nsupro
,
note 136 at 5.
140/bid,and United Nations, The Global Partnershipfir Envirotment and Devdopmenf: A Guide to
A enda 21, Posf Rio Edition (New York: United Nations, 1993 ) at 48.
Wathen, supra note 136 at 10.

d'

development and irnprove environmental protection. 142 Advocates also assert that open
markets will lead to a more efficient use of naturd resources "by utilizing economies of
scale, penalizing overproduction, and eliminating subsidies" and, advocate the
intemalisation of environmental costs in product prices through the use of "process
standards, pollution taxes and pollution permit[~]".~uInternational business is a
supporter of fiee trade:
Internationally cornpetitive business believes that open markets are the
most - and perhaps only - effective stimulus to the development of new
products and technologies needed to both lower costs and to promote
wider use of products and processes that will reduce environmentally
destructive and wasteful practices. Open trade, buttressed by
multilaterally agreed-upon rules that constrain arbitrary government
actions, is the best way to assure that markets are in fact open to
cornpetition-1"

In contrast, some opponents of fiee trade fear increases in corporate flight to states with
lower environrnental standards, and that specialisation, as a consequence of comparative
advantage, will continue to focus developing states upon exports of cornrnodities, which

can be detnmental to the enviroment.145 Contrary to the assertions of free trade
advocates, environrnentalists also believe that fiee trade will hurt the environment unless
sustainable development principles are intenvoven into trade policy.146 In addition, they
assert that a fiee trade system may serve to decrease existing environmental protection if
a harmonisation of international environmental regulations should result. This is because

1 4 Z ~ a t h e nsupra
,
note 136 at 18.
143~bid
at 1O, 1 8.
1 4 4 ~Morris,
~ . "A Business Perspective on Trade and the Environment" in D. Zaelke, P-Orbuch & R.F.
Housman, eds., Trade and the Environment Law,Economics, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island Press,
1993) 121 at 123.
1 4 5 ~ a t h e nsupra
,
note 136 at 10.
i 4 6 ~ 6 i dat 18.

harmonisation may serve to lower environmental standards in order to accommodate the
interests of business and developing States. 147

A third position present in the literature is that trade and environmental concerns are not

mutually exclusive.
There are few inherent conflicts between Iiberal trade and environmental
protection. Many of the apparent conflicts aise either because countries
have failed to take appropriate domestic environmental protection
measures, in which case trade can be the agent but not the root cause of
environmental degradation, or because the persistence of irnport barriers
and subsidies themselves misallocates the use of environmental and
natural resources. Environmentally motivated trade restrictions will not
solve these conflicts.148
In this third position, free trade advocates and opponents are described as having the
same economic ideal: that of making the most efficient use of natural resources.
Trade liberalization seeks to achieve this goal by allowing countries to
specialize more fùlly in producing goods and services in which they have
a comparative advantage, and by allowing consumers to purchase goods
and services from countries that produce them most efficiently.
Environmental regulation seeks to achieve the same efficiency goal by
ensuring that the full incremental costs of production and consurnption,
including costs imposed on other parties through environmental impacts,
are reflected in the decisions that producen and consumers face.149

14'1bid at 1O.
I4*C.s. Pearson, "TheTrade and Environment Nexus: What is New Since '72"in D, Zaelke, P. Orbuch Br
R.F. Housman, eds., Trade and the Environment: Law, Econornics, and Policy (Washington, D.C.:Island
Press, 1993) 23 at 32.
1 4 9 ~ Repetto,
.
"ComplementariesBetween Trade and Environment Policies" in D. ZaeIke, P. Orbuch &
R.F. Housman, eds., Trade andthe Environmenri Law, Economics, and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Island
Press, 1993) 237 at 237.

One author has suggested that an integration of international trade and environmental
policy making rnay be the fust step toward improving environmentai protection.Is0 This
is based upon the observation that there may be a positive relationship between
competitiveness and environmental quaiity.151 This finding was made in a case study of

Australia, where "there appear to be economic incentives in the industry, and its markets,
that enhance environmental quality, which in turn enhances companies' international
competitiveness".~52 However, how to intepte these two realms remains unclear, and
would likely have to begin with a sufficient nurnber of GATT and World Trade
Organisation (WTO)member states expressing such a desire. 153 The author does caution
that this hypothesis requires more investigation before it is used to replace the current

presumption that corporations located in states with greater environmental protection are
less cornpetitive. 154

This review of the literature reveals that there is a central position between the two
polarised positions of free trade advocate and free trade opponent. If there is to be any
change in thk mutuai antagonism it must, of necessity, corne from the international arena,
because it is from here that the dominant trends towards the liberalisation of trade and
investrnent are coming.

Therefore, what is currently lacking intemationaily is an integration between trade and
investment liberalisation, and sustainable development.155 This lack of integration has
I 5 O ~ . ~Clark,
.
"Global Cornpetition and Envuonmental Regdation: 1s the 'Race to the Bottom' Inevitable?"
in R. Eckersley, ed., Mwkets, The State and the Envimnmen~Tuwards Integtarion (London: Macmillan
Press, 1996) 229.
15' lbid. at 247.
I5*1bid at 250.
i531bîd at 247.
i541bid at 253.
1 5 5 ~ . Gontales,
~.
"Trade, Invesmient and Sustainable Development" ( 1 997) 7(4) Dev. Alternatives 8.

32
been attributed to a contiming separation and compartmentaiisation of environment,
development, trade and economic policy concems, whether within govemmental

ministries, or amongst intergovermnental organisations.156 In addition, a failure to
incorporate all relevant actors into the policy integration process and a lack of political
will to integrate these policy concerns have resulted in this outcome.ls7

It would appear that the challenge for govemments is not to lean too far in either
direction (trade versus environment) but instead to recognise that these two policy
directions need not be antithetical and therefore, to "design and implement mutually
supportive policies". 158 As another author has said:

...the question really becomes not whether trade is bad for the environment
but whether there are sufficient international safeguards that can
encourage sustainable trade and discourage trade that is environmentally
destructive. 159
It is to an analysis of the current trade and investment initiatives that the discussion now
turns.

3.2 GATT and the WTO:
Intemationally the tems of trade have pnmarily been set by the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), and more recently, the World Trade Organisation
(WTO). In an effort to restore economic activity after World War II, governments
needed to re-establish international trade. This was dificult due to the use of high tariffs

i561bid

1571bid,
at 8.
i 5 8 ~ Eglin,
.
"Enlistingthe Suppon of Liberal Trade for Environmental Protection and Sustainable
Development" (1993) 23 Env. L.697 at 697.
lSg.l.~.
Nissen, "Achievinga Balance Between Trade and the Environment: The Need to Amend the
WTO/GATT to Include Multilateral Environmentai Agreements" (1997) 28(3) L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 90 1 at
903.

placed upon imported goods and quota restrictions.160 For this reason, it was decided that
a multilateral trade agreement was required, and GA ïT 1947 6 1 was negotiated.

GATT 1917 entered into force on January 1, 1948,162 and "is [a] major multilateral
agreement on trade rules, providing a framework for international trade policy and a
forum for trade disputes".1s It was premised upon three key ideas: that tanffs should be

reduced; that there be non-discrimination amongst GATT 1947 members; and that there

be a transparency of non-tariff barrien to trade.164

GATT 1947 was originally only intended to be a provisional agreement until the

International Trade Organisation (ITO) agreements were signed. l65 Later, when the ITO
agreements failed to be ratified, GATT 1947 became an "dl-purpose trade treaty".166

Since 1947, the GATT 1947 has been amended on various occasions with the most recent,
and eighth round of negotiations, beginning in 1986. The premise behind these
negotiations, also known as the Uruguay Round, was that continued expansion and
liberalisation of trade was necessary for al1 States.
The growth of worid trade and financial flows over many years has
provided an important basis for the development of nations; in the past
year it has provided virtually al1 growth in the industrial nations. The
opportunity to enhance the contribution of trade to overall economic
activity in the decades to corne, through providing greater stability by
6 0 ~ . ~H.udec, Enforcing hternationaf Traie Law: The Evohtion of zhe Modern GA TT Legai System
(Salem, New Hampshire: Butterworth Legal, 1993) at 4.
I 6 b ~ 7 1947,
T
s u p note 43.
1 6 2 ~GroOmann,
.
"Fi@ Years of GATT" (January/Februaiy 1998) Intereconomics 1 at 1.
163~ a t h e nsupra
,
note 136 at 6.
1641bidat 1 1.
1 6 5 ~Stiles,
.
"Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT,and the WTO" (1996) 2
Global Gov. 119 at 121.
'%1bid. at 121.

updating and strengthening rnultilateral trading d e s and liberalized trade
in al1 secton is within grasp.167
States were also warned of the dangers of failing to complete the Uruguay Round
negotiations:
Failure to conclude would validate the rishg wave of protectionist rhetoric
and increase the danger of a vicious circle in which heightened
protectionkm irnpedes economic recovery, and the lack of recovery in
tum feeds protectionist pressure. Experïence shows that defensive
measures to protect sensitive industries may preserve jobs in those
industries for a short tirne, but will destroy jobs elsewhere - nationally and
globally - through increased prices and taxes, lower wages, and lower job
growth. Liberal trade, based on clear and predictable d e s , on the other
hand, leads to a virtuous circle of lower prices, higher wages, and more
vigorous job growth.1"
States obviously heeded this advice as the Uruguay Round negotiations were concluded
on December 15, 1993.169 The new multilateral trade agreement, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the

Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiationsl70 sets both the

structure of international trade law and has sought "to further the goal of free
international tradew.I7' To this end, new multilateral rules for the conduct of trade in
services, intellectual property, agriculture, and textiles and clothing, were includedY2
The negotiations also resulted in a proposal for the WTO "which would finaliy fiIl the
gap in the post-war econornic reconstruction established at Bretton Woods".[n

i 6 7 ~ Media
~ ~ Relations
~ ,
Division, "Bretton Woods Institutions Urge
Decisive Action to Conclude the
Uruguay Round" (1993) 102 Focus: GATT Newsletter 1 at 3.
1681bid,at 3.
1 6 9 ~
Media
~ Relations
~ ~ , Division, "Success! The Most Comprehensive Round Ever is Concluded"
( 1993) 1O4 Focus: GATT Newsletter 1 at 1 Fereinafter llSuccessl'].
7 0 ~ i n aAct
i Enrbodying the Resuits of the Uruguay Round of MuItifateraf Trcde Negotiatiom, 1 5 Aprïl
1994, (1994) 33 1.L.M. 1 143, cited to (visited August 16, 1998)
<http://www.wto.or~Wto~egavfinaIact.ht
[hereinafier Final Acf].
1 7 1 ~ .Schoenbaum,
~.
"International Trade and Protection of the Envimnrnent: The Continuing Search for
Reconciliation" (1997) 9 1 Amer. J. Int'l LI268 at 271.
supra note 169 at 2.
172"~uccess",

731bid

The WTO was oficially established on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco, when
more than one hundred govemment Ministers signed the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round.174 The Final Act contains 28 agreements and is estirnated will "add some U.S.

$755 billion to world exports and raise incomes by some $235 billion anouallyt1.~7s

The WTO is an umbrella organisation designed to administer GATT and other
international trade agreements.176 The WTû's role is to "oversee the implementation of
the Round's results, administer al1 the agreements in goods, services and intellectual
property, and mange the unified dispute senlement system", as well as raising the
political profile of trade and acting as a forum for future trade negotiationsY7 The
legally-binding rules of the WTO has led it to be characterised as evidence of the
increasing institutionalisation of the globalisation process.178

In a speech by His Majesty King Hassan II, at the closing of the signing ceremony for the

Final Act, the environment is mentioned as a challenge which requires further
consideration:
By bringing into being the World Trade Organization today, we are
enshrining the rule of law in international economic and trade relations,
thus setting universal d e s and disciplines over the temptations of
unilateralisrn and the law of the jungle ...Regardless of the size of our
economies, fiom now on we shall al1 enjoy the sarne rights and be subject
to the same obligations. We share the same goals and must meet the same
challenges: tackling the scourge of unemployment, redressing the problem

I7%~TT,
Media Relations Division, "The WTO 1s Born"(1994) 107 Focus: GATT Newsletter 1 at 1
[hereinafter "WTO 1s Born"], and Finui Act, supra note 1 70.
17511WT0
1s Born", ibid
1 7 6 ~Snoderly,
.~.
"Clearing the Air: Environmental Regulation, Dispute Resolution, and Domestic
Sovereignty Under the World Trade Organization"(1996) 22(1) N.C.J. Int'l L. & Corn. Reg. 24 1 at 242.
1 7 7 ~Sutherland.,
.
"Global Trade - The Next Challenge"(1994) 105 Focus: GATT Newsletter 5 at 5.
178"~lobalisation
Must be Brought Under UN Fmework" (1 997) 8 1/82 Third World Resurgence 40 at 4 1.

of social exclusion, or hding appropnate ways of responding to Our
environmental and other concems.179

The environment, as an issue, was not a concem to original GAZT 1947 negotiators, and
as such, the word does not appear in the te~t.'~OEnvironmental issues were only a
concern for a member state who believed that another member's environmental
regulations adversely affected them. In such an instance, they could request that the
matter be resolved through GATT I9V.s dispute resolution process, in an attempt to fmd

the regulation invalid by virtue of its inconsistency with GA ïT 1947's trade rule~.~gl

The Final Act also did not result in the inclusion of any provisions dealing specifically

with the environ ment,'^ even though negotiators did recognise that "it was no longer
redistic for GATT representatives to leave environmental issues to environmentai experts
because trade and environrnental issues now often intersect".lg3 The Preamble of the
Agreement Establishing the WorZd Trade Organization states:

...relations

in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, enswing full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing
so in a marner consistent with their respective needs and concems at
different levels of economic development. ls4
i 7 9 ~ .King
~ . Hassan II, Address (GATTMinisterial Conference, 15 April 1994) as quoted in G A m ,
Media Relations Division, "WTO:Rule o f Law in Economic Relations" (1994) 107 Focus: GATT
Newsletter 4 at 4.
'**~athen,supra note 136 at 13.
l ~noderly,s&wa note 176 at 244.
l 821bid at 245.
i 8 3 ~Media
~ ~ Relations
~ ,
Division, "GATTStans Follow-up of Eanh Summit Results" (1993) 101
Focus: GATT Newsletter 10 at 10.
i84~greement
Estabfbhingthe Wodd Traak Organkation, Finai Act Ernbodyng the R~erulrsof the U m p q
Round ofMulriIateraf Trade Negotiations, I 5 Apri 1 1994, ( 1994) 33 I L . M. 1 1 44.

Through a Ministerial Decision, adopted at M d e s h on April 14, 1994, a Comrnittee
on Trade and Environment (CE)was estabIished.'Ss The mandate of the CTE is to

make recommendations for d e s to promote sustainable development through a positive
relationship between trade and environmental measures. [fi6

The work of the CTE was constrained by only two parameters: f a that the mandate of
the WTO must not be exceeded, as it extends oniy to trade, and second, that if problems
of policy CO-ordinationbetween trade and environmental concerns were to arise, that
trade would prevail. Es7 M e r two years of deliberation the CTE reported their progress at
the first WTO Ministenal Conference in December 1996.

The report, which discussed

the debates within the CTE and the opinions of its members, has been descnbed in the
following manner: "[tlhere is very little analysis and evaluation and virtually no

l f i ~ e c ~ ion
o nTra& ami Environment, Final Act Embodyng the Resuftsof the Uruguay Round of
Multitateraf Trade Negotiations, 14 April 1994, (1994) 33 C.L.M. 1267, preamble [hereinafter Minhteriaf
Decision].
186~choenbaum,
supra note 171 at 269. This mandate included:
(a) to identiQ the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, in
order to promote sustainable development;
(b) to make appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions
of the multilateral trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable and
non-discriminatory nature of the system, as regards, in particular:
the need for ru les to enhance positive interaction between trade and environmental
measures, for the promotion of sustainable development, with special consideration
to the needs of developing countries, in particular those of the least developed
among them; and
the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and the adherence to effective
muitilateral disciplines to ensure responsiveness of the multilateral trading system
to environmental objectives set forth in Agenda 2 1 and the Rio Declaration, in
particular Principle 12; and
surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-re Iated
aspects of environmental measures which have signifiant trade effects, and of
effective implementation of the multilateral disciplines goveming those rneasures;
Minkterial Decision, supra note 185 at 1268.
l S 7 ~ ~ TMedia
T , Relations Division, "WTO Briefing: Trade and Environment" (1994) 107 Focus: GATT
Newsletter 15 at 1S.
[Ss~choenbaum,supra note 171 at 269.

recommendations for specific actionst'.189 The CTE as an avenue for change therefore
f i o r d s little hope fiom an environmentalist vantage point. The fact that the WTO has
recognised the importance of environmental issues at d l has been attributed to the
general acceptance of trade liberalisation as a means of producing "a coordinated policy
response to environmental problems by allocating scarce resources, including
environmental resources, more efficientiy and by generating ~ e a l t h " . ~ ~

While the Final Act does not preclude states fkom implementing extensive environmental
regulations, it will not allow trade measures to be used to enforce domestic environmentai
regdations where they create an unnecessary barrier to trade. This prernise is contained

within three GA 7T 1991 provis ions: most- favoured-nation; national treatment; and, nondiscrimination, which state:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international
transfer of payrnents for imports or exports, and with respect to the
method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to al1 niles
and formaiities in connection with importation and exportation, and with
respect to al1 matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any
advantage, favour, pnvilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the temtories of al1 other contracting parties.

III. The contracting parties recognize that interna1 taxes and other intemal
charges, and laws, regdations and requirements af3ecting the intemal sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and intemal
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of
products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to

1891bid.
at 270.
I g O ~ ~ ' T TMedia
,
Relations Division, "RoundResults Build Basis for Environmental Protection and
Sustainable Development"(1994) 109 Focus: GATT Newsletter 2 at 2.

irnported or domestic products so as to f i o r d protection to domestic
production.

XIII. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the temtory of any other
contracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the
temtory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the like
product of ail third countries or the exportation of the Like product to ail
third countries is sirnilarly prohibited or re~tricted.'~~

The interpretation of these articles must be made in accordance with the exceptions
contained within GATT 1994 Article XX, which allows States to justify national
environmental legislative measures which rnay appear to be a consaaint on trade.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measwes:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or c o n ~ u m p t i o n ; ~ ~ ~

The interpretation of these articles by GATT and WTO Panels, such as in the Tuna-

Dolphin II case and the Reforrnulated Gasoline case,193 indicate that the narrow
l9 l ~eneral
Agreement on Tor,@s ami Trade 1994, Final Act Embodjing the Resulrs of the Uruguay Round
of Multifateral Trade Negoriatiom, Annex lA: MultifateralAgreements on Trude in Gooak, 15 April 1994,
(1994)33 I.L.M. 1 154,cited to (visited August 16, 1998) <http://www.wto.orglwto~egavf?nalact.ht at
articles I, III, XIII [hereinafter GA7T 19941.
1921bidat article XX.
193Thesecases are briefiy mentioned here as they have already k e n extensively dealt with in other
academic papers. For a full discussion of these cases the reader is referred to: M. Meier, "GATT, WTO,
and the Environment: To What Extent Do GAîT/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations to Protect the
Environment When Doing So Adversely Affects Trade?" ( 1997) 8(2) Colo. J. Int'l Env, L. & Pol'y 24 1;
Schoenbaum, supra note 171 ; Snoderly, supra note 176; J. Waincymer, "International Economic Law and
the Interface Between Trade and Environmental Regulation" (1998)7(1) J. Int'l Trade & Econ. Dev. 3; and
R J . Zedalis, "The Environment and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement: Did the Reformuluted
Gasoline Panel Miss A Golden Opportunity" (1997) Neth. intll L. Rev. 186.

interpretation of article XX exceptions affords little relief for states who legislate to
protect the environment but in doing so, place limitations upon trade. The Tuna-Dolphn

II case dealt with a United States ban on the importation of tuna caught with drift-nets
which were dangerous to dolphins. The Reformulated Gasoline case deait with the
imposition by the United States of gasoline standards which adversely irnpacted upon
non-Amencan producers. In general, the Panels of these cases held that states cannot
unilaterally impose measures with extratemtorial effects when aitemative measures,
which do not arbitrarïly or unjustifiably restrict trade, are available to them.194

The recent WTO Panel decision, United States - Irnport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products,l9* provides another illustration of the impact of GAïT 1994 upon
environrnental decision-making. Following the recognition that sea turtlesl96 were
subject to incidentai capture during the process of shrimp trawling, the United States
enacted legislation, in 1973, requiring shrimpers to employ the use of turtle excluder
devices. This was later followed in 1989 with the enactment of Section 609 of Public
Law 10 1-162, which in combination with guidelines issued in 1991, 1993 and 1996,
prohibited the importation of shrimp after May 1, 1996, f?om al1 states which harvested
wild shrimp with technology which might adversely affect sea t u r t l e ~ . I ~ ~

Iwsee articles cited in footnote 193.
Ig5~nited~tate.s
- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrinp undshrimp Products (India, et al v. United States)
(1W8), WTIDSSUR, cited to (visited 16 August 1998) <httpY/www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.h~~
[hereinafterShrimpSea Turtle Decision].
19%eatunles are recognised by the international community as deserving of protection as they are an
endangered, or threatened species. They are listed in Appendix 1 of the 1973 Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species, in Appendices I and II of the 1979 Corneniion on Migratory Species of Wild
Animais and in the IUCN Red List. See ShrimpSea Turtle Decision, ibid at paragraph 2.1-2.3.
197~bid.
at paragraphs 7.1-7.4.

India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand claimed that the United States legislation was a
violation of GATT 1994 article XI: 1,198 and the United States, having conceded that their
legislation did violate this article, premised their defence upon the exceptions within
article m ( b ) and

(g).l99

In the ShrimpSecl Turtle Decision, the Panel referenced both

previous decisions and the GATT 1994 text, to fmd that article XI: 1 had been v i o l a t e p
and that the legislation could not be defended under the exceptions found within article

XXlol This latter finding focused upon the correct interpretation of the chapeau of
article XX,and the Panel stated:

...we are of the opinion that the chapeau Article XX,interpreted within its
context and in the light of the object and purpose of GATT and of the
WTO Agreement, only allows members to derogate from GATT
provisions so long as, in doing so7 they do not undermine the WTO
multilateral trading system, thus abusing the exceptions contained in
Article XX ...
In our view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be
followed which would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning
access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the exporting
Members of certain policies, including conservation policies, GATT 1994
and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral
frarnework for trade among Members as security and predictability of
trade relations under those agreements would be threatened.202

In response to the United States' assertion that its legislation was justifiable by reference
to international agreements allowing for trade bans to protect animals, whether located
Ig8'Thisarticle States:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale of any product destined for the
temtory of any other contracting party.
GATT 1994, supra note 19 1 at article XI(1). See also ibid. at paragraph 3.1.
Ig91bidat paragraph 3 3 .
2oofbida paragraphs 7.1 1 17.
201fbidat paragraphs 7-24-62.
202fbidat paragraphs 7.44,7.45.

-

within or outside a states' jurisdiction, the Panel noted that there was no international
agreement which required them to place an import ban on shrimp to protect sea wtles.203

In conclusion the Panel stated:

Our fmdings with respect to international noms cofim our reasoning
regarding the WTO Agreement and GATT. General international law and
international environmental law clearly favour the use of negotiated
instruments rather than unilateral measures when addressing
transboundary or global environmental problems, particularly when
developing countries are concemed. Hence a negotiated solution is clearly
to be preferred, both nom a WTO and an international environmental law
perspective. However, Our findings do not imply that recouse to
unilateral measures is always excluded, particularly after senous attempts
have been made to negotiate; nor do they imply that, in any given case,
they would be permitted. Nevertheless, in the present case, even though
the situation of turtles is a serious one, we consider that the United States
adopted measures which, irrespective of their environmental purpose,
were clearly a threat to the multilateral trading system and were applied
without any serious attempt to reach, beforehand, a negotiated solution.2~

This decision reinforces the WTO position that generally states may only restrict trade on
environmental grounds when there is a previously negotiated environrnental agreement
upon which it is premised. This is a difficult position for states wishing to implement
legislative measures for environmental protection and an impossible one given the nature
of environmental issues. It is impossible to have the specificity of coverage for
environmental harms to be legislatively anticipated. The fact that internationally sea
turtles are recognised as endangered but are still not adequately covered by a MEA, from
a WTO perspective, is indicative of this. If the chapeau to article XX is to be given such
a restrictive interpretation, than how will parties be able to make use of the exceptions

within the article itself.
2*3?bid at paragraph 7.50.
2al?bidat paragraph 7.6 1.

In some instances the threat of a trade dispute may be enough to get a state to change its
restrictions, as occurred when the United States placed an import ban on European whes
containhg procymidone, a Japanese manufacturecl fungicide.205 This fungicide, not
approved in the United States, caused a trade dispute until the United States decided to
set an interim tolerance for the fungicide residue, thereby pennitting the importation of

The EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] determined that the
economic impact of not establishing an interim tolerance for procymidone
would be severe. The ban of these imported wines would be detrimental
to the producers, importers, and distributors of the product and would
disrupt the U.S. balance of tmde.207
Preliminary assessments on the fungicide had indicated that it was carcinogenic, and had
effects on reproduction and the development of reproductive organs.208

At the Uruguay Round, two supplemental agreements to GATT 1994 were also
e
of
negotiated which have environmental consequences: the Agreement on ~ h Application
Saniiary and Phyîosanitary M e a s u r e P and the Agreement on Technical Burriers to

Tradez'o.

The International Implications of Pesticide Regulation and the Need for Hannonized
Environmental Law" (1992) l(2) Dickinson J. Env. L. & Pol'y 1 17 at 121, and B.P. Miller, "The Effect of
the GATT and the NAFTA on Pesticide Regulation: A Hard Look at Harmonization"(1990) 6 Colo. J. Int'l
Env. L. & Pol'y 20 1 at 2 13-4.
206/bid at 122.
2 o S ~ . Pitts,
~ .

2071bid
2081bid at 12 1.
2W~greementon the Application of Sanitcuy and Phytmanitaty Mesures, Final Act Embodyng the
Raults of the Umguuy Round of Mtrlriiateral Trade Negotiations, 15 April 1994, cited to (visited 16
Fereinailer SPS Agreement].
August 1998) <http://w.wto.org/wto/legavfinaIac~h~
21O ~ ~ r e e m e on
n t Technical Barriers to Trade, F i m i Act Emboàying the Results of the U'guqv Round of
Mulrilarerul Trade Negotiationr, 15 April 1994, cited to (visited 16 August 1998)
~http~/www.wto.org/wto/legavfinalact.htmereinafter TBT Agreement].

The SPS Agreement extends the protection offered by Article XX(b), by establishing
d e s which the environmental laws of states must comply with in relation to food safety,

and animal and plant heaith2"
The agreement recognises that govemments have the right to take sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, but that they should be applied only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and
should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members
where identical or similar conditions prevail.212
States are to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations where possible,
or to use higher standards where scientific proof or risk assessrnent makes it justifiable to
do ~

0 . ~The
~ 3
tems

of the SPS Agreement prevail over the other terms of GATT 1994,

such that an environmental measure fouod to be inconsistent with Article =@)

may

remain valid under the terms of the SPS Agreerne~zt.~'~

The TBT Agreement is designed to cover "processing and production methods related to
the charactenstics of the product itself 'Fis It therefore seeks "to ensure that technical
negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create
unnecessary obstacles to tradeM.2i6 Ail product regulations are caught by the TBT
Agreement, such as product size and quality, but it only covers those processing and
production methods which are 'related' to a productF7 It therefore deals with the
application of technical regulations and standards and their relationship to imported

2i l ~ e Meier,
e
supra note 193 at 273, and Miller, supra note 205 at 2 14-8.
2 1 2 ~ Media
~ ~ Relations
~ ,
Division, "The Final Act of the Uruguay Round: A Summary" ( 1993) 104
Focus: GATT Newsletter 5 at 7 [hereinafter "Summary"], and SfS Agreement, supra note 209at article 2.
213"~ummary",
ibid at 7. and SPSAgreemew* ibid at article 3.
2 1 4 ~ e i esupra
r,
note 193 at 273, and SPSAgreement, ibid at article 1.
2i s ~ e i e ribid
,
at 277. For a more detailed discussion of the TBT Agreement see Zedalis, supra note 193.
216tt~ummary",
supra note 2 12 at 8, and TBT Agreement, s u p note 2 10 at article 2.2.
2 1 7 ~ . ~Garvey,
.
"The GATTNTO Committee on Trade and the Environment Toward Environmental

-

Reform" (1 995) 89(2) Amer. J. Int'l L. 423 at 426-7, and TBT Agreement, ibid at annex 1, definition 1.
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products.218 The TBT Agreement also encourages the use of international standards, but
recognises that states have the right to establish protection at levels which they believe to

be appropriate and therefore, "does not require them to change their levels of protection
as a result of standiudization",219

Not everyone is pleased with the establishment of the WTO because of the extent of its
legislative and judicial power. Its creation has allegedly afTorded to unelected trade
representatives the opportunity "to ovemde the economic, social and environmental
policy decisions of states and democratic legislatures around the ~ o r l d " .From
~ ~ the
decisions of the WTO Panel, no appeal is ailowed and global conformity is required.221

Another envuonmental issue which bas been raised in the titerature is the use of trade
sanctions in MEAs and their validity under the GATT 1994WTO system. This is an
important issue because while MEAs and the Final Act are expressions of international
agreement, their terms can be in conflict.

3.3 Tmde Sanctions in MEAs

Not only is there a concern regarding the impact of trade upon the environment, but for
the impact of the GATT 19941WTO system upon existing MEAs which use trade
restrictions as a means of securing cornpliance with their terms."

The use of such

measures has been effective as evidenced by the success of the Montreal Protocol and the

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movernents of Harardous Wastes and
*I8~eier,
supra note 193 at 277, and TBTAgreement, ibid at article 2.1.
2i9'1~ummary",
supra note 2 12 at 8, and TBTAgreemeni, ibid at articles 2.4,2.6,2.9.

no~ilentCoup, supra note 30 at 65..
Zzllbid
"~earson, supra note 148 at 30.

Their dispos al,^ but these are only two of the twenty MEAs currently in force which
contain a trade prescription?

These trade restrictions act to secure cornpliance with the

terms of the MEA by sanctionhg trade with states who rnay, or may not, be members of
the MEA. Their use has been described as a "highlycontentious issue":

...the use of trade sanctions for breaches of environmental noms and of
trade restrictions by one country to try and influence the environmental
policies and practices of another is very divisive, and contradicts efforts to
fmd cooperative, multilateral solutions.=

Although MEAs are, by defuiition, international statements of mutual intention with
respect to the environment, when they employ trade restrictions against non-parties, they
potentially violate the GATT 1994MrTO system.226 Under this system they are illegal if
they can not be upheld under the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions or the SPS or TBT
Agreements.227 What is required is a balancing of the GATT 1994NTO system to

"protect legitimate environmental laws that benefit the environment, while shielding the
world trading system From protectionist laws...that have little to do with environmental
preservation" .=*

The CTEfs position, regarding the relationship between WTO provisions and trade
measures found in MEAs, is that state govermnents should continue to address
transboundary or global environmental problems under MEAs and not undertake
m~arvey, supra note 2 17 at 433; Montreal Protocof, supro note 1 O6 at article 4: B d Convention on the
Control of Tramboundary Movements of Harordour Wmtes and Their Disposaf (as arnended), 22 March
l989,28 I.L.M.657, cited to (1 995) 2 1 Int'l Env. Rep. 370 1, article 4.2(e) [hereinafter Basel Convention];
and, N ken, supra note 159 at 9 12-6.
Z 2 4 ~ .Esty,
~ . Greening the GAm: Trade. Environment. and the Future (Washington, D.C.: lnstitute for
International Economics, 1994) at 2 19,275-8 1.
"~glin, supra note 158 at 699.
Z 2 6 ~ ~ supra
e n , note 159 at 9 14.
2 2 7 h k i at 9 15.
*=D.M. Parks, "GATTand the Environment: Reconciling Liberal Trade Policies With Environmental
Preservation"( 1 996197) 15(2) U.C.L.A. J. Env, L. 15 1 at 1 84.

unilateral courses of action.229 The reason being that MEAs provide "a more effective

and durable approach...[than an] ad hoc resort to unilateral trade rneasures".~OHowever,

they note that trade measures within MEAs may not be the "most effective policy
insbument".=I The legality of MEAs containing trade sanctions has not yet been
addressed by the WTO."

An analysis of this predicament reveals that in the event of a conflict between the GATT

1994/WTOd e s and the treaty provisions found in MEAs, the GATT 1 9 9 4 M O d e s
would prevail. This is due to the fact that some of the MEAs were signed f i e r the
original GATT 1917 document was produced, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations has reset the GATT 1994/WTO clock to 1994.233 The international 'Later in
i
l
ewould not apply in this situation because it is only applicable in situations
Tirne' n
z z s W T ~ ,The Relationship Berneen the Provisions of the Multifateral Trading System a d Trade Measures
for Enviionmenral Purposes, Including Those Pursuant to Muftifateral Environmentuf Agreements (visited
26 June, 1998) <http://www,wto.orglwto/environlrelation,htm>.
2 3 0 ~ ~"GATT
l T , Mem bers Urged to Build on Uruguay Round Success" ( 1994) 105 Focus: GA=
Newsletter 1 at 3.
WTO, supra note 229.
u21bid
233~arvey,
,p,,note 2 17 at 434.
234 vienna Convention on the L m of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S.33 1, Article 30 [hereinafter
Viema Convention],states:
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations
parties to successive üeaties ~ l a t i n g
to the same subject-matter shall be
of
determinid in accordance w ith the f o l l o ~ i n ~ ~ a r a ~ r a ~ h s .

tat tes

2. When a treaty specifies chat it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatibte with, an earlier treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.

3. When al1 the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the Iater treaty but the earlier
treaty is not terminated or suspended in opemtion under article 59, the earlier treaty
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include al1 the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) As between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties,
the treaty to which both States are parties govems their mutual rights and obligations.
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any questions of the termination or
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of

where the two treaties have the same subject matter and where the states concemed are
parties to both instruments-as

Solutions to this dilemma have been advanced. The fvst is essentially that of the status
quo, namely, that an MEA's vdidity is determined on a case-by-case basis.26 A second

proposai is to amend the GATT 1994/WTOsystem so that it allows for legai certainty by
"encouraging countries to negotiate [multilated environmental agreements] with the
understanding that if they meet certain criteria, they will not be GATT-illegal".U7 This
can be achieved by amending article XX in a similar fashion to that presently found in
article XX(h) for cornmodity agreements.238 Alternatively, it could be accomplished by
amending article XX so that it references specific international agreements, thereby
"establish[ing] that actions taken in accordance with that treaty meet the basic test of
environmental legitimacy, thus providing a presurnption of justification" to those using
the trade sanctions.~g A further suggestion is to arnend GATT XX and append the
relevant MEAs, in Ml, in an annex.240
Amending the GA?T/WTO to allow for MEAs can ensure that important
existing and future MEAs are effective and can yield important
environmental results, while also ensuring that a nation does not use
unilateral extrajurisdictional actions to achieve its environmental
objectives.241

responsibility which may arise for a State fiom the conclusion or application of a maty
the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under
another treaty.
supra note 159 at 9 16-7.
235~issen,
usMd at 917-8.
U71bid at 924.
= * ~ s t supra
~ , note 224 at 2 19 and GATT 1994, supra note 19 1 at article XX(h).
2 3 9 ~ t yibid.
,
at 2 19.
240~issen,
supra note 159 at 925.
2411bid at 928.
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While some of these suggestions may be more beneficial than others, the CTE has
resisted suggestions that GATT 1994MrTO provisions should be broadened to include
trade measures of MEAs a s an e~ception.2~2Experts at a WTO symposium in April 1998
felt "generally that the WTO's dispute senlement system was not the best place to senle
environmental disputes", but that the WTO does have a role "in ensuring consistency
between multilateral trading d e s and international environmental agreements while
resisting attempts by member countries to use unilateral measures to achieve
environmental objectives"-243

Unfominately, this is an issue which will not be resolved in the near hture. International
progress in the trade versus environment debate would have been useful recently, because
efforts to liberalise foreign direct investment would have been wiser for an infonned
envuonmental viewpoint.

3.4 Foreign Direct In vestment:

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of in\lestment which acqyires operational
control over corporations.244 FDI by MNCs has been increasing annually. Between
1980 and 1997, FDI from MNCs grew fiom $500 billion io nearly $3 trillion per year.245

FDI investment is primarily focused in three regions of the globe: Japan and Korea, The
United States, and Europe;246 and has become particularly important with the growing
recognition that "investment has become the driving force of deepening integration in the

2 4 2 ~supra
~ ~ note
,
229.

2 4 3 1 ' ~ x pSay
e ~ WTO Should Have Limited Role in Dealing With Trade, Environment Nexus" (1998)
2 1( 10) Int'l Env. Rep. 46 1 at 46 1.
244~oldblatt,
supra note 23 at 277-8.
24S~art,
supra note 77 at 76.
246~oldblatt,
supra note 23 at 279.

world ec0nomy".2~7 Dunng the past 25 years FDI in developing states has been
concentrated in China, Nigeria and India248 While FDI flows in the 1990s bave begun to
include Vietnam, Ghana and Bangladesh, for other developing states it remains
minimal.249 Reasons for this have been cited as "[tlhe structural weaknesses of these
econornies, the inefficiencies of their smdl markets, their ski11 shortages and weak
technological capabilities...".mIn response to this, several states have begun to
unilaterally liberalise their investment regimes, but there has d s o been a growing
recognition that there is a need for international investment d e s which cover FDI.ZS1
The need for international agreements that provide a framework for the
promotion and protection of investment has been widely felt. This has
been manifested, in part, in a great increase in interest in bilateral
investment treaties; some 60 percent of the more than 900 bilateral
investment treaties that presently exist have been negotiated during the
course of this decade.252
M e r the formation of the WTO in 1994, attention turned toward the creation of a global
investment treatyX3 Although the GATT I994MITO system contained ihree agreements
which mentioned investment concems: Trade-related lnvestmenf Meusures, Trade-

Relafed Aspects of Intellectual Properîy Righfs, and the Generul Agreement on %de in
Services; they were al1 considered to provide too marginal a coverage for F D I P At the
fust WTO Ministerial meeting held in Singapore in December 1996, some delegates

2 4 7 ~ Sauvé,
.

"Qs and As on Trade, Investment and the WTO" ( 1997) 3 1(4) J. WorId Trade 55 at 57.
'Foreign Direct Investment Flows to Low-Income Counaies: A Review of the Evidence"
(September 1997) 3 ODI Briefing Paper at 4.
2491bid.
250~bid.
z ' ~Ruggiero,
.
"Foreign Direct Investment and the Multilatenil Trading System"(1996) 5(1) Transn'l
Corp.1 at 5.
z2Ibid
2S3~ilent
Coup, supra note 30 at 66-7.
w ~ .Witherell,
~ . "The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment"(1995) 4(2) Transn'l Corp. I at 5.
See also A.A. Fatouros, "Towardsan international Agreement on Foreign Direct Investment?"( 1 995) 1 O(2)
ICSID Rev. - Foreign Invest. L.J. 1 8 1 at 189,202.
2 4 8 ~ Marr,
.
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pushed for the commencement of negotiations for an investment treaty.255 However, this
proposed Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA), was opposed by developing States
who feared that such a treaty would not only result in a loss of sovereignty but that it
represented a "virulent fonn of colonialism". This resulted in the formation of a
working group on Trade and Investment,~' who were given a mandate to make a report
at the next Ministerial meeting in 1998.z8

AAer the failure of the M A , a second Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was
proposed by the OECD.=g It was hoped that this agreement would later serve as a
prototype for the WTO

The development of the MAI and its relationship with environmental protection requires
analysis because investment liberalisation has k e n linked to a growing detenoration in
the global environment.
Investment liberalisation, without corresponding tightening of regulation
but instead accompanied by further deregulation, can be predicted to
accelerate the process M e r . The higher flows of FDI in recent years to
developing countries is increasing the tempo of ecologically-darnaging
activities. The proposed multilateral agreement on investment ...and
similar moves in the WTO to liberalise investment rules will have wide
environmental implications, and have raised senous concerns with many
environmental groups.26'

2 5 5 ~Clarke
.
& M . BarIow, MI: The Muitih~eralAgreement on Investmeni and the Threat to Canadian
Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddat, 1997) at 26 [hereinafter Theut].
x61bid
a7~iienfCoup, supra note 30 at 67.
z8~hreat,supra note 255 at 26.
x9~iïentCoup, supra note 30 at 67.
2M1~hreat,
supra note 255 at 27.
26i'~~~
supra
s " note
, 3 1 at 14.

To what extent has the MAI been designed to reflect these environmental concerns or
does it, like the GATT 1994/WTO systern, sirnply propose to add in environmental
concerns as an aflerthought? To what extent can the MAI be accurateiy characterised as:

...a whole new set of d e s for investrnent that will grant transnational
corporations ...the unrestricted "right" and "fieedom" to buy, sell, and
move their operations whenever and wherever they want around the
world, unfettered by govenunent intervention or regulati~n.~~*
3.4 1 The MuZtiZateral Agreement on Investmenl:

The OECD was formed in 1961, with a mandate to promote the Iiberalisation of crossborder transactions.263 It presently provides a forum for twenty-nine industrialised
state~
"to~ coordinate
~
monetary, trade and economic development poiicies".265 The
OECD's primary role is to assist members in "improv[ing] the economic performance of
theïr countries".266 To this end, the organisation is not assigned a specific way through
which its mandate m u t be achieved.267
They simply recognise - though not without reservations of various kinds that there would be benefits to al1 their countries, and indeed to the world
as a whole, fiom moving towards a more liberal international economic
order. They use the Organisation both as a means of identifying,
reviewing and agreeing on specific ways of advancing in that direction,

2 6 2 ~ Clarke,
.
"A Treaty For Corporate Rule: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Seeks to
Consolidate Global Corporate 'Power"' (JuIy/August 1997) Cdn. Forum 19 at 19 [hereinafter "Corporate
Rule"].
2 6 3 ~Henderson,
.
"The Role of the OECD in Liberalising International Trade and Capital Flows" (1996)
The World Economy: Global Trade Poi'y 1 1 at 1 1.
2 6 4 ~ hOECD
e
member States are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Icetand, Ireland, Itaiy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and United States. See OECD,OECD News Release: OECD Meeting at MinrSteriaI Level, Paris,
26-27 May 1997 (visited 7 December 1997)
<httpY/~.oecdwash.org/PRESS/PRESRELS/news974
1.htmI>.
265 ~ a t h e nsupra
,
note 136 at 6.
266~enderson,
supra note 263 at 14.
267/bidat 15.

and as a rnechanism by which departues from accepted liberal practice
can be averted or kept within bounds.
The OECD has k e n called the "club of the rich industridized nations" because "477 of
the Global Fortune 500 corporations" are based within them.269 It is reasonabie to infer
fiom this that MNC interests are of concem to the OECD, and especially since business

has been a strong supporter of the development of the MAI.
Many members of the business community have strongly supported this
objective, have advised the OECD on the nature, scope, fonn and content
of the Agreement, and have strongly urged that it prescribe the highest
standards of market access liberalkation, transparency, non-discriminatory
treatment and investrnent protection, supported by effective disputesettlement mechani~rns.~~O

In 1995 the OECD commenced negotiations to draft the MA.i.271 Onginally intended to
be fmalised by mid-1997?* this agreement was heralded as "the constitution of a single
global economy" by Renato Ruggeno, Director General of the W T O F Although the

agreement would initially only bind OECD member states, non-memben will be allowed
to accede to the treaty.274 During the negotiations, non-OECD memben have been kept

apprised of the draft2- and meetings have been held with investment policy officiais
representing 36 developing states."6

Not ail reviews of the document have been

z681bid
269~ilent
Coup, supra note 30 at 67.
2 7 0 ~W.
.

Messing, "Towardsa Multilateral Agreement on Investment"( 1997) 6(1) Transn'l Corp. 123 at

133.

27i"GreenhouseGas Emission Talks, Update on Rio Earth Summit to Top 1997 Agenda" (1 997) 20(2) Int'l
Env. Rep. 79 at 8 1.
272witherell, supra note 254 at

1.

"AS quoted by the Economic Justice Working Group, "M.A.1....The End of Dernocracy" (1997) Pamphiet

at 1.
274"CorporateRule", supra note 262 at 19.
2 7 5 ~ Engering,
.
"The Multilateral Investment Agreement"(1996) S(3) Transn'l Corp. 147 at 160.
2 7 6 " N Coalition
~~
Inciuding Environmentalists Vows Campaign Against MAI Under Way at OECD"
(1997) 20(22) Int'l Env. Rep. 1 007 at 1008 [hereinafter "NGO Coalition"].

favourable,n7 and environrnentalistshave spoken out regarding the lack of environmental
protection within the draft agreement, and the potential harm to the environment from
some of the proposed clauses.

The prearnble presently contains mention of the environmenf278 although this inclusion is

[Recognising that investment, as an engine of economic growth, can play
a key role in ensuring that economic growth is sustainable, when
accompanied by appropriate environmental policies to ensure it takes
place in an environmentally sound m a ~ e r . ]Fecognising that appropnate
environmental policies can play a key role in ensuring that economic
development, to which investment contributes, is sustainable], and
resolving to [desiring to] implement this agreement [in accordance with
international environmental l m and] in a manner consistent with
sustainable developrnent, as reflected in the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development and Agenda 2 1, [including the protection
and preservation of the environment and principles of the polluter pays
and the precautionary principle;]280 (emphasis added)
Footnotes within the negotiating text reveal concem with the inclusion of the italicised
portion of the preamble, and whether it raises a presumption that MEAs will take
precedence over the MAI.281 This is an important consideration given the present
concem regarding this same issue under the GATT 1994/WTOsystem.
2 7 7 ~ eJ.e Ash, "Beginner's Guide to the MAI" (1998) S(35) The Coast 10; Economic Justice Working
Group, supra note 273;and, S. Nova & M. Sforza-Rodenck, "Multilateral Agreement on Investment: "The
Constitution of a Global Economy"" (1997) 27(1) The Ecologist 5.
"*ln attendance at the OECD annual ministerial meeting May 26-27, 1997, ministen agreed that
"economic, social and environmental objectives should be a fundamental aspect of govenunental efforts to
adapt to new economic realities" however later discussions on the MAI reached consensus on the point that
"environmental conditions should not be used as an FDI barrier". See "Environmental Objectives Must Be
Integrated into Policies on Global Economy, Group Says" (1997) 20(12) Int'l Env, Rep. 55 1 at 551-2.
279~ee
"Environment Still Major Issue in Talks on OECD's Multilateral lnvestment Accord" (1998) 2 l(2)
Int'l Env. Rep. 46. As discussed later, see footnote 334 and accompanying text, it remains uncertain
whether or not this wording will remain because the future of the MAI itself is unknown.
2 8 0 ~ The
~ Multiiateral
~ ~ ,
Agreement on Im>estmenc The MAI Negorirting T a t (as of 14 February 1998),
cited to (visited 20 July 1998) <http://web.uvic.ca/german/hendriklmai-0298,Preamble Fereinafter
UAI Negoliating Text].
2811bid.at Preamble, Footnote 7.

A legal analysis authored by the OECD regarding the relationship between the MAI and

MEAs, assessed the extent of any incompatibilities between thern.282

The study

concluded that there were no "prima facie legal incompatibilities" since no MEA
currently "has sought to impose investment related sanctions or measures, and the
obligations established by MEAS to date do not require or cal1 for hplementation which
would clearly conflict with MAI obligation^".^^ In addition the study States, that MAI
parties have the ability to address this matter explicitly in their MEAs if they so desire.
If a fbture MEA were to contain specific investrnent measures or require
treatment of investors which would violate the MAI, it would fairly clearly
be intended to over-ride incompatible provisions of the earlier MAI...2"
The study also notes that it is with "the power of a future MAI Contracting Party to take
national environmental measures in general, with or without an MEA" which raises the
most questions about the environmental impact of the MAI.285 In this context the
environmental impact of the MAI appears to be &in to that previously discussed in
relation to the GATT 1994NTO system.2g6

It is also worth noting that this concem over the inclusion of these words may be moot,
because another footnote to the Preamble states, "[ilt was the strong feeling of many
delegations that preambular reference to the environment be limited to one paragraph and
that it be as short as p0ssible".~8~This may reflect the intention of some parties not to
2820
ECD, Relaiomhips Between lhe U4I and Sefected MulrilateraI Environmenta1 Agreements (MEAs)
(visited 20 July 1998) ~http~/w.oecd.org/daVcmis/mai/meaenv.h
[hereinafier MAI and M a s ] . The
decision to initiate this examination followed the outcry fiom NGOs over the Iack of attention to
environmental issues. in addition to this report, nation-states were also requested to review their national
environmental legislation to determine its relationship to the proposed MAI. See L.J. Speer, "OECD
Multilateral Agreement on Investment to Give More Consideration to Environment"(1997) 20(23) Int'l
Env. Rep. 1040.
2 8 3 and
~ 1MEAs, ibid at 1 .
2841bid at 3.
2851biddat 9.
286~ee
footnote 193 and accompanying text
2 8 7 Negotiating
~ ~
T a t , supra note 280 at Preamble, Footnote 9.

continue to expand the preambuiar reference to the environment because the statement in

this draft has been expanded îrom that found in an earlier version.2"

In Part III of the draft, the articles for National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation
Treatment are found.
1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investon of another Contracting

Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the
treatment it accords [in like circurnstances] to its own investors and their
investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, use, enjoyment
and sale or other disposition of investments.289

2. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting
Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable than the
treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to investors of any other
Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, with respect to the
establishment, acquisition. expansion, operation, management, use,
enjoyment, and sale or other disposition of investments?

3. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting
Party and to their investments the better of the treatment required by
Articles 1.1 and 1.2, whichever is the more favourable to those investors
or investments.291
The inclusion of these articles has attracted a lot of attention. For developing states there
is a concem that these articles allow foreign corporations and investors to "be treated
better than locals, but not less favourably".292 These clauses also serve to protect
corporations frorn being discriminated against by governments who disapprove of their
actions in other states whether on the b a i s of hurnan rights, labour or cnvironmental
2 M ~D,~MuItiIateraI
C
Agreement on Investmem Conrofidated Text and Commeniary,
DAFFE/MA1(97)/REV2 (1997), cited to (visited 2 December 1997) <http'J/~~~.isIandnet.com/plethora~,
Prearnble. For a discussion on this earlier drafi text in relation to environmental concerns see R. Cowling,
"PIC, POPs and the MAI Apocalypse: Our Environmental Future as a Function of Investors Rights and
Chemical Management Initiatives" (Faculty of Law, Daihousie University, 1997) [unpublished].
2 8 9 ~ Negotiating
/
T a ,supra note 280 a<Part III, Article 1.
290~bidat Part III, Article 2.
291~bid
at Part III, Article 3.
2 9 2 ~ .Khor, "What is the MAI?" (1998) 9O/9 1 Third World Resurgence 5 at 7 [hereinafter "What"].
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grounds.293 States that wish to make reservations, thereby listing sectors or economic
activities in which investon would face restrictions, were to provide these to the MAI
negotiating group no later than Febniary 1997.2M

Protests over the proposed MAI have taken place with citizen's groups from both the
Northem and Southern states.295 Northern NGOs mobilised after a leaked ciraft of the
MAI was obtained and its potential consequences upon national sovereignty, the
environment and consumen, was found to be unacceptable.296 In addition a statement
"endorsed by more than 500 environmental, development, labour, consumer, church and
women's organisations from 67 countries" was presented to the OECD,requesting them
to suspend negotiations.297 This statement, presented to OECD officiais on October 27,
1997,298 characterised the MAI as "completely unbalanced" because "[i]t elevate[ed] the
nghts of investors far above those of govermnents, local cornmunities, citizens, workers

and the environrnentM.299 The statement also addressed other concems including the
absence of any binding obligations for corporate conduct toward the environment, and
the ability of corporations to attack existing national environmental regulations.3"

2 9 3 ~ Clarke,
.
"The Corpomte Rule Treaty" (1998) 9O/9 1

Third World Resurgence 1 1 at 14 [hereinafter
"Treaty"1,
294Thisdate was premised upon an expectation that the agreement would be ready for adoption by the
summer of 1997. Engering, supra note 275 at 15 1-2, 160- 1. It is interesthg to note that the inclusion of
these restrictions may in fact have k e n part of the reason for the demise of the MAI, see footnote 335 and
related text.
2gS~ee
What", pro note 292; M. Khor, "NGOs in OECD Countries Rotest Against MAI" (1998) 9019 1
Thini World Resurgence 25 [hereinafter 'WGOs"]; and "565 Groups Say 'NO' to MAI" (1998) 9019 1 Third
World Resurgence 23 Fereinafter "565"].
2 g 6 ' ~ ~ibid.
~ s at
" ,25.
297/bid
298"~hat",supra note 292 at 5. Also TJGO Coalition", ~ p r note
a 276.
299n~6S',
supra note 295 at 23.
300/bid at 24.

Govemments have in the past used their power to regulate foreign investment to their
own advantage, having been able to "choose [their] own independent policies on how to
treat foreign companies and investments".30~ It has been suggested that in the case of
developing states, granting investors the increased rights of the M N may cause "the
disappearance of many local enterprises, higher unemployment, greater outflow of
fmancial resources, and, therefore to [balance of payment] problems".302 One study of
national legislation from developing states Iisted potential regulations which might
violate the MAI,303 while the ability to substantiate each of these regulations exceeds the

scope of this analysis, the subject matter of these regulations as described in relation to
proposed MAI articles is illustrative of some of the possible legal contlicts which may
arise.

The MAI need not be the only means of establishing relations between foreign investors
and host states, because an alternative exists in the draft United Nafions Code of Conduct
on Transnational Corporations.3" This document was designed out of two observations

in relation to transnational corporations and their role in the world economy:

...on the one hand, it is recognised that transnational corporations play a
positive role as effective instruments of development in developed and
developing countries dike and that this role should be strengthened; on the
other hand, it has also been recognised that the pervasive role of
transnational corporations in the world economy requires the formulation
of guidelines for their conduct305

301"The
Need to Regulate Foreign Invesûnent"(1998) 9019 1 Third World Resurgence 15 at 15 [hereinafter
"Regulate"].
3°21bid at 17.
303~riends
of the Earth, Exampies of Foreign Imtestment Reguiations that Could Violace the Muitiiateral
Agreement on Imestment, cited to "How the MAI Would Affect the South" ( t 998)9019 1 Third World
Resurgence 18 at 18-20.
3M"~egulate",
supra note 301 at 17.
3 0 5 ~ The
~ United
~ ~ Nations
~ , Code ofîondufr on T r a m ~ t i o m Corporations
I
(New Y o k 1986)(CM
Doc. STlCTClSER.Al4) at 1 mereinafter Co& of Conduct].

The Code of Conduct was therefore designed to balance the interests of govemments and
transnational corporations, thereby facilitahg the flow of investments intemationally for
economic and industrial growth, and minimishg any negative effects caused by TNCs
upon their host.306 Provisions relating to TNC activities encompassed several issues
including "respect for national sovereignty and observance of domestic laws, regulations

and administrative practices" and "adherence to economic goals and development
objectives, policies and priorities". Other TNC provisions were in relation to "adherence
to socio-cultural objectives and valuestt, "non-interference in internai political affairs",
the "transfer of technology" and, to "environmental protection".'07

With respect to environrnental protection, the Code of Conduct contained three pertinent
clauses.3o8 These clauses placed obligations upon TNCs to undertake their activities in
accordance with national environmental legislation and policies, with attention to
international standards. Second, to take steps to protect the environment and to restore it,
if damaged, and third, to supply information akin to an environmental impact assessrnent
to national authonties for their products and processes, as well as related regulatory
information from other States. Finally, TNCs were directed to CO-operatein the
development of national measures for environmental protection.309
306~bidat 2-3, 12-3.
307~bidat 9.
308~bid,at 36.

309Thehl1 text for these clauses is:
4 1. Transnational corporations shalVshou1d carry out their activities in accordance with
national laws, regulations, administrative practices and policies relating to the
preservation of the environment of the countries in which they operate and with due
regard to relevant intentionai standards. Transnational corporations shalVshould, in
performing their activities, take steps to protect the environment and where damages to
[restore it to the extent appropriate and feasible] [rehabilitate it] and should make efforts
to develop and apply adequate technologies for this purpose.
42. Transnational corporations shalUshould, in respect of the products, processes and
services they have introduced or propose to introduce in any country, supply to the

While this Code of Conduct was never comp1eted;"o there is an intention to append the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as an annex to the M A I F These
Guidelines are voluntary and therefore, not legally enforceable.312 They deal with
"general policies, information disclosure, cornpetition, financing, taxation, employrnent

and industrial relations, environment and science and technoiogy".3'3 The text used in
relation to the environment states that MNCs should "[alssess and take into account in
decision making, foreseeable environmental and environmentally related health
consequences of their activities" and to "[CIO-operatewith competent authorities" through
the provision of information regarding the potential impacts of their activities upon the

environment and through the provision of expertise.314 In addition, MNCs are directed to
"minimise the risk of accidents and damage to health and the environment, and to

CO-

operate in mitigating adverse effects".)ls The text in the MAI introducing this annex
States:

competent authorities of that country on request or on a regular basis, as specified by
these authorities, al1 relevant information concerning:
Characteristics of these products, processes and other activities including
experimental uses and related aspects which may h m the environment and the
measures and costs necessary to avoid or at least rnitigate their harmful effects;
Prohibitions, restrictions, warnings and other public regulatory measures imposed
in other countries on grounds of protection of the environment on these products,
processes and services.
43. Transnational corporations shalVshouId be responsive to requests From Governments
of the countries in which they operate and be prepared where appropriate to cwperate
with international organizations in thek efforts to deveIop and promote national and
international standards for the protection of the environment.
Ibid. at 36-7.
310~ee
the previous discussion regarding the Code of Con&
at foomote 63 and accompanying text.
31'Mt/ Negoîiating Text, supra note 280 at Part X.
I*OEC D, The O E C D Guidelinesrfw MdtinatÏona[ Enterprises: Overview (visited 2 1 July 1998)
~http://www.oecd.org/daVcmis/cimdmneguide.h
at 1.
3i3~bid
at 2.
I 4 0 ~ cThe~O, E C D Guidefinesfor Multinational Enterprises: T a t (visited 2 1 July 1998)
~http://www.oecd.oi.g/daWcmis/cime/mnete~hûn#top>
at 6.
51bid

The following Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a joint
recommendation by participating G o v e m e n t s to muitinational
enterprises operating in their temtory. Their purpose is to help
multinational enterprises ensure that their operations are in hannony with
the national policies of the countries in which they operate.216
In contr;ist to the Code of Conduct, these Guidelines place a lower level of responsibility
upon MNCs for their activities and conduct.

These different obligations for MNCs can be contrasted with the Performance
Requirements of the MAI for state governments:

1. A Contracting Party shall not, in comection with the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, operation, maintenance, use,
enjoyment, sale or other disposition of an investment in its temtory of an
investor of a Contracting Party or a non-Contracting Party, impose,
enforce or maintain any of the following requirements, or enforce any
commitment or undertaking:
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or
services provided in its temtory, or to purchase goods or services
from persons in its temtory;317
An exception to this is found in article 4:
4. [Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or
unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on
investment, nothing in paragraphs I(b) and l(c) shall be construed to
prevent any Contracting Party from adopting or maintaining measures,
including environmental measures:

(a) necessary to secure cornpliance with laws and regulations that are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant Me or health;
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible
resources.]3l~
3 1 6 ~lVegotiuting
/
T a t , supra note 280 at Part X .
3'7~bid.
at Part III.
l s~bid

A number of delegates do not believe that this clause should be included in the text at dl,

as they feel that the text is too broad, especially in part (a).319 This clause is sirnilar to the
exceptions found in Article XX of GAlT 1994, which have been given a very strict
interpretation in favour of trade liberalisation.320 Many delegates would in fact prefer the
use of a more generai clause:

Provided that such rneasures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable
manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on investment, nothing
in paragraphs 1@) and l(c) shall be constnied to prevent any Contracthg
Party from adopting or maintaining measures necessary to secure
cornpliance with environmental [laws and regulations] [that are not
otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement and] that are
necessary for the conservation of Living or non-living resources, [or that
are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.1321
In contrast, some delegates would simply prefer the inclusion of an additional clause later
in the text to address environmental concerns:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which wodd constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable disct-irnination
or a disguised restriction on investment, nothing in this agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption, maintaining or enforcement by any
Contracting [Plarty of measures:
(a) necessary to protect human, animai or plant life or health[;]
(b) relating to the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible
natural resources. 322
Another, even more general clause has also been proposed.3a What is curious is the
revealed anxiety by delegates regarding the continued ability of States to legislate andor
uphold existing national environmental legislation.

3191bidat Pm III, Footnote 28.
3 2 0 ~ efootnote
e
192 and attached text.
3 2 i~ e
~~o
~ t i a tT'
i n ~ supra note 280 at Part III, Footnote 28.

3 U ~ b i dat Part 111, Footnote 118.
323 1bid

Since GATT 1994 has been

interpreted in such a favourable manner with respect to trade, one can only assume that
investment would be accorded a similar treatment as well.

Another MAI clause worthy of mention is that related to the non-lowering of
environmental standards:
[Alternative 1
The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
lowering [domestic] health, safety or environrnental [standards]
[measures] or relaxing [domestic] [core] labour standards.
Accordingly, a Party shouid not waive or otherwise derogate fkom, or
offer to waive or otherwise derogate fiom, such [standards] [measures] as
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or
retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party
considers that another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may
request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shdl consult
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.
Alternative 2
A Contracting Party [shdl] [should] not waive or otherwise derogate fiom,
or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from [domestic] health, safety or
environrnental [measures] [standards] or [domestic] [core] labour
standards as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion or retention of an investment of an in~estor.13~~
The fact that these clauses are still placed within square brackets indicates that their
inclusion in the f m d text is not yet certain. The footnotes are unhelpful in clarieing this
point, mentioning primarily that the controversy between the two alternatives focuses
upon the inclusion of the first sentence of alternative 1. The discussion surrounds the
issue of "as to whether the provisions should refer to respect for universal standards or
onIy to the relaxation of domestic standardstt.3z

324i6id.at Part III.
325~6idat Part III, Footnote 116.

A final MAI investor entitlement worthy of reflection is found in the settlement of

Investor-State disputes.326 This set of clauses has as its focus the granting of the right to
investors to take legal action against a Contracthg Party for an alleged breach of a MAI
provision. The potential damage which such a provision can inflict is evidenced in the
case filed under the provisions of NAFTA by Ethyl Corporation against the Govemment
of Ca11ada.32~ Ethyl, the sole manufacturer of a product called Methylcyclopentadienyl
Manganese Tricarbonyl (MMT), filed the suit after the Canadian Government banned
MMT on the b a i s that it had adverse effects on automobile diagnostic systems w d to
assess automobile emissions, and concem regarding the release of manganese emissions
on human health?

Ethyl sought restitution of $251 million to cover losses resulting

from an alleged expropriation of its MMT production plant and of its rep~tation.32~
However, on July 20, 1998, the Canadian government withdrew its ban and paid a surn of

$13 million U.S. to Ethyl in exchange for Ethyl withdrawing its lawsuit.330

This case was obviously in the mind of Canadian MAI negotiators as Canadian Trade
Minister Sergio Marchi had previously expressed his intention of demanding a narrow
interpretation of the MAI expropriation clause, stating:
We have absolutely no intention of leaving the government open to the
prospect of being hauled before an international tribunal by companies or
investors.331

3261bid. at Part V, Section D.
)*'~ee "Canadian Government Withdraws Ban on Trade, lmpon of Gasoline Additive M M T (1998)
2 i(15) Int'l Env. Rep. 719 [hereinafier "Canadian Govemment"]; "Legal Challenge Against Canada on
MMT' (1998) 2 1(2) Int'l Env. Rep. 47; and M. Sforza & M. Vallianatos, "Ethyl Corp vs. Govt. of Canada:
Chernical Finn Uses Trade Pact to Contest Environmental Law" (1998) 9019 1 Third World Resurgence 21;
and "Fuel Additive is an Environmentai Negative" (1997) No. 18 Sierra Legal Defence Fund Newslener 5.
328~form,
ibM, and "Canadian Govemment", ibid
329~form,ibid at 2 1 .
330"~anadianGovemment", supro note 327.
3 3 1 ~Scofield,
.
"Canada, U.S. Dump on MAI", The Globe and Mail (14 February 1998) 83 at 83.
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The relationship between this case and the MAI is that the MAI contains similar clauses
dealing both with expropriation332 and investors' nghts to take legal action against a
Contracting Party.333 The Ethyl case has therefore already set a precedent, regardless of
the fact that it was settled prior to the adjudication.

For now, it would appear that the progress of the MAI has been slowed or perhaps even
ended. On Febniary 17, 1998 representatives at the OECD decided to defer their decision
regarding the future of the MAI until a meeting in April 1998.334 Reasons given for the
decisions were that the ciraft was too weak and subject to several state exemptions,

making it largely ineffectud.335 It had also lost the support of the United States
delegation.'"

The OECD later decided to set a new target deadline of April 1999.337

Whether the MAI will re-emerge as an issue in 1999 is a matter for the future, but what
remains apparent is that the desire for an investors' agreement will not simply disappear.

The MAI may simply retum as the MIA in the GATT 1994/WTO system in years to
corne.

3.5 The Road Ahead:
With the GATT now 50 years old and ministen cheering the fdling of protectionist trade
wallsP8 it is time for reflection not only on what is missing fiom the GATT 1994/WTO
system, but upon where we are headed environmentally. While it may be compelling to
3 3 2 Negorioring
~ ~
Tmt, supra note 280 at Part IV.
333~bidat Part V, Section D.
3 3 4 ~ Oyog,
.
"Final Decision on Future of Çapitalists' Charter' Defemd" (1998) 90/91 ïhird World
Resurgence 27 at 27.
335~bidat 27.
336~bidAlso see Scoffielci, supra note 33 1 where the US. position was quoted to Ms. Barshefsky. a U.S.
Trade Representative, as being that the MAI was "sirnply not good enough"and "unbalancedand
rejudiciat". Ms. Barshefsb did not clariS, this position
97T.Corcoran, "TheMAI is Dead. Cheers!",The Globe and Mail (25 March 1998).
Trade Convention" (23 May 1998) The Economist 18 at 18.
338n~eneva's
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argue for a revision of the GATT 1994/WTOsystem, given the position of the CTE such
an event appears to be extremely unlikely. Instead, the dominant liberalised trade and
investment regirnes of the world have succeeded in maintainhg the marginalisation of
environmental concems and initiatives, in the form of MEAs. The CTEs' expressed
reluctance to remedy this situation, and negotiators' subsequent avoidance of this issue in
relation to the MAI, leads to the conclusion that MEAs will continue to be applied in a
world dominated by trade and investment policy.

Liberaikation not only colows those environmental initiatives of the past but also of the
future. International environmentai law is therefore being formed and evaluated in an

atmosphere which is antithetical to i t How will emerging MEAs deal with this problem
and is there suficient political will to draft exemptions to the GATT 1994/WTO or MAI
documents? An analysis of two emerging chernical management initiatives will provide

an answer to this inquiry by examining the tension between the mitigation of
environmental h m and the protection of trade.

4.0 Prior Informed Consent

The increasing global use of chemicals and pesticides has led to heightened international
concem regarding their associated health and environmental nsks both in the developing
and developed states. Initiaily, the trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides began to
change due to the efforts of the OECD, through its Complementary Information
Exchange Procedure, the United Nations Environment Programme, using the
International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals, the European Economic
Community, using labelling requirements and later bans, and by NGOs, under the Pan
Action Network and the Coalition Against Dangerous Exports."g

The response to these

initiatives by developing state govemments, industry and pesticide consumers, was
discouraging in light of the growing recognition that it was a problem which required a
global solution."O

This recognition led to the creation of two voluntary chernical management instruments,

the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides341 in 1985,
as approved by the United Nations Food and Agriculturai Organisation (FA0),342 and the

3 3 q ~ eJe.H.Colopy, "Poisoning the Developing World: The Expottation of Unregistered and Severely
Ressicted Pesticides fiom the United States" (1995) 13 J. Env. L. 167; KA. Goldberg, "Efforts to Prevent
Misuse of Pesticides Exported to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification"
( 1985) 12 Ecology L.Q. 1025; R Hill, "Probiems and Policy for Pesticide Exports to Less Developed
Countries" (1988) 28 Nat'l Res. J. 699; M A . Kablack, "Pesticide Abuses in Third World Countries and a
Model for Refonn" (1991) Boston College Third World L. J. 277; H-W.Micklitz, "International Regulation
and Control of the Production and Use of ChemicaIs and Pesticides: Perspectives for a Convention" (1992)
Mich. J. Int'l L. 653; and, C. Uram, "International Regulation of the Sale and Use of Pesticides" (1990) 10
Northwestem J. int'l L. & Bus. 460.
"O~oldberg, ibid at 1051 and Hill, ibid at 720.
lntern~iomiCode, supra note 126.
%%ne author commented that this action by the F A 0 was in fact duplicitous as they had previously
"advocated the sale and use of restrïcted pesticides in the world market". In Kablack, supra note 339 at
300.
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London Guidelinesfor the Exchange of lnformatr'on in International Trade"

in 1987, as

adopted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Both of these
instruments were designed to increase state access to information about chemicals and
pesticides, and to therefore enable them to "assess the nsks associated with the use of
chemicais in their own countries".344

In 1989, UNEP and the FA0 amended the International Code and the London Guidelines
to include the Prior Informed Consent (PIC)procedure which was designed to:
improve the protection of human heaith and the environment from the
potentiai adverse effects of certain chemicals, recognising the limitations
of some countries in not having sficient IegaYregulatory systems or the
fmanciai and human resources to gather the necessary information and to
make and implement informed decisions concerning the use of chemicals
in their nationai situation245
The PIC procedure, originally the conception of the OECD,"

is implemented by the

FAO/UNEP Joint Programme for the Operation of PIC.Y' As of December 1997, 154
stateswg have registered with the F A 0 and UNEP to take part in the voluntary
programme.

ondo don Guirleinesfor the Exchange of ln/ormation on Chernieah in International Trade (as amended),
1987,cited to H. Hohmann, ed, Basic Documents of Intermtional Environmental Law, vol, 1 (London:
Graham & Trotman, 1992) 157 Fereinafter Londm Guidelines].
3 4 4 ~ PIC
~ -~A Brief
~ , Ovetview of Whaf It Is and How It Operates (visited 29 November 1997)
dittpJ/irptc.unep.ch/pic/volpic/h3.htm b at 1 Fereinafter Brief Overview].
3 4 S ~ Implementation
~ ~ ~ ,
of the ExExisg, Voluntary P K Procedure (visited 28 Novem ber 1997) c
h //irpt~.unep,ch/pic/volpic/h2~htmb
at 1 Fereinafter implemeniation].
e origin of the PIC procedure was in an Expert Group on Information Exchange related to Export of
Hazardous Chemicals, who in 1982 proposed a NO-step notification process. The fmt step being the
notification of export together with infonnation regarding regufatory actions, restricted uses and a means to
obtain additional information. The second step was to provide any additionally requested infonnation. See
Goldberg, supra note 339 at 1040; Hill, supra note 339 at 714; and Miller, supra note 205 at 209.
"'UNEP, PIC: Priw Informed Consentfi Certain Hazardozrs Chemicals in Inter~rionalTrade (visited
28 Novembet 1997) dittp://irptc.wiep.ch/pid> at 1.
"UNEP. PIC Uphte on Implementation as of 31 December 1997 (visited 3 August 1998)
dittp://irptc.unep.ch/pidvolpic/h4.html at 1.
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Since 1995 negotiations have been underway for the cirafting of a legally binding
international instrument which would combine both chernical and pesticide management

within one agreement. Before evaluathg the latest negotiations and draft in this process,
it is usetùl to examine both the International Code and the London Guidelines, to
determine how different the draft convention is fiom the voluntary regime.

4.1 The FA0 International Code

The purpose of the International Code is to "provide a practical framework for the
control of pesticidesW.349In its preamble, it acknowledges both the need for concern over

increasing global pesticide use, and of the inevitability of such an increase.
Recognizing that increased food production is a high priority need in many
parts of the world and that this need cannot be met without the use of
indispensable agricultural inputs such as pesticides.
Acknowledging that pesticides can be hazardous to humans and the
environment and that immediate action must be taken by al1 concemed,
including govemments, manufactures {sic), traders and users, to
eliminate, as far as possible and without the scope of their responsibility,
unreasonable risks, not only in the country of ongin but also in countries
to which pesticides may be exportedF (emphasis in original)

The preamble also acknowledges that pesticide use will likely continue although attempts
to utilise biological and integrated pest management are being rnade.351

The substance of the International Code is found within its twelve articles. Its objectives

are stated as follows:

...to set forth responsibilities and establish voluntary standards of conduct
for public and private entities engaged in or affecthg the distribution and
349~nternati~na~
Code,supra note 126 at 173,preamble.
350~bid
3511bid

use of pesticides, particularly where there is no or an inadequate national
law to regulate pesticides.352

To achieve this it describes the shared responsibility of society and is addressed to
various actors, including:

...international organizations; govemments of exporting and

importing
countries; industry, including manufacturers, trade associations,
formulators and distributors; users; and public sector organizations such as
environmental groups, consumer groups and trade unions.3"
The standards of conduct to expected fiom these actors are to:
Flncourage responsible and generaily accepted trade practices;
[Alssist countnes which have not yet established controls designed to
regulate the quality and suitability of pesticide products needed in that
country and to address the safe handling and use of such products;
[Plromote practices which encourage the safe and efficient use of
pesticides, including minimising adverse effects on humans and the
environment and preventing accidental poisoning kom hproper handling;
[Elnsure that pesticides are used effectively for the improvement of
agricultural production and of h u m a .animal and plant health.3M

In Article 2 the defuiitions are Iisted. Of interest are those for 'pesticidef,3*5'bannedf,356
and for 'prïor information consent' and the 'pnor informed consent
'severely restri~ted','~~
procedure'. The latter two are defmed in the following way:
3521bid.at 174, article 1.1.
353Ibid at 174, article 1.4.

3S4fbid at 174, article 1.5.
3 5 5 ~ htee m 'pesticide' is defined as:
mean[ing] any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying or
controlling any pst, including vectors of human or animal disease, unwanted species of
plants or animals causing h m during or otherwise interfering with the production,
processing, storage, transportation, or marketing of food, agricultura1commodities,
wood, wood products or animal feedstuffs, or which may be adrninistered to animals for
the control of insects, arachnids or ofher pests in or on their bodies. The tenn includes
substances intended for use as a plant growth regulator, defoliant, desiccant, or agent for
thinning h i t or preventing the premature fall of fruit, and substances applied to crops
either before or afier harvest to protect the comrnodity from deterioration during storage
and transport,
Ibid. at 175-6, article 2.
3S6~heterrn 'banne8 is defined as:
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Pnor Information Consent (PIC) refers to the p ~ c i p l ethat international
shipment of a pesticide that is banned or severely restricted in order to
protect human health or the environment should not proceed without the
agreement, where such agreement exists, or contrary to the decision of the
designated national authority358 in the participating importing country.
Pnor Infomed Consent Procedure (PICprocedure) means the procedure
for formally obtaining and disseminating the decisions of importing
countries as to whether they wish to receive further shipments of
pesticides that have been banned or severely restricted..359
Article 3 of the International Code sets out specific aspects of pesticide management. It
acknowledges the authority of govemments, and directs them to "regdate the distribution
and use of pesticides" and m e r directs govemments of exporthg states to both provide
technical assistance to developing states who may require it, and to "ensure that good
trading practices are followed".360

Industry is directed to utilise the International Code as a standard for the "manufacture,
distribution and advertising of pesticides", taking into account the special circumstances
of some developing states, and further directs that manufacturers and traders should
supply only those pesticides "of adequate quality, packaged and labelled as appropriate"
and to try to reduce hazards to users by paying attention to "formulations, presentation,

mean[ingJ a pesticide for which all registered uses have been prohibited by final
government or regulatory action, or for which al1 requests for registration or equivalent
action for ail uses have, for heaIth or environmental reasons, not been granted.
lbid at 175, article 2.
3 5 7 ~ hterm
e 'severely restricted' is defined as:
a Iimited ban - mean[ing] a pesticide for which virtually al1 registered uses have been
prohibited by finai governent regu latory action but certain specific registered use or
uses remain authorized.
lbid at 177, articIe 2.
3 5 8 ~ hterm
e 'designated national authority' is not defined in the text of the agreement. However, it has been
described in CMEP literature as being a focal point within a nation-state for the operation of the PIC
rocedure. See Brief Overview, supra note 344 at 2.
P591ntern~ti~naI
Code, sup note 126 at 176, article 2.
360~bid
at 177, articles 3.1,3.3.

packaging and labelling"M1 In addition, ïndustry was directed to provide user-fiendly
instructions and information regardhg the use of the substance and, to stay uiformed both
of the use of, and any associated problems with, the substances after being obtained by
consumers.362

Articles 4 through 8 list specific suggestions for states and industry regarding the testing
of pesticides,3" measures to reduce health hazards?

appropnate regulatory and

technical requirements,365 the availability and use of pesticides266 and their distribution
and sale267

Article 9, titled 'Information Exchange and Prior Informed Consent' establishes the
operation of the PIC procedure.368 Governments which make a control action to ban, or
severely restrict, a pesticide are to inform the F A 0 of their decision as soon as possible.

The F A 0 will then notiQ the designated national authonties (DNAs) of other states of
the control action.369 Of key importance to the PIC procedure is the timeliness of the
information exchange, because its provision allows other states to "assess the risks
associated with the pesticides, and to make timely and informed decisions as to the

3611bid.at 177, articles 32,3.4.1,3.4.2.
3621bid at 177, articies 3.4.3,3.4.4.
3631bid at 178, article 4.
3641bid at 179, article S.
3651bid at 180, article 6.
3661bid at 18 1, article 7.
3671bid at 18 1, article 8.
3 6 8 ~ tis interesting to note that when the Interdonat Code was fmt drafted it contained a PIC procedure
but that it was deleted from article 9 phor to acceptance of the Irzfernationai Code in 1985- In 1987,
fol1owing a F A 0 Conference "the PIC provisions were adopted in principte, despite heavy lobbying against
them by representatives corn the agrochemical industry and deveIoped countries". In J. Picarazzi,
"Regulating the Exports of Hazardous Pesticides: In Search of an Ecological World Oder" (1989) XV(2)
Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 433 at 447 and Urani, supra note 339 at 47 1-3.
3691~ernafionai
Code.supra note 126 at 182, article 9.1.
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importation and use of the pesticides concemed, taking into account local, public health,
economic, environmental and administrative conditions".37*

An exchange of information is also required between a state exporting a banned, or

severely restricted pesticide, and the state irnporting it. When the pesticide is to be
exported, the exporting govenunent is to supply the DNA of the importing state with
relevant information in order to both idorm them that an export w
i
i
i occur, and to remind
them of the earlier notification regarding the status of the pesticide.37' This notification is
to take place with the fust export following the control action, and at any tirne that there
is new information or a new condition in regard to the original control action.372

The PIC procedure is applicable to d l pesticides which have been banned, or severely
restricted, for health or environmental reasons.J73 Govermnents receiving a control
action notification from the FA0 are to advise the FA0 of their decision regarding the

friture use of the pesticide within their state, and to:
[Elnsure that govemmental measures or actions taken with regard to an
imported pesticide for which information has been received are not more
restrictive than those applied to the same pesticide produced domesticaily
or imported from a country other than the one that supplied the
information;
[Elnsure that such a decision is not used inconsistently with the provisions
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GArn.374
This inclusion of an article speciQing the relationship between a control action
notification and the global trading system is interesting because it places the Inrernoiional

37016id.at
3711bid at
3721bidat
)"lbid at
374~bidat

183, article 9.2.
183, articles 93,9.4.
183, article 9.5.
183, article 9.7.
184, article 9.10.2,9.10.3.
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Code within the economic hienuchy of global interests. Because these articles could be
construed as a justification for restraining trade, they have been clearly drafted to remove
any such interpretation.

The remaining three articles of the International Code speciS: the correct labelling,
;~~~
packaging, storage, and disposal of pesticides;375 acceptable advertising p r a ~ t i c e s and,
the means of monitoring the observance of the International Code.377

Control actions for both the International Code and the London Guidelines are entered
into a database by the Joint Secretariat of FAORMEP?*

At present, any chemical or

pesticide banned or severely restricted in at least one state after January 1, 1992 is
eiigible for inclusion in the PIC procedure. For those banned or severely restricted pnor
to this date, they must have k e n made subject to a control action by at least 5 or more
states.379

4.2 The London Guidefines

The second voluntary chemical management instrument, referred to above, is the London
Guidelines. Although similar to the International Code, the London Guidelines deal with
chemical as opposed to pesticide management, and were designed to be both
complementary and utilised in a "non-duplicative manner" with the International
Code?

375~bid.at 184, article 10.
376~bidat 185, article I 1.
3771bid at 1 86, article 12.
3R~rief0verview,
supra note 344 at 2.
3791bid
380~ondon
Guidelines, supro note 343 at 157, Introduction, paragraph 7.

In the introduction to the London Guidehes, it states that they were developed for
govemments "with a view to assisting them in the process of increasing chemicai d e t y
in al1 countries through the exchange of information on chemicals in international
trade1'.38' They are further characterised as being "general in nature and...aimed at
enhancing the sound management of chemicals through the exchange of scientific,
technical and legal information".3"

The tenn 'chernical' is defined as:

...mean[ing] a chemical substance whether by

itself or in a mixture or
preparation, whether manufactured or obtained from nature and includes
such substances as industnal chemicals and pesticides;JB
The defulltions for 'banned chemical'3W and 'severely restricted chemicalq85 are similar to
those found within the International Code, as are those for 'prior informed consent' and
'prior informed consent procedure'.
"Prior informed consent" (PIC)refers to the prhciple that international
shipment of a chemical is banned or severely restricted in order to protect
human health or the environment should not proceed without the
agreement, where such agreement exists, or contrary to the decision, of the
designated national authority in the importing
(emphasis in
original).

"Prior informed consent procedure" (PIC procedure) means the procedure
for formally obtaining and disseminating the decisions of importing
38 [lbid.at Introduction, paragmph 1 .
382ibida 157, Introduction, paragraph 2.
383ibidat 158, anicle !(a).
384The term 'banned chemical':
means a chemical which has, for health or environmental reasons, k e n prohibited for all
uses by final govenunental regulatory action;
Ibid at 158, article l(b).
385nieterm 'seve~lyresbicted chemicaf:
means a chemical for which, for health or environmental reasons, virtually al1 uses have
been prohibited nationally by final governmental regulatory action, but for which certain
specific uses remain authorized;
Ibid at 158, article I(c).
386ibid.at 158. article I(g).

countries as to whether they wish to receive fuhire shipments of chemicals
which have been banned or severely restricted. A specific procedure was
established for selecting chemicals for initial implementation of the PIC
procedures. These include chemicds which have k e n previously banned
or severely restricted as weil as certain pesticide formulations which are
acutely toxic...387 (emphasis in original).

The six general principles of the London Guidelines state a need for al1 states who import
or export chemicals to protect human health and the environment through an exchange of
information on chemicals.3" States are expected to act in accordance with P ~ c i p l 21
e
of the Stockholm Declaratiorr'89, and ensure that national measures taken to regulate
chemicals should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade.3w National measures taken
for an imported chemical are not to be more strenuous than those used for domestically
produced chemicals or for those imported fiom a state other than the one which provided
the control action information.39' States are aiso expected to share their k n ~ w l e d g & ~ ~

and, to improve their national legislative and regdatory systems, their national registers
of toxic chemicals, and any manuals, directories and documentation related to chemical
trade.393

3871bid at 158, article I(h).
3881bid at 158, article 2(a).
3g9Ibid. at 158, article 2(b). Ptinciple 2 1 states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
International law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pwsuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause darnage to the envitonment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Declmation of the United Nations Con&ence on the Human Emironment, 5 lune 1972, U.N.
Doc.A/CONF.48/ 14, (1972) 1 1 1.L.M. 14 16.
3g0~ondonGuidelines, supra note 343 at 158, article 2(c).
3911bid at 159, article 2(d),
3921bid at 159, article 2(e).
393lbid. at 159, article 2(9.

Some chemicals are expressly exempted fiom inclusion under the Guidelines. These are:
phannaceuticals; radioactive materials; chemicals imported for research or analysis in
quantities unlikely to cause harm to human health or the environment; reasonable
amounts of chemicals imported as personal or household effects; and, food additivedg4
States are allowed to choose, however, if they wish to apply the London Guidelines to
pharmaceuticals and food additives.395

Article 5 specifies the institutional arrangements of the Guidelines, such as the
development by üNEP and the FA0 of a single information exchange system for states
to receive and comrnunicate information under the PIC procedure.3% UNEP is directed
to "share with F A 0 the operational responsibility of the PIC procedure and jointly
manage and implement common elements including the selection of chemicals".397 This
article also describes the designation by each state of a national authority "competent to
perform the administrative functions related to the exchange of information and decisions
regarding importation of chemicals included in the PIC proced~.re".3~~
The designated national authority should be authorized to communicate.
directly or as provided by national law or regulation, with designated
national authorities of other States and with international organizations
concerned to exchange information, to make and communicate decisions
regarding chemicals included in the PIC procedure and to subrnit reports
at the request of such States or on its own initiative;399
States are directed to supply the name and address of their DNA to the International
Register of Potentially Toxic Chernicals (IRPTC).W The IRPTC in tum was to maintain

394~&id
at 159, article 3.
395~bidat 159, footnote 1.
3%lbid at 159, article 5.1.
3971bidat 160, article 5 2 .
3981bid at 160, article 5.4.
3991bid.at 160, article 5.5.
Joo~bidat 160, article 5.7.

a directory of DNAs, to be disseminated to states,401 and to cosrdinate the work of the

DNAs. In addition, the IRPTC was to develop recommendations on the means of making
the Guidelines effective, to act as a liaison among the various acton and, to review the

implernentation of the Guidelines by providing reports on its effectiveness.402

Part II of the London Guidelines specifies the procedures for notification and the
operation of the PIC procedure. Notification of a control action is to be made by the
DNA to the IRPTC as soon as practicable after it has been taken, with suficient
information, so that it may be disseminated by the IRPTC to other DNAs to enable them
to evaluate the risks associated with their own continued use of the banned or severely
restricted chemicals."3

States so notified have the opportunity of participating in the PIC

procedure, whereby the IRPTC will record and convey their decisions regarding the
future importation of chernicals into their state?

The response from a DNA to a

notification of a control action is to be received by the lRPTC within 90 days?s

The

IRPTC then inforrns the other DNAs of the importing states' decisions in a "timely
fashion"$06

If a chernical subject to the PIC procedure is to be exported, than the exporting state
should provide the DNA of the importing state with a reminder of the control action and
"to alert it to the fact that an export will occur or is occurring"."7

This information

should be provided with the fust shipment following the control action, and perïodically

40'lbid at
4021bidat
4031bidat
4w1bid at
4051bidat
406~bid
at
40716id.at

160, article 5.8.
160, article 5.9.
161, article 6.
161-2, article 7.1.
162, article 7.3(a).
163, article 7,4(a).
163, article 8(a),(b).

thereafter, or in the event that any new information relating to the control action is
taken.408 The Guidelines also provide specific instructions for DNAs regarding their
functions in relation to irnports and exportS.*

Part III of the London Guidelines provides additional recommendations to states:
For the protection of hunian health and the environment, States should
facilitate:
(i) The exchange of scientific information (including toxicological and
safety data) and technical, economic and legal information concemiog the
management of chemicals, particularly through designated national
govemmental authorities and through intergovernmental organizations as
appropriate;
(ii) The provision upon request of technical advice and assistance
conceming the management of chemicals to other States, on a bilateral or
multilateral basis, taking into account the special needs of developing
countries.4~0
Additional recommendations regarding the classification, labelling and packaging of
chernicals41 and technical assistance412 are also provided. This latter article directs the

IRPTC to:

...encourage funding agencies, such as the development banks and United
Nations Development Programme, and bilateral donors to provide
training, technical assistance and funding for institutional strengthening
and should further encourage other United Nations organizations to
strengthen their activities related to safe management of chemicals;413
States are also encouraged to provide technical assistance to developing states in relation
to the development of infrastructure and capacity for chernical rnanagement.4'4 Special

408~bidat 164. article 8(e).
409ibid at 164-5, article 12.
'Oibid at 166, article 13.
41 Ibid at 166-7,article 14.
412~bid
at 167, article 15.
413~bid
at 167, article 15(a).
414~bid
at 167, article 1S(b).

attention is requested for those states "without any regdatory procedures on chernicals in
developing a regime for their contr01".~~5The essentid elements of technical assistance

by many developing states is M e r specified.416

The annexes of the London Guidelines provide the forms to be utilised by DNAs for a
control action,417 a response to a control action by an importing s t a t e s b m d export
infor~nation.~19Annexes also establish the procedure to be followed for the initial
identification of chernicals for inclusion in the PIC procedure,420 and the information to

be included in a PIC guidance document321

4.3 Critiquing the Voluntary Instruments

The International Code and the London Guidelines while capable of critique in retrospect
were certainly perceived to be advantageous when they were first adopted,
notwithstanding their voluntary legd statu. An article authored in 1990 states:
making the Code legally binding would not significantly advance its goal
of promoting international regulations to ensure safe use of pesticides in
ail countries. The resources at this stage might be better spent on
scientific and educational programs designed to close the gap, using the
F A 0 Code as a beacon, rather than on efforts to try to eliminate the gap
through legal declaration.4*

-

4151bid at 167, article 15(c).
4161bid at 167, ar&icIe15(d).
4171bidat 168, annex 1.
4181bid at 17 1, annex IV.
4191bidat 172, annex V.
4201bid at 169, annex II.
4211bid at 170, annex III.
4z~ram,supra note 339 at 477.

The Internorional Code was also favourably portrayed by another author who stated "[a111
effective code of conduct would provide a basis for civic courage and rn0rality".~~3
These accolades are arguably equally applicable to the London Guidelines.

Another favourable point is the inclusion within the International Code of directives
aimed toward industry and other actors, in addition to those directed toward governments.
Such an inclusion recognises the complexity of the problems associated with pesticide
trade, and the fùtility of attempting to challenge the sfatus quo when not al1 of the actors
are addressed. While the London Guidelines was directed solely toward governments, in

1994 CMEP concluded the Code of Ethics on the International Trade in Chernicals. a
voluntary instrument directed toward industry and other private sector parties.J24
Through the implementation of the Code of Ethics private sector parties were to help
achieve the objectives of the London Guidelines by "goveming standards of conduct in
the production and management of chernicals in international tradem.JZ In August 1994

UNEP distributed the Code of Ethics to 185 industry and business associations and 77
NGOs, but its adoption by these groups remained limited as of July 1 9 9 8 F

W l e the International Code and the London Guidelines did illustrate an international
recognition of the need for change, they have proven to not be as effective as once hoped.
Evidence for this point, at least in relation to the International Code, can be found in a
supra note 368 at 462.
4U~icarazi,
2 4 ~ Code
~ ~of ~
Ethics
,
on the International Trade in Chemicals, cited to (visited 8 September 1998)
~ h n p ~ / i ~ t c . u n e ~ : c h / e ~ [hereinafter
ics/>
Code of Ethics].
42'~bid.at Part 1, article 1 .
4 2 6 ~ofs July 1, 1998 the following private sector parties had notified UNEP o f their decisions to apply the
Code of Ethics: Ewopean Chemical hdustry Council; European Ferti lizer Manufacturers Association;
Japan Responsible Care Council; Spanish Chemical Industry Federation; Earthcare Afica; and, the
International Union o f Pure and Applied Chernisûy. See UNEP, Report on the Staus of the Application of
the Code of Ethics on the fnternafionalTrade in Chemicafs, cited to (visited 8 September 1998)
<http://irptc.unep.ch/ethics/english/rep-en 1 .htrn> at 2-5.
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survey conducted by the F A 0 in 19969 Of the 177 states sent the questionnaire, 91
responded to the 144 questions which were arranged according to the articles of the

Iniernational Code."*

The results of the questionnaire demonstrated an increased

compliance with the ternis of the international Code, but deficiencies were also
identified.
National authorhies of several developing countries recognize that they
lack and are strongly interested in acquiring the necessary expertise and
basic infrastructure in evaluating risks and in risk management and risk
reduction strategies, adapted to local conditions (sic}. Furthemore, at
least half of those responding to the questionnaire indicate the need for
technical assistance and increased goveniment support to strengthen their
national capabilities and infrastnictures necessary to operate effectively
their pesticide control schemes {sic). Therefore, there appears to be a
continuing need to further strengthen efforts to assist countries to
implement the various provisions of the Pesticides Code of C o n d u ~ t . ~ ~ ~

The most obvious critique of both the International Code and the London Guidelines is
the fact that they are voluntary and as such, have no means of ensuring compliance or of
taking punitive measures against uncooperative states.

A second point is that they fail to provide a funding mechanism to assist developing

states to take part in the PIC process. While the London Guidelines do recognise the
special needs which some states may have, especially those without any national

of Government Responîes to he Second Questionnaire on the State of lmplemenfutionof
the International Co& of Conhct on the Difiribution and Use of Pestici'cies, (1996) cited to (visited 27
August 1998)

4 2 7 ~ Analysis
~ ~ ,

~http~/~~~.fao.orglWAICENT/FaoInfolAgricu
...PP/Pesticid/ManagelQuesWintro.htm#obj2q~
[hereinafter Analysis]. The first survey was conducted in 1986. For a discussion of this questionnaire see

ibid at 2-3.
428~6id
at 3.
429i6id.at 4. For specific information about the survey see F A O , Tabular Summary of Resulfs,(1996) cited
to (visited 27 August 1998)
~http~l~~~.fao.org/WAICENT/FaoInfo/Agricu
...PP/Pesticimanage/quesWtab.htm>.
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chemical management system of their own, it fails to do more than "encourage" donors to
financially as&

these states.

One author cntiqued the drafters of the International Code for the failure to include the
precautionary principle.430 Reliance for this assertion was placed upon an interpretation
of the precautionary principle found in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import
N>lo Africa and the Control of

T'ramboundPs, Movement and Management of Hazardous

Wastes Within AfricaP31 The logic of this is that the precautionary principle would
prevent the use of harmful chemicais even before there is scientific proof that a given
chemical would prove hamiful to the environrnent.432 This same argument can aiso be
advanced in relation to the London Guidelines.

A fourth comment c m be made regarding the relationship of these two instruments to

international trade. Neither of these documents places a limitation on the trade of
chernicals or pesticides falling under the PIC procedure. Instead, they both expressly

should not be construed in any manner which would provide such a

state that they

justification. In this way, although these instruments both recognise the environmental
-

-

-

-

4 3 0 ~ . ~
Baender,
.
"Pesticides and Precaution: The Bamako Convention as a Mode1 for an

International

Convention on Pesticides Regulationn (1991) 24 Int'l L, & Politics 557.

and the C o n r d of Tranrboundary Movernent
and Management of Hazardorrs Wasfes Within Afiica, 30 January 1991, (1991) 30 I.L.M.773, cited to
(visited 17 August 1998) <http://www.tufts.edu/fI etcher/muIti/text Fereinafler Bamako Convewion].
The precautionary principle is defined at article 4(3Xf) of the Bamako Convention as:
Each part. shall saive to adopt and implement the preventative. precautionary approach

431~ a m a k o
Convernion on the Ban of the irnport into Afiica

to pollution problems which entails, inter-alia, preventing the release into the
environment of substances which may cause h m to humans or the environment without
waiting for scientific proof regarding such h m . The parties shall CO-operatewith each
other in taking the appropriate measures to implement the precautionary principle to
pollution prevention through the application of clean production methods, rather than the
pursuit of a permissible emissions approach based on assimilative assumptions.
432whilethe precautionary pnnciple is dealt with in a cursory fashion here. it is discussed in more detail
iater in this chapter, see footnote 580 and accompanying text.

harm which is incidental to the use of pesticides and chemicals, they do not evidence any
intention on the part of the international community to delineate such a h m . From an
environmentai perspective these instruments may not go far enough, as a limitation on

trade itself may be a wise environmental choice.

Another factor is the difference in breadth of coverage of actors between the two
instruments. While the international Code purports to be addressed to numerous actors,
both public and private, the London Guidelines have been drafted to reflect a concem
only with governmental actors. Knowing the dificulty of binding private actors under
international instruments, and recognising that these two documents are volmtary, does
not remove the need to address the actions of private actors, such as industry. The fact

that the London Guidelines does not address industry's involvement in chernical trade, is

a large gap in its credibility as a valid environmental tool. This sentiment is echoed in the
words of one author who states that "[tlhe best prospect for international regdation is an
approach that relies on notification procedures and on concepts of shared responsibility
between manufacturers and govemment agencies"9

Finally, the instruments may also exhibit a naiveté regarding the ability of states
themselves to provide technical assistance. As has been discussed earlier, MNCs are the
actors who hold the majority of intellectual property nghts for most of the technical
information required by developing states. This is not information which c m be handed
to these states by anyone other than MNCs.

.
--

.--

-

- .-

4 3 3 ~ i c k l i t supra
q
note 339 at 697.
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In short, while these two instruments have provided a badine for international action, in
the late 1990s they fail to provide sufficient assistance to states given the magnitude of
known environmental and health concerns. A legally binding instrument is now required
to alter the problems associated with the international trade of chemicals and pesticides.

4.4 Negotiaiing a New PIC Convention

Since the initial drafting and adoption of the International Code and the London
Guidelines, UNCED was held in 1992. The acceptance of Agenda 21 at this conference
by the world community evidenced a new concern for the proper handling of

environmental concems. This plan of action expressly dealt with trade in toxic
chemicals.

4.41 Agenda 2 1

Chapter 19, of Agenda 21, entitled "Environmentally Sound Management of Toxic
Chemicals, Including Prevention of Illegal International Traffk in Toxic and Dangerous
Products" establishes the world's perspective on chemical management in 1 9 9 2 9 The
Introduction of this Chapter states: "[a] substantial use of chemicals is essential to meet
the social and economic goals of the world cornmunity and today's best practice
demonstrates that they can be used widely in a cost-effective manner and with a high
degree of safety"."s

To achieve this end, six programme areas for change were

proposed:
(a) Expanding and accelerating international assessrnent of chemical risks;

(b) Hannonization of classification and labelling of chemicals;

(c) Information exchange on toxic chemicals and chernical risks;
a4~genda21, supra note 65 at Chapter 19.
43516id at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.1.

(d) Establishment of risk reduction programmes;
(e) Strengthening of national capabilities and capacities for management
of chernicds;

(f) Prevention of illegal international trac
products.436

in toxic and dangerous

The success of these programme areas was characterised as being dependent upon an
international will to work and CO-ordinate activities, including "identification and
application of technical, scientific, educational and fmancial means, in particular for
developing countnes"337

Agenda 2 1 expressly acknowledged the role of industry in chemical management.

The broadest possible awareness of chemical risks is a prerequisite for
achieving chemical safety. The principle of the right of the community
and of workers to know those risks should be recognised. However, the
right to know the identity of hazardous ingredients should be balanced
with industry's right to protect confidential business information...The
industry initiative on responsible care and product stewardship should be
developed and promoted. Industry should apply adequate standards of
operation in al1 countries in order not to damage hurnan health and the
environment.438
While this recognition of the mitigative role industry is important, it pales in cornparison
with the contents of the drafi Code of Con&,

which would have placed more binding

obligations upon industry conduct. Agenda 21 therefore indicates a shift in political will
away From the regulation of industry.

Of the six programme areas, the exchange of information on toxic chemicals and
chemical risks is of particular interest. Although the use of the London Guidelines is
acknowledged in the text, there remains concem over the continuing export of banned or
436~bidat Chapter 19. paragraph 19.4.
437~bidat Chapter 19, paragraph 19.5.
4381bid. at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.8.

severely restricted chemicals to developing states.439 The text also acknowledges various
international initiatives in relation to chernical management040 and states
"[n]otwithstanding the importance of the PIC procedure, information exchange on d l
chernicals is neces~ary".~iThis cd1 to provide information for ail chemicals envisions a

much more transparent system than that provided under either the International Code or
the London Guidelines.

The objectives of the programme are stated as:
(a) To promote intensified exchange of information on chernical safety,
use and ernissions among al1 involved parties;

(b) To achieve by the year 2000, as feasible, full participation in an
implementation of the PIC procedure, including possible mandatory
applications through legally binding instruments contained in the amended
London Guidelines and in the FA0 International Code of Conduct, taking
into account the expenence gained within the PIC procedure.**

The Chapter than proceeds to outline the various actions which need to be undertaken in
relation to the programme by governments and international organisations, with the
cooperation of industry. In the context of management directives to strengthen rational
and international information exchange networks, to provide technical cooperation to
those states in need of assistance, and to implernent the existing PIC procedures while
working toward the conclusion of legally-binding instruments, are given.443 In relation to
data and information, the need for the creation of information networks in developing
states, in addition to improving existing networks is expressed?

Knowledge on

severely restricted and banned chemicals to importing nations is to be provided, as is
43glbid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.35.
"Olbid at Chapter 19, pamgraph 19.36.
"llbid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.37.
*2/bid.at Chapter 19, pmgraph 19.38.
43~bidat Chapter 19, paragraph 19.39.
4441bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19.40.
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information required to assess risks to health and the environmentP45 In addition the
chapter specifies the requirements for international and regional CO-operationand

CO-

ordinatiofl and, for fuiancing and cost evaluation.447

What Agenda 21 does not do is assert the need to take a proactive stance on chernical

management. While this c m be reduced to a need to accommodate the tensions between
various negotiators, it can also be said that it is a faiture to utilise the precautionary
principle as it is found in Principle 15 of the Rio Declarafion- The statement found
within paragraph 19.37, regarding the need for an exchange of information on al1

chemicals, may have been a vague attempt at incorporating this principle.

The international community, acting upon the directive of Agenda 21 to provide a more

mandatory scheme of regulation before the year 2000, began to initiate the process. It
began at the 107th Session of the F A 0 Council, where it was "agreed that the F A 0
Secretariat should proceed with the preparation of a drafl PIC convention as part of the
current FAO/LMEP programme on PIC" in CO-operationwith other interested actors.49
This was followed by the UNEP Goveming Council Decision 18/12, made at its
Eighteenth Session, in May 1995PM This Decision states that having taken into account
4451bid

461bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 19-42.
"'1bid at Chapter 19, paragraph 1 9.43.
48Principle 15 states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be wideIy appiied
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shal1 not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1 3 lune 1 992, LN,Doc. NCONF. 1 5 1/S/Rev. 1,3 1
I.L.M. 874, cited to S.P. Johnson, The firth Sumrnit: the United Nufions Conference on Environment and
Deve[opment (UNCED)(London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) 1 17 at 120, Principle 1 5.
%EP,
Deveiopment of an Internuîionuiiy Legaliy Binding Inst~(menu(visited 29 Novernber 1 997)
dittpY/irptc.unep.ch/pic/h2.htmI> at 1 mereinafier Deweloprnen~].
JsO1bid
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Agenda 21, and the FA0 Decision, the Executive Director of UNEP is to convene,

working in conjunction with the FAO, govemments, and international organizations, "an
intergovernmental negotiating cornmittee, with a mandate to prepare an international
legally binding instrument for the application of the prior informed consent procedure for
certain hazardous chernicals in international trade".451

The fvst meeting of the Intergovemmental Negotiating Cornmittee (INC)took place in
Bmsels on March 11- 15, 1996.452 This meeting was attended by " 194 Delegates from

80 Govements, the European Commission and a number of UN Organs, Speciaiised
Agencies. IGOs [Intergovemmental Organisations] and NGOs won-governmental
Organisations]".453 At this session the INC agreed on the Rules of Procedure and
"compieted a preliminary review of a drafl outline of the hiture agreement".454 A
working group was aiso formed to commence selection of the chernicals which would be
covered by the convention.4Ss

The second meeting of the MC was held in Nairobi on September 16-20, 1996.456 At this
meeting technical and legal drafting working groups were formed, and 24 pages of ciraft
convention text was developed.457 One element of disagreement arnong delegates at this
meeting was whether the convention should mirror the existing voluntary regime or,

4 5 1 U N ~UNEP
~ , Governing Council Dechion IS/Z2,(1 995). cited to (visited 29 November 1997)
&ttpY/irptc.unep.ch/pic/h5. hml> at 1-2, paragraph 1 meminafier /8/I21.
452~evelopmenr,
supra note 449 at 1.
4 a U N ~ ~UNEP
,
Chemicals: Dewlopment of an IntermtionaI Legally Biding I ~ l r u m e n on
& Prior
Informed Consent (PIC) for Certain Harardous Chemicals in international Trade (visited 4 December
1997) chttpY/irptc.unep.ch/pid> at f bereinafier UNEP Chemicals].
4541bid.
4ssIbid

supra note 449 at 2.
456~evelopment,
5
7 Chemicafs,
~
~
~supro note 453 at 1.
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alternatively, if its scope should be developed to "allow some flexibility in order to
include the possibility of considering measures beyond the existing PIC pr0cedure".~5*

In the Decision of the 11Ith FA0 Council Meeting, made October 10, 1996, the Council
"expressed its satisfaction with the progress on the PIC negotiations".4"

They also

discussed the mandate of the INC and whether it should be broadened to negotiate a
fkamework Convention on chernical management46° Such a Convention would then deal

with both pnor informed consent chemicals and those chemicals which are capable of
being classified as persistent organic pollutants (POPs). As the Council members were
unable to agree whether or not the mandate should be broadened, it was decided to leave
the MC with its original mandate."'

To this end the INC was directed to focus "its

attention on the elaboration of practical and operational procedures to impiement the PIC
procedure".J62 At the Nineteenth Session of the UNEP Goveming Council, the MC
mandate was also M e r confmed.463

The third meeting of the INC was in Geneva on May 26-30,1997PsJ The issues
addressed at this session were:

the respective obligations of importing and exporting countries, and how
to identiQ the types of chemicals to include in the agreement...the cnteria
4581bid
4 5 9 ~ Decbion
~ ~ , of the I 11th F A 0 Council Meeting: Report on the Progrers of Negotiarions of an

International tegally-Binding Instrumentfor the Application ofthe Prior Injbrrned Cornent (PIC)
Procedurefor Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Traak, ( 1W6), cited to (visited
29 November 1997) <http~lirptc.unep.ch/pic/fao1 I 1en.html> at 1 [hereinafter I l I t h Councilj.
460Ibid.
46 Ibid
" I b i d at 2, paragraph 5.
4 6 3 U N ~Decisions
~,
Adopted &y the Governing Council at ifs Nineteenth Session: 19/13A. Dewlopment of
an International Legally Binding Instrumentfor the Application of the Prior lnformed Corsent Procehre
for Certain Hazardozis Chmiculs and Pesticides in International Trade, (1 997), cited to (visited 29
November 1997) <http~lirptc.unep.ch/pic/gcpic-e-htmb
at 2, paragraph 1 Fereinafter 19/i3A].
4"~evelopment, supra note 449 at 2.

'

for selecting the specific chemicals; the d e s for notifjhg exporters of
banned or severely restricted chemicals and pesticides and hazardous
pesticide formulations; the designation of competent national authorities;
the use of risk assessments; classification, packaging and labelling
requirements; technical assistance; and hancial mechanisms.~~

The fourth MC meeting was held in Rome, on October 20-24, 1997. At this session,
more than two-thirds of the drafl provisions were provisionally endorsed by the
Cornmittee membersP66 At the f i a and final, MC session held in Brussels from March
9-14, 1998,a7 95 states468 and the European Community were in attendance.*9 It was

also attended by United Nations bodies and speciaiised agencie~,~~O
intergovemmental
organisations,~7~
and non-govemmentai organisationsJ*
5 Chemicais,
~
supra
~ note 453 at 2. In addition see "Prior Infonned Consent TaIks to Address
Which Pesticides to include, Data Required" (1997) 20(18) Int'l Env. Rep. 821, and "Agreement on Drafi
PIC Text Sets Stage For International Treaty Later This Year" (1997) 20(12) Int'l Env. Rep. 551.
4
6
6 Chemicais,
~
~
~ ibid.
~
J67~eport
o/rhe htergowrnmental h'egoti~tingCornmirteefor an Internutioml Legafiy Binding Inrrnmenr
for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedurefor Certain Hazardous Chernicals and
Pesticiaks in International Trade on the Work of Its F@h k s i o n UNEP/FAO/PIC/MC.5/3, (1 7 March
1998), cited to (visited 25 July 1998) d i r t p ~ / w w w . f a o . o r g l a 9 / a g p / a g p p / p e s t i cat
i ~1
hereinafler PIC INC.51.
L8The States in attendance were: Algeria, Angola, Antisua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia Australia,
Austria, Barbados, Belanis, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad,
Chile, China, Colornbia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivorie, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungaxy, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic
of ), Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali,
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Narnibia, Nepat, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peni, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Rornania,
Russian Federation, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Afnca, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem
Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. See ibid at 3, paragraph 16.
469~bidat 3.
470~he
United Nations bodies and specialised agencies in attendance were: Secretariat of the Convention
on Biological Diversity, United Nations Institute for Training and Research and the World Trade
Organisation. See ibid at 4, paragraph 17.
471Theintergovernmentnl organisations in attendance were: the Afncan Caribbean Pacitic Gmup and the
Gulf Cooperation Council. See ibid at 4, paragraph 18.
472Thenon-governmental organisations present were: the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Consumers
International, European Chemical industry Council, Foundation for Advancements in Science and
Education, Global Cmp Protection Federation, HeaIth and Environment Watch, International Council on
Metals and the Environment, International Federation of Phannaceutical Manufacturers Association,
International Institute for the Sociology of Law and the Pesticides Trust. See ibid at 4, paragraph 19.
M

4.5 The Druft Convention and O Critique

During the negotiations, the Chair of the MC, Ms. Maria Celina de Azevedo Rodngues,
of Brazil, "stressed that the purpose of the preamble was to reflect what had k e n left out
of the articles" of the convention973 Therefore, its preamble differs fiom those found in
its voluntary predecessors, and includes paragraphs which recall Chapter 19 of Agenda

21 by titie and acknowledge the voluntary PIC procedure found in the Internaiional Code
and the London Guidelines.474 The prearnble also directs that the needs of both
developing States and of those in transition must be considered, mentions the need for
appropriate packaging and labelling of substances and recognises that "trade and
environmental policies should be munially s u p p o a i v e " P 7 5 It M e r emphasises that its
terms should not be "interpreted as implying in any way a change in the rights and
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreement applying to chernicals in
international trade or environmental protection" and, that the preamble "is not intended to
create a hierarchy between this Convention and other international agreements"

The three paragraphs which concem trade issues refiect the tension regarding the
relationship between this Convention and the GATT 1994/WTO system, and the
negotiations surrounding the adoption of this wording apparently provided "one of the
tensest moments of lNCS"P77 Although delegates stated that the inclusion of this
language will not prejudge their fùture positions in international forums and negotiations

al., e& "Report of the F i f i Session o f the M C for an International Legally Binding
Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chernicals
and Pesticides in International Trade"(1998) 15(4) Earth Neg. Bulletin, cited to (visited 25 July 1998)
~http://www.mbne~mb.ca/linkages/downloac/enb
1504e.txt> 1 at 5 [hereinafter Fgh Session].
4 7 4 INCS,
~ ~ supra
~
note 467 at 14.
4751bidat 14-5.
4761bid at 15.
477 ~ i j Session,
h
supra note 473 at 25.

4 7 3 ~Chasek,
.
et

deding with trade and environmentai issuesp78 it is difficult to believe otherwise. This
Convention provides such a close and obvious nexus between trade and environment, that
if the Parties had wished to demonstrate an intention to alter the current baiancing of
power between these two policy arenas they could have done so. The fact that many of

them believed that the inclusion of the preambular language was simply a preventative
measure based "on the fear that the Convention might be used as an excuse to take WTOinconsistent rneasures or that the perception of a hierarchy between different agreements
might be createdW479
demonstrates their desire to retain trade supremacy.

It is interesting to note that previous drafts of the Convention contained articles dealing

with "phase-outs and trade bans" and also "control of trade with non-parties1'.48* These
articles would have been counter to GATT 1994/WTOgoals, and if included, would have
been interpreted as being an expression of intent that the PIC Convention should restrict
trade, if it had not been for the presence of another clause which specifically stated that

"any conflict between the Convention and the WTO rules would be settled in favour of
the latter".48i Some delegates expressed "surprise and concem that the wording could
allow international trade rules to override the provisions of the Convention" while others
felt that the former delegates were not "properly briefed on the trade implications of a
legally binding PIC proced~re".~" The fact that delegates saw no need to retain these
clauses within the fmal drafi M e r illustrates their confidence in the supremacy of trade.
-

-

4781bid
4791bid. at 25.
4 8 0 ~Chasek,
.
et ai., eds., "Reportof the Third Session of the MC for an International Legally Binding
instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals
and Pesticides in International Trade" (1997) 15(2) Earth Neg. Bulletin, cited to
<hnp://~~~~.mbnet.mb.caninkages/downIoad/anb1502e.a<~
1 at 19 [hereinafler Third Sersion].
48g'lbidat 29.
4 8 2 ~Chasek,
.
et ai.. eds., "Report of the Fourth Session of the MC for an International Legally Binding
Instrument for the Application of the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Wazardous Chemicab
and Pesticides in International Trade" (27 October 1997) 15(3) Earth Neg. Bulletin, cited to (visited 25 July
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By agreeing upon the current prearnble language, and by removing the previously drafted
articles, there is an expressed intention by the Parties that the GATT 1994/WTO system
will retain suprernacy over this MEA. ïhis interpretation is predicated upon the prhciple
that a legal instrument must be interpreted within the context established by its' Preamble
and cannot, therefore, be found to be inconsistent with GATT f 994/WTO-

The objective of the Convention is found in article 1:
The objective of this Convention is to promote shared responsibility and
cooperative efforts among Parties in the international trade of certain
hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health and the environment
from potential harm and to contribute to their environmentaily sound use,
by facilitating information exchange about their characteristics, by
providing for a national decision-making process on their import and
export and by disseminating these decisions to Partie~.~*3
Article 2 of the drafi lists the definitions. Of interest are those for ~hernical,~w
banned
chernicals8s severely restricted chemical,486 and a newly added terni, severely hazardous
1998) <httpd/www.m b n e ~ m
b.ca/l inkages/downIoad/asc/enb1SO3e. txt> 1 at 23 Fereinafler Fourth
Session]. Also see Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Cornmitteefor an international Legaliy
Binding Instrumentfor the Application of the Prior infrmed Consent Procedurefor Certain Hazardous
Chernicals and Pesricides in Intermiunai Trade on the Work of its Fourth Session,

LMEP/FAO/PIC/MC.4/2, (4 November 1997)- cited to (visited 2 December 1997)
<httpdlirptc.unep.ch/pic/> at 8, where one delegate expressed a reservation with the deletion of article 14
which proposed control of trade with non-Parties, noting that a similar provision existed in the Busel
Convention.
483PIC I m , supra note 467

at 15, article 1.
4 8 4 ~ htenn
e 'chemical':
means a substance whether by itself or in a mixture or preparation and whether
manufactured or obtained h m nature, but does not include any living organism. It
consists of the following categories: pesticide (including severely hazardous pesticide
formulations) and industrial;
Ibid at 15, article 2(a).
4 8 5 ~term
e 'banned chemical':
means a chemical al1 uses of which within one or more categories have been prohibited
by final regulatory action, in order to protect hurnan health or the environment. It
includes a chemical that has been refused approval for first-time use or has been
withdtawn by industry either h m the domestic market or fiom further consideration in
the domestic approval process ad where there is clear evidence that such action has been
taken in order to protect human health or the environment;
Ibid at 15, article 2(b).

pesticide for1nulation.~87 These definitions are similar to those used under the voluntary
r e g i m e . Missing, however, is the extensive defmition of a pesticide. Under the
International Code the terni 'pesticide' is defined extensively489 whereas under the current

definition of 'chernical', the meaning of 'pesticide' is left unexplained.

Another defdtion worthy of mention is that of 'Party'. This is defined as "mean[ing] a
State or regional economic integration organization that has consented to be bound by
this Convention and for which the Convention is in force".490 This can be contrasted with
the breadth of the actors listed as being essential for the implementation of the
International Code?'

While such a definition of Party is consistent with international

law, the implementation and success of this Convention will be predicated upon the
cornpliance and actions of many actors, in particular MNCs who remain outside the
boundaries of this Convention. Their liability for inappropriate acts in association with
chemicals is not addressed by this MEA.

486Theterm 'severely mtricted chemical':
means a chemical virtually al1 use of which within one or more categories has been
prohibited by final regulatory action in order to protect human health or the environment,
but for which certain specific uses remain allowed. It includes a chemical that has, for
virtually al1 use, been refused approval or been withdrawn by industry either fiom the
domestic market or fiom fûrther consideration in the domestic approval process, and
where there is clear evidence that such action has been taken in order to protect human
health or the environment;
ibid. at 15-6, article 2(c).
487Theterm 'severely hazardous pesticide formulation':
means a chemical fomulated for pesticidal use that produces severe health or
environmental effects observable within a short period of time after single or multiple
exposure, under conditions of use;
ibid at 16, article 2(d).
4 M ~ efootnotes
e
356,357,383,384,385, and accompanying text
489~ee
foomote 355 and accompanying texr
4 9 0 INC5,
~ ~ supm
~
note 467 at 16, article 2(g).
4 9 1 ~ efootnote
e
353 and accompanying text.

Article 3 of the draft sets out the scope of the Convention. The Convention will not apply
to: narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; radioactive materials; wastes; chemical
weapons; pharmaceuticals; food additives; food; "chernicals in quantities not likely to
affect human health or the environment provided they are imported" either for research or
analytical purposes, or for an individual's persona1 use, in quantities appropriate for such

a use?

Article 4 specifies the selection and reporting of DNAs to the Secretariat of the
Convention, and article 5 sets out the procedures for banned or severely restricted
chemicalsP93 The latter article provides that when a state makes a final regulatory
actionPw

they are to notie the Secretariat of that action no later than 90 days following the action
taking effect.495 The Secretariat in tum will fonvard the information to the other
Parties.496 In addition, every six months the Secretariat will forward to the Parties a
synopsis of al1 information which they have received regarding final regulatory
actions.497

A chemical will be made subject to the PIC procedure when notification has been

received of a final regulatory action in at l e s t two of the global PIC regions498 and the
Chemical Review Cornmittee has ascertained that the chemical meets the criteria listed in
4 9 2IC
~ INCS, supro note 467 at

16-7, article 3(2).
4g31bidat 1 7, articles 4, 5.
49j~hetemi 'final regulatory action':
means an action taken by a Party,which does not require subsequent regulatory action by
that Party, the purpose of which is to ban or severely restrict a chemical;
Ibid at 16, article 2(e).
"qbid at 17, article 5(1).
496~&id
at 18, article 5(3).
4971bidat 1 8, article 5(4).
4 9 8 ~ hPIC
e regions will be set at the fim Conference of the Parîies. See Ibid at 18, article 5(5).

A ~ e 11,
x 499 such that it can be listed in Annex III as a chemical to which the PIC
procedure applies5?

The text conceming the number of notifications required for a chemical to be included in
the PIC procedure was the subject of much negotiation.501 The discussion focused upon
whether it was necessary for the Secretariat to have received notification f?om two PIC
regions, or whether one would be suffiicient."

Several delegations "agreed that one or

more notifications warranted a triggerhg of the PIC procedure, regardless of the number
of regions"?

Some of these delegates were from developing states (Philippines,

Panama, Indonesia, Argentina), which rnay be part of the reason for their concem.
Developing states, if they are grouped into PIC regions together, and have fewer
infrastructural means to analyse chemical characteristics, may be less likely to issue final
regulatory actions. In this way, the admittance of a harmful chemical into the PIC
procedure may take longer than desired. It is interesting that the states supporting the
drafied text requiring two PIC regions include the United States, European Cornrnunity,
Canada and India.sm The basis of their argument was that it "would reflect a broader
concem and ensure that chemicals put on the PIC list had support in a global context".505
In contrast, the industry lobby at the negotiations did not want a substance placed in
annex III until "five countnes fiom three different regions of the world [had] banned
499~nnex
II sets out the steps required to place a chemical under the PIC procedure. This includes:
confirmation of the final regdatory action; establishing that the regulatory action has been made on the
basis of a nsk evaluation based upon scientificdata; ascertain whether the final regulatory action is an
appropriate basis to merit the listing of the chemical in Annex II1 (lists al1 chemicals subject to the PIC
procedure); and, not list the chemical on the basis of its having been intentionaiiy misused. See Ibid. at 36,
annex II.
500~bidat 18, article 5(5),(6).
~ # Session,
h
supra note 473 at 9.
502~bid
s03Ibid

Wbid
5051bid
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it".SM Until the fust Conference of the Parties, it was agreed that the F A 0 list of seven
regions would be used as a mode1 for the PIC regions.m7

Article 6 describes the procedures for severely hazardous pesticide formulations available
to developing states and states with an economy in transition.so8 This article was
designed to assist developing states and those with economies in transition, to quickly
include hazardous pesticide formulations within annex III?

While some negotiations

took place surrounding whether the article should be available to al1 Parties, the original
text was retained out of recognition that developing states have less capacity to respond
to a hazardous pesticide incident than developed states do.510

For any chernical which the Chemical Review Cornmittee decides to list in Annex III,5I1
a decision guidance document (DGD) rnust be prepared.512 The DGD is then reviewed at
a Conference of the Parties, where a decision will be made regarding the inclusion of the

5 0 6 ~Grandi,
.
"'Watch List' Mechanism A pproved by Nations Working on Chemical Trade Treaty" ( 1997)
20(22) Int'l Env. Rep. 993 at 993 [hereinafter "Watch List"].
507~@h
Session, supra note 473 at 9.
5 0 8 ~ iINC.5,
C
supra note 467 at 18-9, article 6.
SOgF@h
Session, supra note 473 at 9.
5lolbid at 10.
[Chemicals presently listed in annex III are: 2,4,5-T, Aldrin, Captafol, Chlordane, Chlordimeform,
Chlorobenzilate, DDT, Dieldrin, Dinoseb and Dinoseb Salts, 12-dibromoethane (EDB), Fiuorocetamide,
HCH (mixed isomers), Heptachlor, Hexachlorobenzene, Lindane, Mercury Compounds (including
inorganic mercury compounds, alkyl mercury compounds and akyloxyalkyl and aryl mercury compounds),
Pentachlorophenol, Monocrotophos (soluble liquid formulations of the substance which exceed 600g active
ingredient per litre), Methamidophos (soluble liquid formulations of the substance which exceed 600 g
active ingredient per litre), Phosphamidon (soluble liquid formuIations of the substance which exceed
1OOOg active ingredient per litre), Methyl-Parathion (certain formulations of parathion methyl emulsifiable
concentrates with 19.5%, 40%, 50%. 60% active ingredient and dus& containing 1.5%, 2% and 3% active
ingredient), Parathion (al1 formulations aerosols, dustable powder, emulsifable concentrate, granules and
wettable powders - of bis substance are included, except capsule suspensions), Crocidolite,
Polybrominated biphenyls (PBB), Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), Polychlorinated terphenyls (PCT), and
Tris (2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate. In this list the first 17 substances are pesticides, the next 5 are
severely hazardous pesticide formulations, and the last 5 are industrial chemicals. See PIC INC5, supra
note 467 at 37, annex III.
l2lbid at 19, article 7( 1).
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chernical in Amex III. Following this decision, a copy of the DGD will be sent to the
Parties.513

Those chemicals presently listed under the voluntary regime of the

InfernafionalCode and the London Guidelines will be included in Annex III as long as

they meet ail of the requirements for being Iisted and a Conference of the Parties
approves their inclusion.51J It is anticipated that at l e s t another 50 chemicals will be
added in the future.515 Chernicals may also be removed from annex III in accordance
with article 9.5'6

Article 10 specifies the obligations of importing states for chemicals listed in annex III.
Parties, within nine months following the receipt of a DGD must reply to the Secretariat
with their decision regarding the future importation of the chemical.5'7 Responses can
range from consenting to future importation518 to not consenting to any future
importations,519 or to consenting with specifications.520 Parties are also allowed to issue

an interim decision.521 Every six months the Secretariat will communkate a listing of ail
of the responses which it has received, as well as the administrative or legislative
measures upon which they have been based, where that information is available. 522 The
Secretariat will also provide the Parties with a listing of those states which have failed to
respond-s*

5131bid at 19, article 7(2),(3).
514~bid
at 19, article 8.
5"~angemus",
s u p note 94.
f 1 6 lm,
~ ~ supra
~
note 467 at 19-20, article 9.
517~bid
at 20, article 1 O(2).
5181bid at 20, article 10(4)(a)(i).
I9Ibid at 2 1, article 10(4)(a)(ii).
s20~bidat 2 1, article 10(4)(a)(iii).
52 Ibid at 2 1, article 10(4)(b).
5Ul&id
at 2 1, article 1 O( 1 0).
5231&id

Article 1 1 sets out the obligations for the export of a chemical listed in annex III. Parties

are directed to take appropriate Iegislative and administrative measures to ensure that no
Iater than six months following the receipt of a response, exporters comply with the
decisions in the response.524

Article 11 also further delineates the obligations of

exporting Parties where importing Parties have failed to respond or have responded
inadequate1y.m While this article does direct Parties to ensure that appropriate
legislative measures are placed into effect with regard to chemical exportation, it fails to
direct Parties to bind industry in relation to their broader involvement with chemical
trade.526

Export notifications to importing Parties are d s o required when the exporting Party
exports a chernical for which it has taken a final regulatory action, thereby banning or
severely restricted the use of the chemical within its own temt0ry.5~~The export
notification is to be provided with the first shipment following the final regulatory action,
and also with the first shiprnent in a calendar year and the fust shipment following any
adjustrnents to theu final regulatory action.528 The importing Party must acknowledge
receipt of the export notification within thirty days of its being sent by the exporter, and
in the event that there is no response the exporter must send a second notification.529 The
obligations for Parties under this article cease when a chemical is listed under annex III,
the importing party has responded to the Secretariat in accordance with article 10, and,

524~bid.at 22, articte I 1(1fi).
S2S~bid
a 22, article 1 l(2).
52bThisissue is discussed later in this chapter, see fornote 576 and accompanying text.
5 2 7 INC5,
~ 1 s~ u p note 467 at 23, article 12(1). The requirements for an export notification are set out in
annex V of the ciraft Convention. See ibid at 4 1, annex V.
528~bidai 23, article 12(2),(3).
529~6id
ai 23. article 12(4).

the Secretariat has distributed the responses to the Parties.530 The information which
must accompany exports of chernicals is specified in article 13."'

Article 14 provides for the exchange of information between the Parties, and directs that
Parties should facilitate the exchange of "scientific, technical, economic and legal
infonnation" including "toxicological, ecotoxicological and safety information" in
accordance with the tenor of the Convention.532

Parties are allowed to protect

confidential information but article 14(3) lists information which cannot be claimed as
confidential under the terms of the Convention, including information found in annexes

Im and IV53'$a chernical's expiry date, information related to precautionary measures,
and summary results from toxicological and ecotoxicoIogical tests.95

Negotiation took place surrounding whether production and expiration dates should be
regarded as confidential.53Wne delegate stated that this information was not always
available and suggested adding the text "where applicable and available"F7 Several
delegates felt that this would preclude the transparency required in the Convention, and
noted that it was hard to believe "that a manufacturer [did] not have these dates, and

[ M e r ] noted the importance of these dates for developing countries when importing
chernicals".fl* A compromise was reached with the inclusion of the expiry date as not
5301bid at 23, article I2(5).
5311bid at 23, article 13.
532~bidat 24, article 14(1)(a).
1 sets out the requirements for a notification to the Secretariat of a final reguiaiory action taken
533~nnex
by a Party, and specifies that the properties, identifications and name of the chemicai, as well as details of
the final regdatory action be provided. See ibid at 34, annex 1.
53J~nnexIV sets out the information and criteria required in order to list a banned or severely restricted
chernical in annex III. See ibid at 39, annex IV.
535fbid at 24-5, article 14 (3).
5 3 6 ~ 8 Session,
h
supra note 473 at 13.
5371bid at 14.
538ibid. at 14.

102
being confidential, and a new subparagraph 14(4) stating that the production date is
"normally not considered to be confidential".539

Article 15 discusses the implementation of the Convention. It directs Parties to take the
necessary measures to ensure that their national infrastructure and institutions wiIl
effectively carry out the intention of the Convention, including any alteration required
in their national legislation or administrative measures. Additionally, Parties may

establish national data banks and registen on chemicals, encourage industry to promote
chemical safety, and promote voluntary agreements with other states, having taken into
account article 16 which deals with technical assistance.540

Article 16 titled 'Technicd Assistance' states:
The Parties shall, taking into account in particular the needs of developing
countries and countries with economies in transition, cooperate in
promoting technical assistance for the development of infrastructure and
the capacity necessary to manage chemicals to enable implementation of
this Convention. Parties with more advanced programmes for regulat ing
chemicals should provide technical assistance, including training to other
Parties in developing their infrastructure and capacity to manage
chemicals throughout their life-cycle."l
This small article can be contrasted with the much more detaiIed article on Technical
Assistance found in the London Guidelines.s42 While the London Guidelines were
5391bid,and PIC INCS, supra note 467 at 25, article 14(4).
5 4 0 INC5,
~ ~ ibid
~ at 25, article 15( 1).
54 l 1bid at 26, article 16.
542~ondon
GuideIines, supra note 343 at 167, article 1 5:
(a) IRPTC should encourage fünding agencies, such as the development banks and the
United Nations Development Programme, and biiateral banks to provide training,
technical assistance and h d i n g for institutional strengthening and should fiirttier
encourage other United Nations organizations to strengthen their activities related to safe
management of chemicals;
(b) States w ith more advanced chemical regdatory programmes should provide technical
assistance to other countries in developing inffastnicture and capacity to manage

criticised as k i n g unrealistic because they do not recognise that much of this technology,
information and expertise is within the hands of industry,j43 the Convention is even less
expansive on this issue. This may be because there is now a recognition that under the
present global economic and political system, there is no political will to achieve such
assistance anyway.

The issue of cornpliance with the Convention, and the institutional mechanisms to ded
with non-cornpliance, are matters which have k e n left for the Conference of the Parties

chemicals within their countries, including implementation of the provisions of these
Guidelines. Developing counties with more advanced systems should be particuIarIy
encouraged to provide technical assistance to other developing countries with no, or less,
advanced, systems of chemicals management. To the extent possible, donor countries
and institutions and recipient countries should inform IRPTC of al1 such technical
assistance activities;
(c) Special attention should be devoted by technical assistance and fiuiding authorities to
those countries without any regdatory procedures on chemicals in developing a regime
for their control;
(d) Essential elements of technical assistance needed by developing countries for the
management of chernicals include:
(i) Strengthening existing infrastructureand institutions;
(ii) provisions for the interchange of experts, including short missions, Ciom
developed countries and vice versa and in particular fiom one developing country to
another for the purposes of:
a Sharing each other's experience and exchanging ideas;
b. Advising on analysis of information on chemical risks and benefits, conducting
environmental impact assessment, and disposing of unusable products safely;
c. Sharing information on new products and alternatives;
d. Ascertaining research and development requirements for local pesticide efficacy
studies and development of alternatives;
e. Assisting one another in dealing with practicaI diEculties in implementing these
Guidelines;

(iii) Training to inciude:
a. Technical workshops on a local, regional ad international level;
b. Awareness campaigns on the safe management of chemicals for industrial
workers, customs oficials and doctors;
c. Opportunities for decision makers in developing countries to study systems in
countries which have been successfully implementing these Guidelines.
543~ee
Section 4 3 of this thesis.

to decide?

The remaining articles primarily deai with administrative aspects of the

Convention. Article 18 details the establishment of the Conference of the Parties,
matters to be handled, and fiiture Coderence of the Parties' guidelines."'

establishes the Secretariat and its duties."

Article 19

The settlement of disputes is found in article

20, where Parties are accorded the nght to settle disputes either through recouse to
arbitration or the International Court of Justice.547 If the Parties elect upon ratification to
not choose either of these two alternatives, and are unable to settle the dispute amongst
themselves, the dispute will be submitted to a conciliation commission, who will render a
report with recornmendations.w This latter article also required extensive negotiations,
because the addition of this text extended the means of dispute resolution farther than that
found in previous MEAS."

Articles 21-30 of the Convention deal with the technical matters incidental to its
implementation.j50

On the final day of negotiations, the Chair proposed that the Convention, to be signed in
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, be known as "The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chernicals and Pesticides in
International Trade"?" It is scheduled to be signed in September 1998.jR Until the PIC
Convention has been ratified by 50 states it will not corne into force?
"PIC INC5, supra note 467 at 26, micle 17.
5451bid at 26-7, article 18.
5461bid at 27-8, article 19.
"?lbid at 28-9, article 20(2).
"8ibid at 28-9, article 20(6).
F@hSession, supra note 473 at 1 7.
5 5 0 INC.5,
~ ~ supra
~
note 467 at 29-33, articles 2 1-30.
55 I F$h Session, supra note 473 at 23.
552ibid at 26.
S 5 3 INC5,
~ ~ supra
~
note 467 at 32, article 26(1).

This is expected

to take several years, and therefore, during the interim period, a voluntaxy non-binding
agreement which mirmrs the PIC Convention will be used.sH

An overall critique of this Convention begins with the observation that it "does not

significantiy exceed the scope of the existing voluntary framework"?

This Convention

does not cure any of the issues previously highlighted as being problematic with the
voluntary regime. While two critiques regarding the nexus between this MEA and the

GATT 1994/WTO system, and the inadequate inclusion of technology transfer
provisions, have been discussed above, the foilowing cornments can also be made about

the draft Convention.

First, the failure to provide a mandatory means of dispute resolution has been criticised as
it is feared that it will allow Parties "to circumvent their obligations"*~6under the
Convention. If this is true the Convention rnay be little different in practice than its
voluntary predecessors. Delegates did argue that conciliation commissions have proven
to be "extremely effective in resolving disputes in other areas of international law, such
as in trade and amis contro1",SS7and while this may be the case, it is the subject nature of

the Convention which should dictate that a more stringent and mandatory dispute
mechanism be required. In this sense, it is the magnitude of the h m to be avoided
which is worthy of consideration. The decision to adopt this sort of dispute resolution
can be characterised as being directly proportional to the amount of political will directed

"Countries Agree on Final DraR of Prior Infomed Consent Treaty"(1998) 2 l(6) Int'l Env.
Rep. 245 Fereinafter "Countries Agree"].
55s~$h
Sesrion, supra note 473 at 24.
556~bidat 25.
Ss4~.Kirwin.

557~bid

toward achieving its aims. If states were intent upon meeting the terms of the Convention
themselves, they would not be 'fearfùi' of having a mandatory dispute settiement process.

Another critique of the Convention is that it is silent with respect to the needs of
developing states to fùnding. Without a funding mechanism, the Convention's benefits
may not actually be available for developing states?

What is needed is a funding

mechanism similar to that found in the Montreal Protocol.ss9 This MEA created a
Multilateral Fund (MLF) which was fmanced by contributions nom the Parties, and was
available to those Parties to the agreement who were both developing states and met
certain specifications set out in the agreement.'"

The purpose of the MLF was directed

toward ensuring cornpliance by developing states with the measures of the MEA.561
While the success of the MLF has been a matter of debate,SQ its inclusion expressly
recognised a need to assist some of the Parties to meet the overall goal of the Protocol.

The inclusion in the Montreal Protocol of the following article provides a d u e to the
absence of such a mechanism in the ciraft PIC Convention.
The financial mechanism set out in this Article is without prejudice to any
other future arrangements that may be developed with respect to other
environmental issues.563
It may well be that the Parties themselves have found that the critiques surrounding the

MLF are justified, and have therefore opted to refrain from the creation of a similar
mechanism in the current MEA.
5581bid.at 24.
S59~ontreol
Protocof,supra note 106 at article 10.
560~rticle5 o f the Montreai Prolocol sets out the characteristics of developing nation-states for its own
urposes.
g61Monfred Protocof,supra note 1 O6 at article 10(1).
5 6 2 ~ Khosla,
.
"The Montreal Pmtocol: the Fint Decade of the Fim Global Environmental Agreement"
( 1997) 7(lO) Dev. Alternatives 1 ;B. Rich, Mortgaging the W h : The WorfdBank, Environmental
Impoverishmenr and the Crish of Developmenf (London: Earthscan, 1994) at 278; and, M.S. Soroos, "The
Thin Blue Line: Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons"(1998) 40(2) Env. 7.
563 ~ o n t r e aProtocof,
f
supra note 1O6 at article 1 O(10).

The absence of a funding mechanism is also interesting because the need for one was
discussed by the INC at their third session?

At that tirne article 19 was titled 'Financial

Resources and Mechanisms', and LJNEP presented a summary of options for mechanisms
which could be used, as found in various other ME AS."^ Suggested options were:
providing for administrative costs, provisions goveming financial
resources and mechanisms for technical and financiai cooperation, and
institutional arrangements for the financial mechanism and operational
procedures for fmancial resources."

In the ensuing discussion the delegations acknowledged the need for f i c i a l resources,
The
and the desire to avoid a Convention based solely on voluntary ~ontributions.5~~
Chair, having taken into account the comments of the delegations, stated that there
"would have to be at least one paragraph refemng to financial mechanisrns, although
there did not have to be a detailed budgetm.568 A contact group was formed to consider
the various options and to develop a text.569

This group later reported that two

mechanisms would be required: one for administrative costs, and one for fmancial and
technical assistance.570 The issue of whether the contributions should be voluntary or
mandatory remained contested.571 This issue was not discussed at the fourth INC
session,5n and the negotiations for the fifth session provide no insight into their absence
from the draft text.573 It is possible that this is a matter which will be handled by the
Conference of the Parties.574 It is worth noting that when some developing states

session, supra note 480 at 25.
564~hird
s6s~bid
566fbid

5671bidat 26.
568~bid
569~bid
570/bid at 27.
57

Ibid.

572~owfh
Session, supra note 482 at 16.
573fiJh Session, supra note 473.
5 7 4 IiVC.
~ 5
~, supra
~
note 467 at 32-3, article 18(5)(c). This article states:

"stressed the importance of strengthening the innasrnichire of developing countries to
enable implementation of the Convention, and suggested speciQing the technical and
financial needs of developing countries" under article 16, the Chair stated "that al1 needs

are implicit in the text"."

It is to be hoped that a more concrete recognition of the

hancial needs of developing states will be forthcoming.

A third critique c m be made regarding the silence of this Convention regarding the role

of MNCs in the trade of chemicals. In large part the success of this Convention will
depend upon industry acceptance and adherence to its principles. Even though they are
not bound directly, industry has been mentioned in two areas of the Convention: in article
1 1(l)(b) which requires nations-states to take adequate legislative and administrative

measures to control exporters; and, in article 15(l)(b), which requires the encouragement
of chemical safety by industry.576 What this Convention fails to do is expressly recognise
the extent to which industry itself controls those factors upon which the success of the
Convention is predicated, such as product information and technology. This lack of
attention to the impact of industry and its controlling presence over the heart of the
subject matter may prove to be a fateful choice for this chemical management regime.s77

This lack of direction to industry can also be contrasted with the extensiveness of specific
directions to industry found in the International Code. Not only were actors other than
governments targeted by this Code, but there are nurnerous references to the requirement
The Conference o f the Parties shall keep under continuous review and evaluation the
implementation of this Convention. It shall perform the fbnctions assigned to it by the
Convention and, to this end, shall:
(c) Consider and undertake any additional action that may be required for the
achievement of the objectives of the Convention.
S 7 S ~ f Session,
lh
supra note 473 at 15.
5 7 6 ~ eprevious
e
text at footnotes 526 and 540.
577~his
is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4 of this thesis.

of industry CO-operationand of direct obligations placed upon them.*78 The intention of
the International Code with respect to industry is found in article 12.3, where it states:
The pesticide industry should cooperate fully in the observance of this
Code and promote the principles and ethics expressed by the Code,
irrespective of a govemment's ability to observe the Code.s79
The fact that the International Code was drafted at a time when the Code of Conduct was
also being drafted may partially explain the acceptability to negotiators of the direct
references to industry.

A fourth c o r n e n t can also be made which mirrors one made earlier in relation to the
Inrerrzational

Code and its failure to ernploy the precautionary p r i n ~ i p l e . The
~ ~ ~PIC

Convention fails to include mention of the precautionary principle. The precautionary
pnnciple has been applied in other MEAs, such as the Montreal ProtocoP8[ and the
United Nations Framework Convention o n CZimate Change .58* It has also been applied

578~ee
Internori~na~Code~suuprnote
126atarticles 1,32,3.4,3.6,3.8,3.10,4.1,4.5,52,5.3,5J,61,
8.1, 102, 1 0.3, 1 1.1, 12.1, and 12-3. While this may be attributable to the fact that the i n t e r n a t i o ~Code
l
was non-binding, other international instruments have placed obligations upon third parties. See Section
5.4 of this thesis.
5791bid at 186, article 12.3.
S80~ee
footnote 430 and accompanying text.
""The pream ble states:
Determined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control
equitably total global emissions of substances that delete it...
Montreal Protucol, supra note 106 at 37, preamble.
582~rticle
3.3 states:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the
causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of fiil1 scientific certainty shouId not be used as a
reason for postponing such measwes, taking into account that policies and measures to
deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the
lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and rneasures should take into
account different socio-economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover al1 devant sources,
sinks and reservoin of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and compromise al1 economic
sectors. Efforts ta address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested
Parties.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May I992,3 1 1.L.M. 848, cited to ( 1w3)
Touro. J. Transn'l L. 177 at 183, article 3 3 bereinafter Climate Chmge Convention].

in combination with a consent procedure, such as in the Paris Convention for the

Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic.583

Whiie the

precautionary principle is complex5" and therefore perhaps difficult to enshrine in a

MEA, its presence in the OSPAR Convention, as combined with a notification procedure,

has k e n described both as a successfid partnerships85 and a necessary one because "the
need for anticipation and assessment of the possible outcornes of any pianned action" is
As such, the principle
"fundamental to the application of the precautionary prin~iple".58~

should have been included in the present MEA.

It is likely that some negotiators of the PIC Convention would find the inclusion of such a
principle to be deleterious to trade interests.587 In contrast, the PIC procedure achieves

the opposite. It allows both the trade and use of hannful chemicals. Therefore, the PIC

S83~he
consent or Pnor Justification Pmcedure is implemented by the Oslo Commission under the
Convention, "whereby substances may only be introduced if it has k e n indicated with an acceptable
margin of uncertainty that they do not cause h m to the environment". See O. McIntyre & T. Mosedale,
"The Precautionary Principle a a Nom of Customary International Law" (1997) 9(2) J. Env. L. 22 1 at 225
[hereinaiter Mclntyre], and see Park Conventionfor the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-Eust Atlantic, 22 September 1992, (1 993) 32 I.L.M. 1068, cited to (visited 16 August 1998)
<http://sedac.cies in.org/pidb/texts/acrc/MEofNE.txt.hûnI~mereinafier OSPAR Convention]. The
provisions dealing with the transmission of information are found in articles 6, 8-10.22-3. The
precautionaq pri&iple, in article 2(2Xa) smtes:
The Conmcting Parties shall apply:
(a) the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken
when there are reasoiable &OUI& for concern that substances or energy introduced,
dkctly or indirectly, into the marine environment rnay bring about hazards to human
health, h m ~ivin~~resources
and marine ecosysterns, damage amenities or interfere with
other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is n o conclusive evidence of a causal
relationship between the inputs and the effects;
S84~or
a discussion of the precautionary principle see Mclntyre, ibid; J. Moffet, "Legislative Options for
Implementing the Precautionary Principle" (1996-97) 7 J.E.L.P. 157; and, T. O'Riordan & J. Carneron, eds.,
Interpreting the Precaurionary Princrj>le (London: Earthscan, 1994).
585~c~ntyre,
ibid at 225.
586~bidat 238.
587~ollowing
a recent proposal in the U.S. to incorporate the precautionary principle into decision-making,
it was characterised by the chemical industry as "antagonistic toward sound science, has its origins in
instinct and feeling, and threatens the entire chemical industry". See B. Hileman, "Preautionary Principle:
As Defined Recently, the Principle Provides a New Guide to U.S. Environmental Policy" (1998) 76(6)
Chem. & Eng. News 16 at 16.

111
procedure as an aid to environmentai protection is extremely limited. Al1 it achieves is a
warning for States when enough global scientific evidence has been obtained which
indicates that a chernicd is harmfiil - it never mandates that the accumulation of such a
volume of information requires a ban on their use.588

A f d critique can be made regarding what the Convention does not say. By looking at

the negotiation process issues which appear to have been sidelined or negotiated away,
become apparent. Of interest is the presence in a former dmft of an article titled 'Liability
and Compensation'. Not only was the inclusion of such an article debated, but whether a
liability and compensation regime could be developed or, whether a future Conference of
the Parties should address the matter.589 Although discussed at the third INC, this article

was not mentioned in later negotiation reports. The presence of such an article could
have had far reaching implications, even for industry.

A second chemical management convention is presently being drafted and will deal with

a set of chemicals whose environmental effects are, without doubt, devastating. It is with
interest that the preliminary negotiations of the POPs Convention will be examined,
because this set of chemicals necessitates a strong political will in order to ensure that the
magnitude of the harm is adequately addressed. While the draft PIC Convention has its
failings, it in generai deais with a less serious environmental threat. In this context, the
POPs Convention should surpass the strides made in negotiating the PIC Convention.

S88~ome
negotiators expmsed dismay that the PIC Convention did not ban the chemicals, but noted that it
had been necessary for them to compromise their position after other nation-states had argues that such a
ban would be both unrealistic and unfair to their interests. A chemical in contention was DDT which is
used several nation-sîates, including Brazil and India as a means to control the spread of malaria See
"CountriesAgree", supra note 554, and "Watch List",supra note 506.
5 8 9 ~ ~ e ssupra
s h note
, 480 at 27.

5.0 Persistent Organic Pollutants

Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) is the t e m used to refer to a set of chemicals which
have a distinguishing set of characteriçtics.
Persistent organic pollutants ...are organic compounds of natural or
anthropogenic ongin that resist photolytic, chemical and biological
degradation. They are charactensed by low water solubility and hi& lipid
solubility, resulting in bioaccumulation in fatty tissues of Living
organisms. POPs are semi-volatile and therefore, able to move long
distances in the atmosphere, and are also transported in the environment in
low concentrations by movement of fresh and marine waters, resulting in
widespread distribution across the earth, including regions where they
have never k e n used.290
POPs have become a topic of global concern due to their serious environmental and
health effects. These substances have been shown to have toxic effects on animal
reproduction, development and immunological function?

In addition, they have been

observed to cause reduced immunity in infants and children, developmental
abnormalities, neurobehavioural impairment, cancer and tumour growth, 592 bkth defects

and reduced male sperm countsY

S 9 0 1 ~lntergovemmental
~~,
Forum on Chernical Safety, IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group on Persistent
Organic Pollutants Meeting Final Report on 21-22 June 1996, Manila, Philippines,
IFCS/WG.POPs/REPORT.
1 ( 1996), cited to UNEP, Prepmation ofan lnrernational Legalfy Binding
Imtmment for Implementing InfernationalAction on Certain Persistent O r g d c Pollutants,
LMEP/POPs/MC. I/MF/4 ( 1998) (visited 25 July 1998)
dittp://irptc.unep.ch/POPSSIncmclCC I/inf4.htm> at 3, paragraph 1,
5 9 1 ~ Wania
.
& D. MacKay, 'Tracking fhe Distribution of Persistent Organic Pollutants: Control Snategies
for these Contaminants Will Require a Better Understanding of How They Move Around the Globe"
(1996) 30(9) Env. Sci. & Tech. 390 A.
5 9 2 ~ .Ritter, K.R. Solomon & J. Forgei, Persistent Organic Pollutants: An Asrersmenr Report on: DDTA ldrin-Dieldrin-Encfrin-Chiorhne-Heptachlor-Hexachlorbenzene-Mirer-Taraphene-Pofychlorinated
B@henyls-Diaxinsand Furam (Prepared for the International Programme on Chemical Safety, 1995)
(visited 29 November 1997) dittp~/irptc.unep.ch/pops/indx.htms>,Introduction at 1.
5 9 3 ~ Pruzin,
.
"UN/ECE Drafi Protocol on Heavy Metals, Persistent Organic Pollutants Concluded" (1998)
21(4) Int'l Env, Rep. 141 [hereinafter "UNECE Draft"].

The international community rn0bilised5~~
to seek a legal means to control the use of

POPs as the nsks associated with them were increasingly identified."s

States first

considered whether the mandate of the PIC Convention could be broadened to also
regulate POPs. This is evidenced by Decision 18/12, of the Eighteenth Session of the

LMEP Governing Council, wherein the Executive Director of UNEP was requested to
organise a Govemment-designated group of experts "to consider, takuig into account the
work done in al1 forums...and recommend what M e r measures are needed to reduce the
risks fiom a limited number of hazardous chemicals, either within or beyond the scope of

The results of this inquiry were to be
[the] existing prior inf'ormed consent proced~re".~%
reported to the W E P Goveming Council at its Nineteenth Sessi0n.59~

The Decision also directed that at the Nineteenth Session, the UNEP Governing Council,
having heard the recommendations of the government-designated group of experts,

...should

give consideration to the need to develop M e r measures,
within or beyond the pnor informed consent procedure, to reduce the risks
from a limited nurnber of hazardous chemicais, including the possibility
that the mandate of the intergovemmental negotiating cornmittee for the

5 9 4 ~ October
n
23, 1995, the European Union, Iceland and Norway proposed that a global POPs treaty be
negotiated, see C. Hogue, "EU, Iceland, Norway Cal1 for Treaty to Control Persistent Organic Pollutants"
(1995) 18(22) Int'l Env. Rep. 8 19, and C. Hogue, "Countries Seek Treaty to Curb or Halt Emissions,
Production of Some Chemicals" (1 995) 18(23) Int'l Env. Rep. 856. In the past five years the international
community has discussed the impact of POPs in several different forums, including: the Parties to the
Barcefona Conventionfir the Protection ofthe Mediterranean Sea Againsi Pollution in June 1995; at the
International Experts Meeting on Persistent Organic Pollutants: Towards Global Action in June 1995; The
Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Programme of Action in October-November 1995; and,
the North Amencan Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Sound Management of Chemicals
Initiative in October 1995. For a discussion of these initiatives see UNEP, Status Report on UNEPLF and
Other Refated Activities on Persistenl Organic Pollutants (POPs) (visited 25 July 1998)<
http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/status.htmI~[hereinafterSlutus Report],and D. Vanderzwaag,
"International Law and Arctic Marine Conservation and Protection: A Slushy, ShiAing Seascape" (1997) 9
Georgetown Int'l Env. L. Rev. 303.
5 9 s U N ~Persisrent
~,
Organic PolIutants: Introduction (visited 29 Novem ber 1997) <
h ~/irptc.unep.ch/pops/intrd)1.html> at 1.
59 11812. supra note 45 1 at 2, paragraph 2.
59716idat 2.

'2'

legally binding prior informed consent procedure be extended to provide a
basis for development of such measures-598

This decision to unite the two emerging instruments within a framework chernical
management instrument was later discarded by both FA0599 and W P , W and the PIC

and POPs Conventions have, as a consequence, been developed separately nom each
0ther.W' However, Decision 19/13 D of the UNEP Goveming Council did direct that the
two instruments be developed "in a manner that ensures eficiency and coherence".m

Also at the Eighteenth Session of the UNEP Governing Council, Decision 18/32 was
adopted, wherein it was requested that the Inter-Organisation Programme for the Sound
Management of Chemicals (IOMC), dong with the International Programme on
Chemical Safety (IPCS), the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) and an

A d Hoc Working Group, commence an assessment of a short-list of POPs603 already
being reviewed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE).W

The IFCS were further invited to develop recornmendations and information for a
"possible decision regarding an appropriate international legai mechanism", after having
taken into account the different circumstances of developing States by consolidating

5981bid.at 2, paragraph 3.
5991 11th Councii, supra note 459 at 1.

" 1 9/13~,supra note 463 at 2, paragraph 1.

or more discussion on rhis point see C. Hogue, "UNEP Official Says Linking Global Pacts on
Chemicals Would Enswe Coordination" (1996) lg(l9) Int'l Env, Rep. 808.
M 2 U N ~Decisions
~,
Adopted by the Governing Council at Its Nineteenth Session. 19/130: Enhanced
Coherence and Eflciency Among International Activifies Related to Chemicals ( 1 997). cited to (visited 29
November 1997) <ht~p://irptc.unep.ch/pic/fiirmer/gcfram-e.htm1>at 1,
6 0 3 ~ hUNECE
e
commenced negotiations for a Protocol on POPs to their Convention on Long-Range
TrunsboundaryAir Pollution in 1995. The twelve POPs targeted for action were: PCBs, dioxins, furans,
aldn'n. dieldrin, DDT, endrin, chiordane, hexachlombenzene, mirex, toxaphene, and heptachlor. See
UNEP, Decision 18/32 of the UNEP Governing Council: Persktent Organic Polfutanis (1995) cited to
(visited 25 July 1998) dittpY/@tc.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/gc 1832en.htmb at 1-2 bereinafier 18/32],and
Status Report, supra note 594 at 1.
6ai18/32, ibid at 1. paragraph 1.

existing information on POPs and by analysing their relevant transport pathways, dong
with their origin, transport, and deposition.605 In addition, considerations relevant to

POPs production such as their sources, benefits and nsks, their availability and the
availability of any substitutes, and the means to reduce a d o r eliminate the emissions,
discharges and losses of POPs was to be assessedP06

In October 1995 UNEP, on behalf of the IOMC, established an IOMC Ad Hoc Working
Group on POPs.607 This Working Group was given the responsibility to develop a work
plan, which included the identification of resource needs.608 It was M e r proposed that
the Working Group would include representatives, aside from the Chair, fiom the IOMC
organisations, from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, from four
States of each of the five United Nations regions, and from industry and public interest
groups.609 Other interested parties were also welcomed as observen to the process.610

Recognising a need for increased information regarding the assessrnent of POPs, the
Executive Director of UNEP, together with the President of the IFCS, sent requests to
Govemments and international organisations for POPs case studies in January 1996.611
This information was later collated into a report for presentation at the first session of the
POPs Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee.612

60518/32,supra note 603 at 2, paragraphs I(a),@).
606/bid at 2, paragraphs 1(c),(d).
6 0 7 ~ t aReport,
t~
supra note 594 at 3, paragraph 8.
6081bid
6 0 9 1 ~ ~supra
~ , note 590 at 5, paragraph 8.

io/bid
3, paragraph 10.
6 1 2 ~ eUNEP,
e
Conrideration of Possible Criteriafor Identlfying Furlier Persistent Orgmic Pollutants pr
Candicla~esforIntermtiond Action, UNEP/POPS/MC. 1/6, ( 1W8), cited to (visited 25 July 1 998)
<http~///uptc.unep.ch~pops/POPs-InmC-l/inc 1 -6.htm> Fereinafter ConsiCieration].

61 l~tatu.s
Report, supra note 594 at
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The IOMC A d Hoc Working Group later secured agreement on its work plan at the
second meeting of the Inter-Sessional Group of the IFCS, in March 1 9 9 6 F At this time
it was reconstituted as the IFCS A d Hoc Working Group on POPs and was requested to
continue its "assessrnent process and to develop recommendations and S o m a t i o n on
international actionn.614 Participants at the meeting agreed that work "on the science of
chemistry and toxicity and the global transport of POPs should be conthued..." with
additional work to be done on the "risk/benefit equation and on substitutes for present
POPs and the possible consequences of their use".615

In June 1996, two meetings to discuss POPs were convened in Manila, the Phi1ippinesP16
The first was an experts' meeting, and this together with the collected Govemment
information fiom UNEP, became the basis of discussion at the second meeting. At the
latter meeting, held by the IFCS A d Hoc Working Group, "a report containing
information and recornmendations on international action" was developed for
presentation to the UNEP Governing Council at its Nineteenth Session.617

The IFCS Ad Hoc Working Group on Persistent Organic Pollutants Meeting Final
Report represented the work of representatives of "32 countries, 7 non-govemmental

organizations and 7 intergovernmental organizations".618 Predicated upon the mandate
received from Decision 18/32, the IFCS A d Hoc Working Group developed several
general recommendations, including the following:
6 1 3 1 ~supra
~ ~ , note 590 at 5, paragraph 9(c).
6141bid at 6, paragmph 9(e).
615"~lobal
Initiative on POPs Progressing; Format for Pact to be Appmved in 1997" (1996) 19(6) Int'l Env.
Re -209 at 209.
6' Status Report, supm note 594 at 3, paragraph 9, and IFCS, supro note 590 at 6, paragraphs 9(g), (h).
6 i 7 ~ ibid
~ ~at 6,
~ paragraph
,
9(h). See ais0 "U.N. Urged to Negotiate Treaty on Persistent Organic
Pollutants"(1996) 19(19) Int'I Env. Rep. 808.
6 1 8 1 ~ibid
~ ~at, 2.
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that tiere was sufficient information to conclude a need for international action on the

12 specified POPs and that it required a legally binding instrument;
that different approaches were required for the three categories of POPs (pesticides,

industrial chemicals, and unintentionally produced by-products and contaminants);
that there was a need for the generation of scientific criteria and a procedure for the
identification of additional POPs;
that the elements of the UNECE protocol should be considered in the development of
the instrument;
that measures were required for the development and sharing of information about

POPs;and,
that the full participation of developing States was essential and necessitated
provisions on technical assistance, capacity building and funding.619

At the Nineteenth Session of the UNEP Goveming Council, Decision 19/13 C endoned
the findings and recornmendations of the IFCS A d Hoc Working Group, and stated that:

...immediate

international action should be initiated to protect hurnan
health and the environment through measures which will reduce and/or
eliminate...the emissions and discharges of the twelve persistent organic
pollutants specified in Goveming Council decision 18/32620 and, where
appropriate, eliminate production and subsequently the remaining use of
those persistent organic pollutants that are intentionally produced;62l
The Decision aiso directed that the international action should include:

6191bid,at 7-10.
62%ese twelve POPs are also found in the üN/ECE protocol, see footnotes 600,639.
621UNEP. Decisions Adopted by the Governing Council at its Nineteenth Session: 19/13C. International
Action to Protect Human Health and the Environment Through Memures Which WiffReduce a d o r
Efimimte Emissiom and Discharges of Persistent Organic Pof futants, h cfuding the Dwe fopment of an
International LegaffyBinding Imtmment, (1997), cited to (visited 29 November 1997) <
httpJ/irptc.unep.ch/pops/> at 2, paragraph 4 bereinafter 1W I 3CJ.

(a) Use of separate, differentiated approaches to take action on pesticides,
industrial chemicals, and unintentionally produced by-products and
contarninants;
(b) Use of transition periods, with phased implementation for various
proposed actions;

(c) Careful and efficient management of existing stocks of the specified
persistent organic pollutants and, where necessary and feasible, their
elhination;
(d) Training in enforcement and monitoring of use to discourage the
misuse of persistent organic pollutant pesticides;

(e) Remediation of contarninated sites and environmental reservoirs,
where feasible and practicable, taking into account national and regional
considerations in the light of the global significance of the problem;6=
In addition, possible trade impacts, and other socio-econornic factors were to be taken
into consideration in the development and implementation of the international
initiative.63

To achieve its aims, the Decision requested that the Executive Director of UNEP
convene, with assistance from other affliated organisations, such as the World Health
Organisation (WHO), an Intergovemmental Negotiating Cornmittee (INC) with a
mandate to prepare an international legally binding instrument for the initially specified
twelve POPs.624 In doing so they were directed to take into consideration the work of the
UNECE in the development of the üN/ECE protocol on P O P S . ~ ~ ~

In addition, the Executive Director of UNEP was requested to initiate immediate action
on the recommendations of the report, which was to include:

6*fbid. at 2. paragraph 5.
6 U ~ b i dat 2. paragraph 7(e).
624~bidat 2, paragraph 8.
62sfbid at 3, paragraph 10.

development and sharing of information on POPs;
monitoring and evaluating the success of any strategies;
improving the availability of information and expertise;
providing guidance for alternatives to POPs;
assisting 6 t h the identification of PCBs and the means for their destruction; and,
identifjring dioxins and furans and how to manage them.626

In February 1997, it was decided that the IFCS A d Hoc Working Group would continue
to provide support until the first MC meeting.627 During 1997-1998, UNEP together

with the IFCS have conducted regional awareness raising workshops in Central and
Eastern Europe, Asia and the Pacific, Afnca, Central America and the Caribbean, South
America and West Asia.628 In a Resolution of 5-14 May 1997, the Fiftieth World Health
Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the IFCS A d Hoc Working Group, and
requested that the Director General of the WHO, actively participate in the INC for a
Iegally binding instrument on POPs.629

5.1 The UNECE POPs Protocol

Remembering Decision 19/13 C of the UNEP Governing Council, which recornrnended
that "due consideration" be given to the work of the UNECE in their development of a

a6/bid. at 3-4, paragraph 1 3.
6 2 7 ~ t uReport,
t~
s u p note 594 at 4, paragraph 15.
6281bidat 4, paragraph 16.
629w HA, Resolution WHAiiO.13. on the Promotion of Chemicai Safity, WithSpecial Attention to Persktent
Organic Pollutants Adopted by the Fifrieth World Health Assembly, Held in Geneva 5- 14 May 1997, WHA
Res. 50.13 (1997) cited to UNEP,heparation of an International Legaliy Binding Instrument for
ImpfementingInternational Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, UNEPPOPSANC.1 /iNF/6
(1997) (visited 25 July 1998)
dittp~/i~tc.unep.ch/pops/POPs-InclMc1/inf6.htm> at 3, paragraph 3.

regional protocol on persistent organic pollutants,63* it is prudent to start any
consideration of the future POPs Convention with an examination of this work.

In 1983 the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution entered
into force.631 Negotiations632 for a protocol on POPs took eight years to complete,633 and
on June 24, 1998, it was signed by 32 states634 and the European Community, at the
'Environment for Europe' Ministerial Conference held in Aarhus, Denmark. This
protocol will be administered by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, including
countries of Western and Eastern Europe as well as Canada and the United S t a t e ~ . " ~

5.1.1 An Overview of the Provisions

The preamble to the protoc01636 mentions the need to alleviate the harm fiom POPs and
acknowledges their peculiar characteristics. It also specificaily mentions the international
legal principles upon which it is based:
WI.?C,supra note 62 1 at 3, paragraph 10.
63 UNIECE, Convention on Long-Range Transbounahry Air Pollution (visited 5 August 1998)
< h t r p ~ l ~ ~ ~ . u n e c e . o r g / e n vIh.hm>
p ~ h at 1.
a 2 ~ o rinformation regarding the negotiation process for this protocol see: "U.N. Working Gmup Offen
Draft Text for Persistent Organic Pollutants" (1995) 18(14) Int'l Env. Rep. 604; "Group Moves on Three
Areas of Treaty on Long-Range Transbound;uy Air Pollution" (1995) l8(2O) Int'l Env. Rep. 754; "Texts of
POPs, NOx, Heavy Metals Protocols Planned for Completion No Later Than 1998" (1 996) l9(25) Int'l Env.
Rep. 1093; "Progress on POPs Makes Conclusion of Protocol by 1998 Likely, Oficial Says" (1997) 20(3)
Int'l Env. Rep. 98; and, J. Cohen, "POPs Protoc01 With 15-18 Substances Expected to be Finalized by Early
1998" (1997) 20(9) Int'l Env. Rep. 4 15.
6 3 3 " U N / Draft",
~ ~ ~ supra note 593, and D. Pruzin, "Environment Ministers Sign Protocols On Heavy
MetaIs, Organic Pollutants" (1998) 21(14) Int'I Env. Rep. 663 bereinafter "Sign Protocois"].
634~hese
States were: Austria, Belgiurn, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northem Ireland, and the United States of
Amesica. See UNECE, Environmentfor Europe: 32 Countries and the European Cornmuni@ Sign Two
New Protocols to the Convention on Long-Range Transbouruhry Air Pollution, Press Release
13e.htm> at
ECE/ENV/98/13 (1 998), cited to (visited 5 August 1998) ~http~/www.unece.org/pressl98env
1.
6 3 5 " ~ POPs
~ ~ , Accords Progressing" (1998) 21(2) Int'l Env. Rep. 76.
6 3 6 U N / ~Dr@
~ ~ , Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transbounahy Air Pollution on Perskteru
Organic Pollutants, EB.AI W 199812, (1 W8), cited to UNEP, Prepuration of an International Legally

Resolved to take rneasures to anticipate, prevent or minimise ernissions
from persistent organic pollutants, taking into account the application of
the precautionary approach, as set forth in principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development,
R e a f f i g that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmentai and
development policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not c a w darnage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdictior@
The preamble also notes the importance of private and non-governmental actors'
knowledge of POPs, available alternatives and abatement techniques, and therefore of
their role in alleviating the POPs problem.*8

It also states that the rneasures taken in

cornpliance with the protocol should not interfere arbitrarily or unjustifiably with t r ~ t d e . ~ ~ ~

The term 'persistent organic pollutants' is defmed in the protocol as:

...organic

substances that (i) possess toxic characteristics; (ii) are
persistent; (iii) bioaccumulate; (iv) are prone to long-range transboundary
atmospheric transport and deposition; and (v) are likely to cause
significant adverse human health or envuonmental effects near to and
distant tiorn their sources;640

The objective of the protocol "is to control, reduce or eliminate discharges, emissions and
losses of persistent organic pollutants".@l Parties are therefore directed to eliminate the

Binding Instrumentfor Implemenling International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollufants,
UNEP/POPS/iNC. IlINFl3, (1998), (visited 25 July 1998)
chnp:l/irptc.unep.ch/pops/P0PsSInc/MCC1/inf3 .hm> at 3, preamble [hereinafter UWECE ProtocoCJ. The
protoc01 is not yet in force. Sixteen signatories are required to ratiQ the protocol before it cornes into
force, and this is expected to take at least a year. See "Sign Protocols"supra note 633 at 663, and UAVECE
Prorocol, ibid at 15, article 18.
637UN/ECE Prorocol, ibid
6381bid at 4, pream ble.
6391bid
6401bid at 5, article 1.
@lIbidat 5, article 2.

production and use of substances found in annex

1,642

restrict the substances found in

annex II,a3 and to reduce total emissions of substances found in annex 11194 Article 4
sets out the exemptions which may be invoked by parties for the measures to be
undertaken under article 3. Exemptions exist for laboratory or reference-sized quantities
of POPs, for other specified forms of research with POPs, to manage a public emergency
with a POP or, for a minor application of a POP by a Party.us After applying for an

exemption, the Party must provide specific information to the Secretariat within ninety
days.w

Article 5 provides for the exchange of information and technology. It directs Parties to
facilitate such a process through their national laws, regulations and practices, and
through the promotion of "contacts and cooperation among organizations and individuals
in the private and public sectors that are capable of providing technology, design and
engineering services, equipment or financeU."7 Parties are also to facilitate exchange and
access to, information on alternatives and the risks of these substances, compile and
update information held by their DNAs which are engaged in other initiatives, and to
exchange information on activities in other international forumsP48 The protocol M e r
stipulates that the creation of public awareness is required to meet its airnsF9
642ibid at 5 , article 3(l Xa). Substances listed in annex 1are: Aldrin, Chlordane, Chlordecone, DDT,
Dieldrin, Endrin, Heptachlor, Hexabromobiphenyt, Hexachlorobenzene, Mirex, PCB, and Toxaphene. The
annex States any conditions for theu elimination. See ibid at 15-8, annex 1.
643ibid at 6, article 3(I Xc). Substances listed in annex II are: DDT, HCH, and PCB. Although some of
these substances are listed in annex 1, they are also found in annex 11 with specific restrictions on their use.
See ibid at 18-20, annex II.
644ibid at 6, article 5(a). The substances listed in this annex are: PAHs, DioxinslFums, and
Hexachlorobenzene. The reference year for the reduction of the emissions of these substances is also
provided. See ibid at 20- 1, annex III.
64516idat 7-8, article 4(1),(2).
646~6id
at 8, article 4(3).
"'1bid at 9, article S(a)
u8ibid at 9, article S(b),(c),(d).
6491bid at 9, article 6.

Article 7 States that Parties shall within six months of the protocol entering into force
"develop strategies, policies and programmes in order to discharge its obligations"Ps0 To

this end they are to:
encourage the use of environmentally sound management techniques to ail aspects of
"use, production, release, processing, distribution, handling, transport and
reprocessing of substances";
encourage implementation of management programmes to reduce emissions; consider
the adoption of other policies;
"make determined efforts" to reduce substances contained as contaminants in other
substances; and,
to consider the ability to propose additional substances for coverage.651

Other articles direct Parties to encourage research, development, monitoring and cooperationoz and to report information, according to their own laws of c ~ ~ d e n t i a l i tto
y,
the secretariat.6" Parties are able to review any collected information, the progress under
the protocol, and the effectiveness of the protocol measures.654 The cornpliance of the
Parties will be reviewed regularly,655 and disputes can be settled by the International
Court of Justice, through arbitration, or by a conciliation commission.656

650fbid at 10, article 7(1).
6511bidat 10, article 7(2).
652/bid at 10, article 8.
6531bid at 1 1, article 9.
6541bid. at 12, article 10.
6551bidat 12, article 1 1.
6561bid at 12-3, article 12,
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The remaining articles speciQ the relationship of the annexes to the protocol6*7 and the
implementation of the protocol.658 in addition to annexes 1, II and III, annexes nurnbered
IV to VIII are also appended to the protocol,659 with numbers V and VI being

recommendatory in character.660 A ~ e IV
x is titled 'Litnit Values for PCDDIF From
Major Stationary SourcesI.661 Annex V discusses 'Best Available Techniques to Control

Emissions of Persistent Orgaoic Pollutants fiom Major Stationary Sources'662and annex
VI the Tirnescales for the Application of Limit Values and Best Available Techniques to
New and Existing Stationary Sources1- Annex VI1 prescribes 'Recommended Control

Measures for Reducing Emissions of Persistent Organic PoIl~tants',66~
and annex VIII
'Major Stationary Source categories1.665

51.2 The A ndysis

A starting point for analysis is with the inclusion of the precautionary principle in the

preamble. In this location it results in a generalisation of the principle to the entire text of
the protocol, as contrasted with being an explicit provision which the Parties m u t meet.

An express provision c m be found in other environmental instruments, such as the
Bamako Convention.666

6s7ibid at 13, article 13.
658/bid at 13-5, articles 14-20.
6 5 9 ~ uto
e the very technical nature of these annexes, their contents are not discussed here but merely
identified by title.
M~UN/ECE Protocoi, supro note 636 at 13, article I 3.
6611bidat 2 1, annex IV.
M2~6id
at 22, annex V.
6631bid at 5 1, annex VI.
664~bidat 5 1, annex VII,
665ibid at 56, annex VIII.
431 and associated text.
6 6 6 ~ efootnote
e
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Because the preamble is the only place in the text where the precautionary principle is
mentioned, it becomes necessary to draw an inference of the application of the principle
from the rest of the text. This is difficult to do. Although the protocol contains
requirements for Parties to eliminate, restrict and reduce the use of POPs,~7exemptions
are permissible668 and the directions to Parties regarding the development of their
strategies, policies and programmes are couched in terms of "encourage", "consider" and

of "make determined effortsW.M9If the precautionary p ~ c i p l is
e to be implemented, the
use of a stronger directive text toward the Parties should be evidenced. It therefore
appears that the precautionary principle, as stated in the Rio Decl~rution,6~0
notwithstanding being mentioned in the preamble, is not borne out by the protocol text.

Other concems can also be highlighted. The protocol does not provide a means of
ensuring cornpliance with its terms, such as by placing a ban on trade with States who are
non-signatones or who are Parties in breach of their Convention obligations. In contrast
it only requires a review of the Parties' performances on a regular ba~is.6~'

Another point worthy of mention is the fact that although the protocol does not place
direct obligations upon industry, text found in the preamble and article 5 recognises the
importance of their involvement. The preamble recognises that the knowledge held by
industry is important to the success of the initiative, and article 5 recognises the need for
"contacts and cooperationM672
with industry, yet the directive to Parties to develop this

6 6 7 ~ N / E ProtocoI,
C~
supra note 636 at 6, article 3.
M8fbid at 7, article 4.
66916id at 10, article 7.
6 7 0 ~ iDeclaration.
o
supra note 448 at 120, principle 15.
67 UNIECE Protocool, supra note 636 at 12, article 1 1.
6721bid.at 9, article 5.

union is permissive.

As such, it appears that the means of achieving such a nexus has

remained elusive to negotiatoa and they have therefore marginalised this issue.

The protocol d s o fails to provide any technical or financial assistance to Parties. This
would appear to be a glming omission given that some of the mernben of the UNIECE
are states with economies in transition, and in light of other MEAs which have included
such provisions.

In light of the foregoing, the protocol falls short of expectations. This is especially tnie
given the serious nature of the substances king targeted. In contrast with the hard line of
the Bamako Convention and the strong language of the Montreal Pr0tocolp7~this
protocol appears fiimsy and inept for dealing with the environmental and health risks to
which it is directed.

5.2 The Fimt INC Session

The f ~ s INC
t
was held in Montreal, Canada, from 29 June to 3 July 1998:'s

and was

attended by 93 statest76 9 United Nations bodies and specialised agen~ies,6~'9
intergovemmentai organisations,678 and 56 non-governmentai organi~ationsP~~
67316idat 10, article 7.
6 7 4 ~ hConml
e
Mesures found in article 2 of the Montreal Protocof are strongly worded: "Each Party
shall ensure..As calculated level of consumption of the controlled substances.-.does not exceed its
calculated level of consumption in f 986". See Montreal Protocof, supra note 106 at article 2(1),(2),(3),(4).
6 7 S U N ~Information
~,
Kit Montreal i998 (visited 25 July 1998)
~http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/POP~~IndpressreIeedinfokite.bl
at I Fereinafier Infimation Kit]. The
second session of the MC is tentatively scheduled for February 7- 12, 1999, in Geneva, Switzerland. It is
anticipated that five sessions will be required to complete the drafk convention. See UNEP, Cdendar of
Events (visited 25 July 1998) <http://irptc.unep.ch/pops/newsOI.htm> and "Delegates Begin Work on U.N.
Treaty to Eliminate Persistent Organic Pollutants" (1998) 2 I(l4) Int'l Env. Rep. 66 1 hereinafier
"Delegates"].
676~he
following states were in aitendance: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina., Armenia, Australia
Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belanis, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dernocratic Republic of the
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France,

At that time delegates cornmenced negotiations for a POPs Convention for twelve POPs
identified as requiring urgent action: Aldrin, Chlordane, DDT,Dieldrin, Dioxins, Endrin,
Furans, Heptachlor, Hexachlorobenzene, Mirex, Polychlorinated Biphenyis, and
Toxaphene.a*

Gambia, Georgia, Gemany, Ghana, Guinea, Iceland, hdia, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel,
Italy, Jordan, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherfands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Paraguay,Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation,
Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Afnca, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab
Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, W n e , United Kingdom of Great B h i n and Northem Ireland,
United States of America, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia See Report of the Intergovernmental
Negoriuting Cornmitteefor an I n ~ e r ~ t i o nLegaliy
af
Binding Insrnunent for Implementing International
Action on Certain Persistent Organi'c PolZu~antson the Work of Its Fint Session, UNEP/POPS/MC. 117,
1finalreport-e.htm>
(1998), cited to (visited 25 July 1998) ~http~lirptc.unep.ch~pops/POPsSInc/MCCIIinc
at 3 mereinafier POPs INCI].
6 7 7 ~ hfollowing
e
United Nations bodies and specialised agencies were in anendance: Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Economic Commission for Europe, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, World Health Organisation,
Secretariat of the Global Environmental Facility, Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund for the
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Secretariat of the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and Secretariat of the Convention on
Biological Diversity. See ibid
6 7 8 ~ hfollowing
e
intergovemmental organisations were in attendance: Arab League Educational Cultural
and Scientific Organisation, Commission for Environmental Co-operation, European Commission,
European Environmental Bureau, Intergovemmental Authority on Development, Intergovernmental Forum
on Chemical Safety, International Joint Commission, Regional Organisation for the Protection of the
Marine Environment, and South Pacific Regional Environment Programme. See ibid
6 7 9 ~ hnon-govemmental
e
organisations in anendance wen: Action Network for Alternatives to
Agrochernicafs, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Canadian Polar Commission, CEC
International Partners, Centre for Independent Ecological Expertise, Centre for International Environmental
Law, Chemical Manufacturers Association, Clean Water Action Council of N.E. Wisconsin inc., Coalition
pour un Magnola Propre, College of Medicine, University of the Philippines, Columbia University,
Commonweal, Consumers International, Council of Yukon First Nations, Defence Pest Management,
Denendeh National Office, Edison Electrical Institute, Environmental Justice Networking Forum, European
Chemical Industry Council, Federacion Argentina de C h a r a s de la Industria Quimica y Petroquirnica,
Friends of the Earth, German Association for the United Nations, GIobal Crop Protection Federation,
Global Environmental Issues, Great Lakes United, Greenpeace International, Health and Environment
Watch, Indigenous Environmental Network, International Council of Chemical Associations, International
Indian Treaty Council, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Japan Chemical Industry Association, McGiII
University, Mexican Action Network on Pesticides and their Alternatives, Mexican National Institute of
Public Health, Mouvement au Courant, Multinationals Resource Centre, Observatorio de Conflictos
Ambientales, Pesticide Action Network, Pesticide Action Network AFrica, Physicians for Social
Responsibility USA, Sierra Club du Canada, Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Simon Fraser University,
Société pour Vaincre la Pollution, STOP Montreal, Teslin Thirgit Council, Université du Québec ii
Montréal, University of Missouri, W. Alton Jones Foundation, Women's Environment and Development
Organisation, World Chlorine Council, World Conservation Union, World Federation of Public Health
Associations, and World Wildlife Fund International. See ibid at 3-4.
6801nformationKit, supra note 675 at 3-5.

-
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In the opening remarks to the session, Mr. Klaus Topfer, Executive Director of UNEP,is
reported to have commented that:
[a] global POPs Convention had to promote a shifi away from the
production and use of POPs and the processes that generated them. As
such, the chernical industry had to be seen as part of the solution, for it
was there that new and safer alternative chemicals, processes and
technologies had to be f0und.68~
A summary of the opening comments by delegates reflected several considerations which

they wanted the negotiations and fuial Convention to address. Some of these were:
a desire for the completion of the instrument by the year 2000;
the need to establish an expert group to determine d e r i a and a procedure for the
future inclusion of POPs;
use of the precautionary principle;

use of the UNECE protocol as a guide;
the addition of other POPs substances682 already identified, in addition to the fint
twelve;
technical and fmancial assistance for developing states;
a financial mechanism, such as that found in the Montreal Protocol;
a ban on trade in POPs, as well as the international movements of them, except for
destruction purposes;
that the Convention should be complementary to other international instruments;
a life-cycle identification of POPs, as well as a differentiated approach for the three
POPs categories (pesticides, industrial chernicals and unintentionally produced byproducts and contaminants); and,
68 lPOPSINCI, supra note 676 at 3.

6gtThesesubstances were: chlordecone, hexabrornobiphenyl, hexachlorocyclohexane, polyaromatic
hydrocarbons, short-chained parafins, and pentachlorophenol. See Ibid.at 6, paragraph 29.

a suggestion for the graduai phase-out of the substances.683

Following these introductory statements, the delegates discussed prelirninary articles for
inclusion in the POPs Convention. The M C agreed that there wodd be a prearnble, and
articles for defuiitions and objectives, but that their contents wodd be discussed at a later
session.684 The INC then considered measures to reduce ancilor eliminate releases of
POPs into the environment.685 In relation to this they discussed control measures used in
other MEAs, and in the LJNIECE protocol, the need for compiling information on

"existing production, use, stockpiles and release into the environment for each of the
twelve POPs identified in the Cornmittee's mandate", and the need to group POPs into
their three categories.686

A review of other MEAs reveals that although some of them deal with the reduction of

chemical production, use or release (Framework Convention on CZimate Change687 and
Mmtreal ProtocoP*), or with some of the sarne chernicals (Basel Convention689 and PIC

Con~ention6~0),
but that only the UNECE Protocol is directly related to the draft
Convention.691 However, it has also been noted that the WN/ECE protocol only deais

683~bid.
at 6-7, paragraphs 26-35.
684~bid
at 7, paragraph 3 7.
685~bidat 7.
686~bid.
at 7, paragraph 39.
687~limate
Change, supra note 582.
688~ontreaI
Protocol, supra note 106.
689~arel
Convention, supra note 223.
* * P ~INC5,
c supra note 467.
691UNEP, Possible Substantive Articles of an International Legally Binding Instrumentfor lmplementing
lnternatio~iAction on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutants, UN EP/POPS/MC. 114 ( 1998), cited to
(visited 25 July 1998) ~httpYlirptc.unep.ch/pops/POP~~Inc/MC~llinc
1-4,htm> at 3, paragraph 9
[hereinafter Substanrive ArticIes].
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with POPs found in the air, and not in other media whkh the new Convention should
address.692

In relation to national plans and progress reports, the MC recognised that specific focal
points for POPs in each state would be useful, but that it would have to be discussed afler
the substantive provisions for the Convention were ~egotiated.~~3

Negotiators also agreed that a procedure and mechanism for the future identification of
additional POPs needed to be addressed and again mentioned that an expert group might
be usefùl for this issue.6w It was also thought that this issue could be discussed in
relation to the need to reduce and eliminate releases, dong with the management and
disposal of stockpiles.69* In relation to the management and elirnination of stockpiles, it
was M e r observed that the adopted measures needed to be flexible so as to take "into

account the unique situations of different developing countries".6%

The INC decided to use a contact group to frame the terms of reference for an expert

group who would "deveiop science-based criteria and a procedure for identifiing
additional persistent organic pollutants as candidates for future international action"P97
The contact group was able to achieve this, and f i e r debate within the iNC, the Criteria
Expert Group for Persistent Organic Pollutants was approved and its officers elected.698

692ibid
6 9 3 ~ INCI,
~ ~ ssupra note 676 at 7, paragraph 41.

6941bid at 7. paragraph 42.
69*~bid.af 8, paragraph 42-3.
696~bidP 8, paragraph 43.
6971bid at 1 1, paragraph 64.
698~bidat 1 1-2, paragraphs 65-7 1.

The terms of reference for the Criteria Expert Group (CEG)are found in annex II of the

final report of the MC'Sfirst session.699

The fust meeting of the CEG is scheduled for October 1998.'m At this thne it is likely
that they will review the information previously requested from -tes

by UNEP and the

IFCS, in January 1996.701 The document prepared from this information, titled
Consideration of Possible Criteriafor Identzfiing Furrher Persistent Organic Pollutmts
as Candidatesfor Inlemational Acti0n,~02lists six cnteria to be applied:

(a) Persistence: The ability to resist degradation in various media, such as
air, soil, water and sediment, measured as half-life of the substance in the
medium;
(b) Bioaccumulation: The ability of a chemical to accumulate in living
tissues to levels higher than those in the surrounding environment,
expressed as the quotient between the concentration in the target tissue
and the environmental concentration;
(c) Toxicity: The ability of a chemical to cause injury to humans or the
environment;
(d) Volatility: The ability of a chemical to vaporize into air;

(e) Measurements of the chernical in remote regions: Considered by some
to be criticai for identiGing a chemical as a persistent organic pollutant of
global concem;

699~bidat 23-5,annex II.
"Ibid at 12, paragraph 73.
701~n
the annex to the report is a list of states who replied. These are: Australia, Belarus, B&l, Camemon,
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania,
New Zealand, Niue, Nigeria, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, SIovakia,
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States of America In addition
information was also received h m the following intergovernmental and non-govemmental sources: Color
Pigments Manufacturers Association, European Union, International Council of Chemical Associations,
International Council of Metals and the Environment, International Union of mÜ.e and Applied Chemistry,
North American Commission for Environmental Co-operation. Oslo-Paris Convention, Society of
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, United
Nations Environment Programme, and the World HeaIth Organisation. See Considerarion, supra note 6 12
at 8-13. See also C. Hogue, "Talks on Global POPs Treaty to Include Process for Adding Compounds to
Pact" (1 998) 2 l(13) Int'l Env. Rep. 610.
702~omidera~ion,
ibid

(f) Bioavailability: This, based on field data or expert judgement, has aiso
been proposed as a critenon for identieing POPs.703

It is noted that some of the criteria c m be deterrnined with reference to a cut-off value,
whereas others will need a qualitative assessment.7w The report M e r outlines that
other factors, such as dispersion mechanisms, patterns of use, influences of marine
transport, tropical climate, and the need to conserve biodiversity and protect endangered

species, must be considered?Os In addition the recognition that socio-economic factors,
such as the extent of development of the state, areas of use of a substance, and the
stakeholders involved must be built into the process of POPs identification.7Ofj

In addition, negotiators can reference the mechanism established under the PIC
Convention for the addition of chemicals.707 In other MEAs, it is usually accomplished
through an amendment to the agreement conducted at a Confierence of the Parties708 It is
also likely that the CGE will be assessing additional information about the location of
production facilities and the amounts of POPs they produce, following the recent
revelation that Russia was still producing PCBs.709 The CMA as participants in the INC

will likely submit their suggestions for the identification of POPs to the CGE. They have
"pledged to help develop and implement a process for identifying persistent,
bioaccumulative, toxic substances for control"?~o

703~6id
at 3, paragraph 5.
704~6id
705~6id
at 6, paragraph 22.
706~6id
at 7, paragraph 27.
707~ee
footnote 5 1 1 and accompanying text
708~u6stmtive
Articles, supra note 691 at 5, paragraph 1 1.
7 0 9 ~Baggetta,
.
*'RegionalTreav Woufd Phase Out POPs; Plans for Bmader Pact Would Do the Sarne"
( 1998) 2 1( 12) Int'l Env. Rep. 553.
710"~hemicals
Covered by Future Treaty Should be Toxic, Persistent, U.S. Group Says" (1995) 18(25) Int'l
Env. Rep. 948 at 948.
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The Chair of the MC, John Buccini, has stated that the treaty will only be drafted for the
twelve identified POPs. Any additional POPs which meet the identification cnteria will

be added to the Convention following the conclusion of the negotiations and the adoption
of the ciraft text.711 Concern has been expressed that it is critical that the cntena do allow
chernicals to be added, and do not act as an obstacle to extending the ambit of the
C0nvention,~12

The INC discussion also focused on the intended measure on information exchange.7"

After discussing the importance of such a measure, the need for the dissemination of
information, and for the compilation of technical information for the INC,714 it was
decided that a contact group be formed. This contact group later reported that although
they had been unable to agree on the tenns of reference for an information mechanism,

that the UNEP Secretariat should be approached to undertake the task of compiiing such
information, for the MC, prior to the next session.715

It was also recognised that measures dealing with public information, awareness and
education were required.

Views were expressed that without these measures the

Convention would have little utility at the local Ievel, that the UNIECE protocol measures
could serve as a model, and that the public should have access to any inventory activities

of the INC and of the fùture Convention.7'6

supra note 675.
l"~e~egates",
712~aggena,
supra note 709.
7 1 3 INCI,
~ ~ ~
supra
s note 675 at 8, paragraphs44-8.
7141bid.at 8. paragraph 44.
5 ~ b i dat 8. paragraph 46-7.
7i 6 ~ b i dat 8, paragraph 49.

In regard to research, development and monitoring, it was stated that in addition to the
required research on the POPs substances, research should cover current practices and
options for disposal, and also alternatives to POPs.7'7 Research was also stated to be
required for the issue of the transboundary movement of POPs substances intended for
research.718

Discussion also ensued around the issues of technical assistance, and fuiancial resources
and mechanisms.719 Two broad topics were discussed: the identification of areas
requiring technical and fuiancial assistance, and the identification of sources of this
assistance. In relation to the former, negotiators stressed the importance of technical
assistance to developing States and to those with economies in transition. Suppon was
found in the MC for the provision of technical and financial assistance in the following

...compiling inventories; capacity building; monitoring the environmental
and health impacts of POPs; public education; identifiing and obtaining
alternatives, including recapturing indigenous knowledge; pilot projects;
information exchange; import and export controls; technology transfer;
and, destroying or disposing of obsolete stocks in an environrnentally
sound manner.720
The importance of familiarishg themselves with al1 of the currently available sources of
technical and financial assistance was discussed, as well as the need to obtain more
information on these, and possible under-utilised sources which could be made
available.721 Presentations were made by representatives of the FAO, the Global

'17/bid at 8, paragraph 50.
*/bid
l 9/bid at 9. paragraphs 5 1-2.
Ro16id. at 1O, paragraph 59.
"'lbid at 10. paragraph 60.
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Environment Facility, the United Nations Industrial Deveiopment Organisation and the

WHO,regarding the types of assistance which these organisations couid provide."
In response to this, the MC requested the Secretariat to provide the second session of the

INC with three documents detailing existing programmes providing technical and
financial assistance in relation to chernical management, a review of "possible costs
associated with potential areas of technical and financial assistance" which could be
associated with the POPs Convention, and a description of existing multilateral
mechanisms for technical and financial assistance .?23

At the request of severai memben of the INC,a subsidiary body was then established to
deal with the implementation aspects of the technical assistance and financial matters
pertaining to developing states and those with economies in transition.*4
Examples of technical assistance and financial funding articles can be found in several
MEAS."

However, the PIC Convention is silent with respect to a financial mechanism,

and the UNIECE protocol is silent for both technical assistance and financial
mechanisrns. In the event that negotiators decide to turn to another MEA, perhaps it will

N ~ b i d at I O, paragraph 6 1.
m ~ b i dat 10, paragraph 62.
* 4 ~ ~ INCl,
P s supra note 676 at 10, paragraph 63. The implementation issues to be handled by this
subsidiary body, as defined by John ~uccini,Chair of the M C are:
identi@ provisions to the convention that will address measures required to implement
the convention, including such possible aspects as technology transfer, financial aspects,
and national and regional experiences and strategies to reduce andor eliminate POPs.
"Delegates", supra note 675 at 662.
mSu6stantive Articles, s u p note 69 1 at 6, paragmphs 16-7. The Conventions referred to are the
Montreal Protocol, the draft PIC Convention, the B d Convention, the Climate Change Convention, the
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, and the United Nationr Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those Corntries Experiencing Serious Drought a d o r Desertflcation Particdarly in
Afica.
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be to the Montreal Protocol whose general intent to ban, or reduce use of, hazardous
substances is similar to the intent of the emerging POPs Convention.

Further measures which require discussion, along with the final provisions of the
Convention, are those which deal with cornpliance, senlement of disputes, and
institutional arrangements.726

Other proposed provisions included measures for POPs inventory requirements, liability
and compensation, remediation and clean-up of contaminated sites, sales and trade,
regional CO-operation,and tmnsportation, storage and distribution.727 The INC requested
the Secretariat to prepare a document for the next session M e r speciming these
provisions for possible incl~ion.~28

In addition to al1 of the foregoing issues, the INC must also stay appnsed of the
interrelationship between the POPs Convention and the other international and regional
environmental instruments with which it wili interact.ng

5.3 A Critiquefor the Future
An examination of the international community's initial attempts to resolve the
environmental and health risks of POPs suggests the future scope of the Convention.
First, it appears likely that the UNIECE protocol will be used as a b a i s for the
7 2 6 ~ s~I N
f C I . supra note 676 at 9, paragraph 53.
"fbid at 9, paragraphs 54-7.
n81bid. at 9, paragraph 58.
R 9 summary
~
was prepared by UNEP of other Iegally binding instruments which may be relevant to the
future im plementation of the POPs Convention. See UNEP,Summary of Certain MultiIateraf Legafly
Binding Instrumenrs Relevant to an International Legally Binding Instrument/or Implementing
International Action on Certain Persistent Organic Pollutanis, UNEP/POPS/MC. 113 ( 1 W8), cited to
(visited 25 July 1998) ~http~lirptc.unep.ch/pps/P0PsSInc/MCCl
/ i n 1-3.hm>.
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international agreement. But in doing so, it will be interesting to observe whether or not
negotiators will be stricter with the management of POPs than negotiators for the

UNECE protocol were. As discussed earlier, the protocol did not strictly apply the
precautionary principle, did not inchde technical assistance or funding provisions for its
Parties, and did not provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure Party cornpliance.

It is also likely the PIC Convention will play a large role in the cirafting of the POPs
Convention. The fact that it was recently completed and that the UNEP Goveming
Council, in Decision 19/13 D, highlighted the need for the interrelationship between the
two instniments,730 may result in PIC articles foreshadowing those for POPs. If this is
the case, than the absence of the precautionary principle, the scant attention paid to the
need for technical assistance, and the failure to address financial assistance for
developing states and for those with economies in transition, may again prove to be
problematic. The relationship between the two Conventions is important because some
of the chemicals which fa11 under the PIC procedure will also be subject to the terms of
the POPs Convention.731

Related to this issue is the ability of the POPs Convention to ban or phase-out DDT."2
This pesticide is still being used in several developing states, and notwithstanding its
toxic qualities, continues to provide an inexpensive means of controlling
730~ee
footnote 602 and accompanying text.
7 3 ' ~ eae listing of chemicals for these Conventions x e fmtnotes 5 1 1 and 680, and accornpanying t e a .
n2~
Hileman,
.
"Pollutant Con ference Smiggles With DDT Ban" (1998) 76(27) Chem. & Eng. News 4
[hereinafter "Pollutant Conference"] and "Delegates", supra note 675.
733WHO statistics state that in 1997 over 40% of the world's population are at risk h m malaria present in
100 states and territories. As one of the leading causes of death h m infectious diseases, it accounted for
between 1.5-2.7 million deaths. See WHO,Division of Control of Tropical Diseases, Mafwia Prevention
and Conrrol(1998) cited to (visited 27 August 1998)~http~l~~~.who,int/ctdlhtmUmalariahtmI~,
and
WHO,Fi/sr Factsfiom the World H d t h Report 1998, (1 998) cited to (visited 27 August 1998)
<http~/~~~.who.int/whr/1998/factse.htrn>.
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Even the WHO is only requesting that DDT be reduced and not eli1ninated.~34The Chair
of the POPs INC, John Buccini stated "DDTin my view is probably the hardest issue to
deal with...With other pesticides we will find, ultimately, reasonable approaches to phase
out their use and elirninate stocksn.n* Of the eleven other POPs, only PCBs continue to
be manufactured, and Russia has promised to halt production by 2005.*6

It would be prudent for negotiators to take the directness of purpose of both the Montreal

Protocol and the Bamako Convention into serious consideration. These instruments each
deal with environmental hamis resulting fiom the use of hazardous substances, which is
what the POPs Convention m u t do. The other Iinkage between these three instruments
is the seriousness of the subject matter with which they deal, and the transboundary
nature of the risks. The inclusion of the precautionary p ~ c i p i ein the POPs Convention
would provide a M e r similarity between these three Conventions.

In order for negotiators of the POPs Convention to accept the precautionq principle
they must reject risk assessment as the best means to combat environmental h m . While
risk assessment attempts "to address the issues of scientific uncertainty in a procedural
manner", the precautionary principle in contrast, "recognizes the reality that science will
not provide clear policy prescriptions and that criteria need to be developed to
systematically address the resultant uncertainties in the policy pr0cess".~3~It has been
suggested that in order to effectively implement the precautionary principle policies must

n4"~ollutantConference",supra note 732 at 5.
n5~ohnBuccini, Chair of the MC, as quoted in "Delegates",supra note 675 at 66 1.
736"~011~tant
Conference",supra note 732.
7 3 7 ~ von
.
Moltke, "The Relationship Behween Policy, Science, Technology. Economics and Law in the
lmplementation of the Precautionary Principle"in D. Freestone & E. Hey, eds., The Precautionmy
Principle and Iruernafiom/ L m : The Challenge of lmplementation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1996) 97 at 100, 101.

recognise the domains which circumscribe it namely those of science, technology,
econornics and law, and contributions nom al1 of these areas is required?

Science, to be effective from a precautionary stand-point, must be utilised in an
anticipatory fashion or, for example, as a "biological early warning ~ y s t e m " . By
~~~
utilising techniques which assess biological damage at the cellular level, science can be
used to ascertain whether there is a need for concern in areas which are suspected as
being polluted.740 While this is but one anticipatory technique, a focus on precaution
would encourage the development of others. By approaching POPs in such a fashion, the
suspicion of a problern could be addressed more rapidly than waiting for a detailed risk
analysis of the hazard. The hi& standard of scientific proof required in risk anaiysis
allows hazards to continue unchecked, while a lowenng of this standard would allow
hazards to be constrained much quicker.

A precautionary approach also requires a need to shifi the burden of demonstrating

environmental harm from those affected to those who produce and manufacture the
substances. As previously discussed, the OSPAR Convention utilises a Pnor Justification
Procedure which requires a demonstration that hami will not occur, within an acceptable
Such
margin of uncertainty, prior to the release of a substance into the en~ironment.~~'

an approach then places the burden of establishing cornpliance upon those who have the
knowledge, finance and technological means to remedy the situation.

*81bid, at 108.
7 3 9 ~ - Mee,
~ . "Scientific Methods and the Precautionary RUiciple" in

D. Freestone & E. Hey, eds.. The
Precautionory Principfeand International L m The Challenge of Impfernentarion(The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 1996) 109 at 127.
7401bidat 127-8.
741~c~ntyre,
supra note 583 at 225.

In addition, the precautionary approach requires the active participation of pe0ple.~~2
This has been discussed in relation to the peoples' of the Arctic whose indigenous
organisations have been recognised as a required influence for effective international
environrnental policies.743 In a sllnilar mamer the peoples' of the developing states may
dso find that NGO participation c m prove to be an effective stimulant to chernical
management The influence which peoples' organisations can bring to decision-making
has already been discussed in the context of the MAI?

Recent attempts at forming

networks of developed and developing states' environmental NGOs rnay also prove
useful in this regard because aithough the programme orientation and organisational
environrnents of these two NGO factions is different, their relative strengths and
weaknesses may prove to be complernentary while lobbying for international
environmental law reforms.745

Negotiators must therefore remain cognisant of the

demands of civil society, and heed the directives of the UNEP Report on C o d e r a t i o n
of Possible Criteria for Identz$ing Further Persistent Organic Pollu~antsas Candidates
for Internntional Action which specifically recognises the need to address socio-

economic considerations of ~ t a t e s . ~ ~ ~

Even if the precautionary principle is not included in the Convention's text, the extent to
which the Expert Criteria Group will be able to incorporate socio-economic
considerations into the identification of additional POPs is crucial. This is because the

" ~ e e J. Gupta, "Glocalization:The Precautionary Principle and Public Participation"in D. Freestone Bi E.
Hey, eds., The Precautionmy Principle and Infernational Law: The Challenge oflmplementation (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) 23 1.
743~andemvaag,
supra note 594 at 344.
744~eefoomote 295 and accompanying text.
745~or
a discussion of this topic see R Cowling, "NGDOs,NGO Networks and the Preservation of
Autonomy: Evaluating the Impetus Toward Institutionalisation"(FacuIty of Politics of Alternative
Development Strategies, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1996)[unpublished].
746~ee
Consideration, supra note 6 12 at 7. paragraph 27.
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difiering conditions found in states means that a single, inflexible solution c m o t be
applied effectively in a global context.

In the opening comments to the fmt INC session, Mr. Klaus Tapfer, Executive Director
of UNEP, commented that the chernical industry had to be seen as part of the solution.
However, nowhere in the draft articles is there a provision which achieves such an aim.
In fact, none of the MEAs recommended for consideration to the INC contains such a
provision. This is a concem because the nature of this form of environmental nsk
necessitates a legal remedy which can balance the various social, political and economic
interests present in the international community.

One suggestion for such a balancing can be found in the assignment of liability to
industry present in other international instruments. The utility of this will be analysed
next.

5.4 The Imposition of Liabiiity

The aim in such an undertaking is to make industry visible in a legal sense. While
industry takes part in MEA negotiations,747 they remain largely invisible in the fmal texts.

This was not aiways the case, as evidenced by the difference between instruments such as
the Code ofConduct748 and the International C0de74~,and the current approaches found

in chemicai management instruments.

- -

..

-

747~er
industry groups in attendance at the PIC and POPs MC sessions, see footnotes 472 and 679.
748~ee
foomote 305 and accompanying text.
749~ee
footnote 578 and accompanying text.
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What is required is an express recognition of the environmental role of these actors,
especially since many of them are now economically more powerful than some states.750
The required reconceptualisation of environmental law is simply a realignment of it in
accordance with the changing socio-economic conditions found in the world today.
Globalisation as supported by liberalisation policies aitea the traditional power structures
of the world, and MEAs must be negotiated with express recognition of this fact. Our
current conceptualisation of MEAs results in a faise dichotomy. It requires states,
following ratification of a MEA, to utilise fmmcial, technical, legai, and infiastructural
means to ensure that the terrns of the treaty are met. This is, however, problematic. Not
al1 states, aside fiom political will to do so, have the means of accomplishing an MEA's
goals, and negotiators aware of this reality are likely less anaid to water-dom provisions
of an MEA on the theory that a general provision is better than no provision at dl.

Therefore, a hybndisation of public and private law is required. Such a new species of
MEA would bind private actors at the international level, outright. Now, having stated

the optimal goal, the achievable reality is likely different. But two steps can be taken
which may eventually lead to such a desired result.

The first step toward such a goal cm be made by drafting environmental Conventions
which impose strict requirements upon states to implement national legislation,
reguiations, poiicies or other administrative instruments, directly imposing strong
controls on industry actors.751 Such an imposition should not be a matter for state
discretion, nor the subject of Convention reservations. The previous examination of the
750Seefootnote 30 and accompanying text.
7Si~he
Bamako Convention provides an example of this wherein Parties are directed to impose strict
Iiability upon the generators of hazardous wastes which have been improperly disposed of. See Bamako
Comention, supra note 43 1 at article 4(3)(b).

PIC Convention and the UNECE POPs Convention revealed that they both failed to
regulate industry in this way. In both of these Conventions the directives to States in
relation to industry are couched in very permissive language.7Q

A second step is the imposition of liability upon the chemical industry through the use of

chemical management Conventions. While corporations have already been held
accountable in their home state for actions committed in others,753 an international
imposition of liability is a different matter. However, international law can be drafted so

as to impose liability upon industry, as has been done in relation to nuclear accidents7"
and oil pollution damage. 755 The nuclear accident instruments are predicated upon
7 S 2INC5,
~ lsupra
~ note 467 at article 1S(l)(b), and UN/ECE Protocol, supra note 636 at article 7. Set
also footnotes 576 and 672, and accompanying text.
753 ~n1990 Dow Chemical Company and Shell Oil Company were sued by Costa Rican banana workers
who claimed that they had suffered serious menta1 and physicaf problems, as well as irreversible stenlity
afier handIing DBCP manufactured and exported by the defendant corporations. For an account of this
case see CoIopy, supra note 339 at 2 12-218. Also see D. Mitchell, "Banana Workers Win Compensation in
Pesticide Poisoning" (Spring/Summer 1997) 14(1&5) CHRIA News (visited 17 August 1998)
<httpY~www.brown.edu/CoursedBio~C~mmunity~HeaIth
I68C/chna/s97mitchelI.htrnl>;"The Price of
Bananas" (12 March 1994) The Economist 48(1), and D. Redwood, "Split Decision on Bananas" (1997) 1 1
The Sustainable Times 14. In another recent case, aithough not related to chemicals or pesticides, is a
decision that a U.S. petroleum Company, Unocal, c m stand trial in the U.S. for alIeged human rights abuses
cornrnitted in B m a See J. Greer, "US Petroleum Giant to Stand Trial Over Burma Atrocities" (1998)
28(1) The Ecologist 34.
754Thirdparty liability is govemed by a series of instruments: Viennu Convention on Civil Liabilityfor
Nuclear Damage, 2 1 May 1963, cited to (visited 6 August 1998)
<httpY/www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/gIance/legaMiabiIi~.
h t m [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Civil
LiabiliryJ ;Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (as amended), 29 July
1960, cited to (visited 8 August 1998) <http:l/www .neaFr/htmUIaw/nIparis-conv.htmI> [hereinafter Park
Convention];Brussels Supplementary Convention to the P a r 3 Convention (as amended), 3 1 January 1963,
[hereinafter Brussels
cited to (visited 8 August 1998) <httpY/~~~.neafr/htmulawln1bni~seIs~html
Convention];Joint Prorocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and Paris Convention,
2 1 September 1988, cited to (visited 6 August 1998)
~http:/lwww.iaea.or.at/worl~tom/glan~dega~liabili~.htm~;
Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention
on Civil Liabifityfor Nuclear Damage, 1 2 September 1997, cited to (visited 6 August 1998)
<http~/www.iaeaor.at/worIdatom/updates/nexI .html> [hereinafter Protocol to the Vienna Convention];
and Convention on Supplementary Compensationfor Nuciear Damage, 12 September 1997, cited to
(visited 6 August 1998) <http:l/www.iaeaor.at/worIdatom/updates/anne~.html>Pereinafier
Su piementary Compemation].
73 Third party liability is governed by: the Internatid Convention on Civil Liubilityfor Oil Pollution
Damage, 29 November 1969, cited to (visited 6 August 1998)
~http:/lsedac.ciesin.or~pidb/texts/civilliabii.oiI.pollution.dage.1969.html> Fereinafter Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damuge];Internationaf Convention on the Establishment ofan International Fundfor

-P

principles which channel the liability exclusively to the operators of nuclear installations

and make the operator strictly liable.756 In addition these instruments limit the liability in
amount and in tirne, and require the operator to maintain adequate insurance to cover

their liability.757 Similarly, for oil pollution damage, international conventions make
"shipowners strictiy liable...for oil pollution arising from laden tankers carrying persistent
oil".758

A ship owner must constitute a fund for the extent of their liability,759 based

upon the tonnage of their ship, which can be distributed to claimants in the event of an
incident.760 In addition, an international fund, entitled The Internationai 0i1 Pollution
Compensation Fund", was created out of contributions from cargo owners following the
recognition that the economic burden of pollution damage should not be borne

Compensationfor Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, cited to (visited 6 August 1998)
~htrpYlsedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/intl.nd.oil.llution.e.1971.hm[> mereinafter Fundfor
Compem~tion].Two protocols were adopted in f 992 entitled the Protocol to the 1969 Convention on the
Civil Liabiliry for Oil Pollution Dumage, 27 November 1992, cited to (1996) Int'l Env. Rep. 1551, and the
Protocol to the 1971 Convention on the Establishment of an inîernaiionul Fundfor Compensaiionfor Oil
Pollution Damage, 27 November 1992, cited to (1996) 2 1 Int'l Env. Rep. 1751. These two protocols

superseded the 1984 protocols of the sarne narnes. While both the 1984 and 1992 protocols have the same
substantive provisiork, the 1992 protocols have more lenient entry into force provisions. The future
effectiveness of the 1984 protocois had been called into question when the U.S. Congress decided to reject
them in favour of a unilaterd domestic approach which broadened liability. See E. GoId, ed., Maritime
Aflairs: A World Hundbook, 2nd ed. (Harlow, Essex: Longman Current Affairs, 1991).
7 5 6 1 ~Civil
~ ~Liabilityfor
,
Nuclear Damage: internutional Framework (visited 6 August 1998)
~httpYl~~~.iaea.or.at/worldatomlglance/legaV1iabi
lity. h t m at 1; Vienna Convention, supra note 754 at
articles II, IV; Protucol to the Vienna Convention, supra note 754 at articles 4,6; and Paris Convention,
su r a note 754 at articles 3 , 4 , 6 .
75 IAEA, ibid ; Vienna Convention, ibid at art icles III, VI, VI 1; Protocol to the Vienna Convention, ibid
at articles 5, 8 - 9 ; Park Convention, ibid at articles 7,8; Brussels Convention, supra note 754 at article 3;
and, Supplementary Compensation Convention, supra note 754 at articles II, III.
7S8~old,
supra note 755 at 252. See also Civil L i a b i l i ~ f i rOil Pollution Dumage, supra note 755 at article
III(1):
Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at the time
of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series ofoccurrences at the tie of the
first such occurrence, shall be Iiable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has
escaped or k e n discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.
750Thisis achieved by depositing a sum or by producing a bank or other guarantee, acceptable under the
national Iegislation which appli& to the shipowner, "with the Court or oser comptent authority of any
one of the Contracth g states in w hich action is brought under Article IX". Civil Liabilityfor Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 742 at article V(3). This fund c m even be constituted after an incident has occurred.
See Ibid at article VI(1).
760~bidat article V.
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exclusively by ship owners and that full compensation had previously not been available
to victims.76'

A third example of the imposition of strict liability can be found in a Convention

negotiated by the Council of Europe, the Convention on Civil Liabiliîy for Dumuge
Resultingfiorn Activities Dangerou [O the Emironment.762 The aim of this Convention
is to provide compensation for environmental h m caused by dangerous activities?J
'Dangerous activities' are defmed as:
mean[ingJ one or more of the following activities provided that it is
performed professionally, including activities conducted by public
authonties:
(a) the production, handling, storage, use or discharge of one or more
dangerous substances764 or any operation of a sirnilar nature dealing with
such substances;765
Furthemore, with the defuiition of 'environment' being broad,766 and an 'operator' defmed

as "the person who exercises the control of a dangerous activityn,767the strict liability
imposed by the Convention encompasses severai economic activities.
Compensation. supra note 755 at prearnble, articles 2, 10.
761~und/or
762~onvention
on Civü Liabitityfor Domage Resuiting Frorn Activities Dongerour to the Environment. 2 1
June 1993, ETS No. 150, cited to (visited 6 August 1998)
< h t t p : / / w w w . t u f l s . e d u / f l e t c h e r / m u l t i / t[hereinafter
e~
Dangerous Activities

Convention].
at 1, article 1.
7"4~hetenn 'dangerous substance is defmed as:

763lbid

(a) substances or preparations which have properties which constitute a significant risk
for man, the environment or property. A substance or preparation which is explosive,
oxidizing, extremely flammabIe, highly flammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive.
irritant, sensitizing, carcinogenic, mutagenic, toxic for reproduction or dangerous to the
environment within the meaning of Annex 1, Part A to this Convention shall in any event
be deerned to constitute such a M c ;
See Ibid. at 2, article 2(2).
7651bidat 2, article 2(1).
766nieterm 'environment' is defined as including:
- natural resourccs both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and
the interaction between the sarne factors;
property which forrns part of the cultural heritage; and

-

The operator...shall be liable for the damage caused by the activity as a
result of incidents at the t h e or during the period when he was exercising
the control of the activity.768
While the Convention does provide limited exempti0ns~69it still places a heavy onus
upon industry to avoid environmental ham. Parties are to ensure that operators take part
in a hancial security scheme, or have a financial guarantee, to cover their liability770

These three examples highlight the creativity of international law in assigning
responsibility for environmentai damage. It is not unreasonable to assume that part of the
rationale for the development of these instruments was the perceived magnitude of the
environmental h m to be prevented, or at least mitigated. In the case of both nuclear
accidents and oil spills the event is an extreme occurrence. In the case of the Dangeraüs
Activities Cornenfion,events such as the Union Carbide disaster at Bophal India,771 likely

contributed to its creation and design.

There is a need to address environmental harms which are more subtle to rnonitor and
detect, such as in the case of sorne POPs, where the cumulative effect of each emission or
discharge, results in severe environmental damage. In such a situation legal causation is
difficult, if not impossible to establish, and victims may be left without any legal

-

the characteristic aspects of the landscape.
See Ibid at 3, article 2(10).
767~bidat 3, article 2(5).
768~bidat 5, article 6( 1).
769~bidat 6, article 8.
770~bidat 6, article 12.
7710n December 3, 1884, a leak of methyl iscyanate fiom a Union Carbide plant blanketed the city of
Bhopal, India, killing thousands and resdting-in on going deaths for the hundreds of thousands exVpsed to
the chemical. See Pesticide Action Network North America, Thirteenth Anniversary of Bhopal Dikater (5
December 1997) (visited 10 August 1998) <http://rtk.net/E 19365TS98>; L. Landskroner, Corporate
IrresponsibiIity in the .4ftermarh of BhopaI ( 1 996) (visited 10 August 1 998)
<http~l~~~.landskroner.com/cori~~~htm>;
and, G. Cohen, Bhopal and the New World Order ( 1994)
(visited 1 0 August 1 998) <http:/l&net/E8734T66O>.
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recourse. It is possible that the imposition of liability may provide a solution for this
situation as well.

Liability shouid be assigned to manufachuers of substances caught under the PIC and
POPs Conventions, including those chexnicals which have been designated as banned or
severely restncted substances. Such a regime could provide victim compensation
through the use of a fund similar to those previously mentioned. This sort of legal
development could also result in a greater adherence to the precautionary principle by

industry,in their efforts to limit their future liability.

6.0 Conclusions

This thesis has endeavoured to explore the tensions inherent in the negotiation and
implementation of chemical management MEAs. This analysis cornmenced with the
recognition that risk assessrnent is no longer a preferred means of ensuring environmental
protection and suggested that precaution and an over-ride of private interests might be
more effective. The thesis then examined globalisation as a derivative of the inherent
charactenstics of MNCs and demonstrated that globalisation is inextricably tied to MNC
productivity. By then examining a case study of the chemical industry, the ties between
profit and production, and the environmental ramifications of corporate decision-making
became clearer. For the chemical industry the nexus between environmental harm and
profit may be more obvious than that observed for other industry sectors, because of the
very nature of the products in which they specialise. It is doubtful that many of their
products are capable of being characterised as environmentally benign.

The use of international instruments for the liberalisation of trade and FDI were then
addressed so that the relationship between the agents of globalisation (MNCs) and
liberalisation policies could be made explicit. The instruments used for the liberalisation
of trade demonstrate the precedence accorded to trade over environmental concems.
While this hierarchy between trade and environment has been established throughout the

fifly years of the operation of the GATT/WTO system, it is perplexing that with the
relatively recent identification of the seriousness of environmentai concerns, changes
within the GATTlWTO system have not been made to reflect this. An additional
hierarchical relationship between FDI and the environment was observed in the draft
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MAI provisions. The value accorded to the maximisation of wealth in the MAI is
obscene in relation to the lack of attention to environmental concems.

The fact that the international community has not recognised the need to address in an
international instrument the hierarchical relationship between environmental and
tradelFDI concems is a grotesque oversight. When considered in the context of the
magnitude of environmentai harms which now threaten global ecosystems it is at best a
glaring omission. By ailowing the validity of national legislation to be assessed in a
piecemeal fashion when it impedes trade or FDI interests, this gap -tes

states fiom

taking steps toward environmental protection when it may have an extratemtorial result.
This in tuni undermines the logic of environmental protection which is to protect
ecosystems, notwithstanding state borders. By insisting that the validity of national
legislation be predicated upon the existence of a MEA for each isolated and specific
incidence of environmental h m creates an impossible situation. To draft MEAs in a
timely environmental manner would therefore require a foresight of pending
environmental harms which is impossible to possess. It is therefore suggested that
environmental legislation should tnunp tradelFD1 concems when there is a pressing
environmental need which necessitates such a decision, even if a specific MEA is not in
existence. When an MEA is in existence it should be perceived as evidence of a
sufficient international intention to protect the environment, and trade/FDI impacts
incidental to the enforcement of the MEA should be ignored or accepted.

The examination of the two emerging chernical management conventions assists in the
illustration of this point. While the PIC Convention will guide states in their decision-

making regarding trade in chernicals and pesticides, it does not take into consideration the
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realities of the marketplace.

The chernical industry which controls production,

marketing, technology, and information about these substances remains relatively
unchallenged. It might even be possible to suggest that industry is now better off.
Corporations can now wait until national legislation is implemented thereby giving effect
to the convention, and have in the interim k e n fieed of any moral imperatives found in
the International Code. In the context of the liberalisation policies previously discussed,
the PIC convention has been drafted so as to not place any constraints upon the current

system of trade thmugh the careful negotiation of its articles. It therefore does not
challenge the status quo.

The subject matter of the POPs Convention, which is the environmental consequences
caused by the continuing emission, discharge and use of POPs, requires a change in
policy making. In this case it is not enough to continue in the traditional trade/FDI and
environment hierarchical relationship, for if this Convention is to have an impact it must
be drafted to take precedence. This is a situation in which public environmental interests

must be accorded greater importance than private interests. One suggestion was for the
imposition of liability on industry because it would assist in assigning responsibility for
environmental damage, and therefore help to gain industry's cooperation. However, a
more effective rneans would be an express provision within the Convention which clearly
States that trade and FDI interests are to be interpreted as secondary to its environmental
objectives.

The PIC and POPs Conventions M e r illustrate the fbtility of continuing to draft MEAs
which fail to recognise the precautionary approach to environmentai protection. The
nature of environmental harms in the late twentieth century require preventative means of

action and this, coupled with the recognition that science and technology can support
such a policy orientation, leaves linle excuse for its non-implementation. Many of the
expressed inadequacies with these two Conventions can be readily addressed if a
precautionary approach was adopted. The acceptance of this approach would relieve
developing States fkom some of the financial and technological burdens of risk analysis
and instead shift these burdens to industry. It aiso allows for the inclusion of alternative
visions of environmentai policy by encouraging the recognition of socio-econornic
conditions. This is achieved through the incorporation of state-specific and indigenou
knowledge systems into decision-making. Furthemore, a precautionary approach
recognises the finiteness of the environment and the need to include environmental
frailties into economic decision-making. If the magnitude of harm generated by POPs is
worthy of a MEA which is predicated upon risk analysis, negotiators should consider
how much they wish to garnble on the extent of unknown harms being constrained by
such an instrument.

To conclude, the hture utility of MEAs depends upon the ability of negotiators, having
taken into consideration al1 of their contextual tensions, to reach a suitable balancing of
public and private interests. This may require re-negotiating the Final Act7'* and
developing a side-agreement on the protection of the environment or drafting MEAs with
clauses which announce their supremacy over trade and FDI interests. What is certain is
that the status quo is not an adequate basis upon which effective environmental
protection c m be undertaken. MEAs must no longer be designed to advance trade and

FDI interests but rather should be effectively designed to advance environmental ones.
The seriousness of the environmental harrns with which the world is now concerned
772~inal
Act, supra note 170.

IS2
requires change from a risk to a precautionary based system of decision-making. It is

time to invert the trade/FDI and enWonmentai hierarchy by factoring in precaution and
to embrace the thought "Whata Wondemil World".m

7 7 3 ~ . Armstrong,
~.
"What a Wondefil

World", song.
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